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Abstract 
Following the secularization of the world in modernity, art's 
concomitant fate was the separation of form and content, which 
has founded art on a split that has entailed the inheritance of an 
abyss of incommunicability. Secularization, however, has not 
liberated art from the model of representation, which has now 
assumed the form of the identification of a self-referential 
beauty. Moreover, the modernist doctrine of autonomy has 
deprived art of the possibility of infusing the vital powers of 
being and society, subsuming it to the demands of the 
institution and the art market. Nevertheless, twentieth-century 
art is driven by the will to overcome the schism (form/content, 
art/society), to touch the viewer, and to become an experience 
rather than merely an object of vision. 
Responding to this problem, this thesis explores the 
notion of rhythm, drawn from Bergson's concept of la duree and 
Deleuze's rethinking of immanence as difference and repetition. 
Rhythm, which grants the communicability of the work of art, 
emphasizes that art can only live in the experience; to conceive 
it solely in-itself as modernism has done unavoidably leads to 
its reification. Rhythm considers art in terms of intensity of the 
work and of the encounter, rather than in identifying art's 
spatial qualities. It tests the work of art and the encounter, but 
immanently in the life generated for the body. For this latter is 
also a rhythm, that is an affective surface which creates itself 
and reflects the world. Art then lives in the body but it also 
infuses life to the body. 
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Aspects of the work of a film-maker (Theo 
Angelopoulos) and a video-artist (Bill Viola) are also elaborated, 
in order to show how their singular implementation of time in 
images takes them beyond their representational content and 
opens them to rhythm as an affective, embodied experience. 
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Introduction 
I. The context: experience and modernity 
The modern era has been founded on the recognition of 
an absolute separation between immanence and transcendence, 
which has subsequently structured the world and experience on 
a split. Although it is not entirely correct to say that the 
Enlightenment introduced the schism to a previous wholeness 
of life, we can nevertheless validly claim that the Enlightenment 
firmly established this division in consciousness by 
institutionalizing it. Accordingly, as Simmel notes, earlier 
intimations of the rift were significantly found in at least two 
historical instances: first, during the Classical era, when Plato's 
doctrine of Ideas conceived the world of truth and eternal Ideas 
as a 'beyond' the empirical world of things, which is only the 
imitation or copy of the original world. Such an intimation of 
the rift was expressed again with the rise of Christianity, which 
condemned the flesh as the origin of sinful desires and exalted 
instead the aspiration for the attainment of a state of purity for 
the soul. However, "being a religion, it offered reconciliation 
with the same hand that had created the rift. It was only after 
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having lost its unconditional power over the soul, only after its 
solution to the problem had become questionable at the 
beginning of the modern period, that the issue could emerge in 
its full extent". ' It was only after the Renaissance that the 
recognition of the fundamental dualism became dominant and 
reorganized the world and experience according to a polar 
structure. 
The complete separation of the metaphysical from the 
physical was expressed in modern philosophy and science, and 
this had a most significant consequence: not so much the 
'disenchantment' of the world but the recognition that the 
world had no end, finality or redemption; there was no 
transcendent point from which the world would be illuminated 
and existence ascribed a meaning. As we will see in the course 
of this thesis, the Baroque expresses vividly how, emptied from 
(transcendent) meaning, the world collapses into an image of 
inert matter. 
To be sure, it is not that before the schism the world had 
a self-evident meaning, but by being a whole, and participating 
in both the physical and the metaphysical simultaneously, 
nature - the animate and the inanimate - communicated in the 
single life of creation. Before the split the world had no meaning 
simply because it did not need one; it was, and existence did not 
need justification because it was the expression of God's 
creative will. However, the need for meaning emerges once it is 
recognized as lost. 
The shift that has taken place in the modem view of the 
world was practically expressed in the structure of experience. 
As Benjamin has pointed out for us, nothing renders more 
I Georg Simmel, "Kant and Goethe: On the History of the Modern 
Weltanschauung", in Theory, Culture and Society, forthcoming. 
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evident the different status of experience in pre-modern 
communities and modern societies, than the story and the novel 
as their respective modes of communicating experience. The 
story is embedded in the life of the storyteller so that it can be 
passed on as experience, continuously molded in the flow; "the 
experience that is passed and the experience that the storyteller 
has, i. e. the way in which he experiences, are inseparable" .2 This 
fusion does not testify to the actuality of what is narrated but 
rather to its plenitude. As opposed to information - which ties 
itself to the surfacing instant only to be discarded at the 
following one - the story is anchored in the long past of the 
community. Its origins become lost in space and time, but such 
dispersion adds to its authority, not simply because of an 
abstract, long past but rather because of the repeated deaths it 
has survived and carries all along. Benjamin wrote that "not 
only a man's knowledge or wisdom, but above all his real life 
[... ] first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his 
death" 
.3 Death punctuates the story ,4 embedding it more firmly 
into what Benjamin calls a 'natural history', and endowing it 
with an aura, as if it had momentarily glimpsed another world 
and come back. Death opens up the story to its continuation in 
life and disperses the dead within the living. Finally, the story is 
not narrated merely for pleasure or for the pleasure of telling it; 
the thread of the past that it carries does not have a historical 
interest but a practical interest: embedded as it is in the life of 
the community it always contains a kernel of wisdom. 
As opposed to the story, which is grounded in the 
community, the novel is the "form of the transcendent 
2 Scott Lash, Another Modernity, A Different Rationality (London: Blackwell, 
1999) p. 314. 
3 Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller" in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Press, 1992) p. 93. 
4 Scott Lash, supra, p. 316. 
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homelessness of the idea" and that is why "it includes real time 
- Bergson's duree - among its constitutive principles" .5 Once the 
idea has fallen from its transcendent home, time also falls from 
eternity and assumes the form of "a sluggish, yet constant 
progress". The man whose life has been deprived of an afterlife, 
is deprived of continuity both temporal (I continue something 
from the past and I'll be continued by something in the future) and 
spatial (communal) ties. As opposed to continuity as wholeness 
of experience (Erfahrung), which is true of the story, the 
continuity that Lukacs describes is that of fragmentation, the 
succession of instants (Erlebnis). When meaning ceases to be 
immanent in life, it gives rise to a concept of time as an abstract 
form, distinct from the events that materialize it. But the 
problem with such a conception is not merely that it'spatializes' 
time in the Bergsonian expression, but mainly that events are no 
longer embedded in a whole, but individualized, contingent 
and only externally connected; they become meaningless and 
cannot be incorporated in present experience. The novel strives 
to come to terms with such a condition by creating meaning 
subjectively and reflexively. Death in the novel comes as a 
closure as it frames an individual life, but it also appears to give 
meaningful form to an otherwise scattered life, retrospectively in 
the epic form of a redemptive memory. 6 
Emptied from its immanent value, the living event 
becomes identified with mere fact. This identification is not 
natural and fact is not neutral or value-free. Rather it marks the 
imposition of a rational meaning (rather than spiritual or 
5 Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the 
Forms of Great Epic Literature, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 
1978) p. 121. Although Lukacs' use of the Bergsonian term of la duree is rather 
unsuccessful here, this neither changes the meaning nor delimits the 
significance of his point. 
6 Ibid., p. 124. 
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metaphysical) upon events. Although modernity turns 
instrumental rationality into its own mythology,? the aim of this 
thesis is not to argue against this assumption in favor of the 
irrational and its disruptive force in experience. Instrumental 
rationality presupposes a Newtonian universe of an abstract 
space and time, but it also takes this conception further: having 
abstracted the event from the spatio-temporal whole and 
therefore stripping it of its immanent meaning in the whole of 
life, it is able to impose an external meaning according to the 
criteria of utility. Although utility is significantly implicated in 
life, life's interest is much broader than utility. But for 
instrumental rationality life bears no immanent reasons. It is an 
empty biological substratum upon which we structure and 
organize our activity. This is how Erlebnis gradually substitutes 
Erfarhung, thus marking the increasing rationalization of 
experience and its reduction to knowledge. 
But it is also the structure of experience that follows this 
tendency. Practically, the status of experience in a given socio- 
historical context cannot be diagnosed in-itself but, as Benjamin 
has shown, it is reflected in the modes of communication: "[t]he 
replacement of the older narration by information, of 
information by sensation, reflects the increasing atrophy of 
experience" .8 The modes and technologies of communication 
This is one of the central arguments of Adorno's and Horkeimer's 
Enlightenment project. Thus they write: "Man imagines himself free from 
fear when there is no longer anything unknown. That determines the course 
of demythologization, of enlightenment, which compounds the animate with 
the inanimate just as myth compounds the inanimate with the animate. 
Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical. The pure immanence of 
positivism, its ultimate product, is no more a so to speak universal taboo. 
Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is 
the very source of fear" in Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London, New York: Verso, 
1999) p. 16. 
8 Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire", in Illuminations, supra, 
p. 155. 
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are the virtual mirrors or reflexive surfaces of the mode and 
value experience assumes. Benjamin with his consideration of 
the story and the novel (but also of Baudelaire's lyric poetry, 
and photography) has opened the field for us to consider art as 
a mode of communication, which implicates aesthetic 
experience within experience. 
II. The problem: aesthetic experience 
The exclusion of the absolute from the immanence of 
experience also had a major impact on art; it redefined its 
function and its distinct field which gave rise to aesthetics. The 
secularization of art has inherited the split as the separation of 
form and content and has opened up an abyss of 
incommunicability. Moreover, the modernist conception of 
autonomous art that is free from material constraints (such as 
economic, moral or political concerns) did not emancipate art 
but on the contrary, disempowered it and rendered it all the 
more dependent on the art market. 
The paradox of art in modernity consists in that although 
art has freed itself from external references and the need to refer 
to something other than itself, nevertheless, it has not 
emancipated itself from the model of representation. The idea of 
representation has haunted western art since the Classical era 
and has its origins in Plato's doctrine of mimesis: Plato 
considered art as the copy of reality, which was in turn the copy 
of the only original and external world of Ideas. Since then, the 
doctrine of mimesis has been recurring in various guises and 
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sophisticated accounts. Thus the modernist account of self- 
referentiality, according to which art refers to and questions 
itself, assumes the existence of a formal artistic essence which 
determines the particular work of art. The separation of form 
and content establishes their (impossible) relation in terms of 
activity/ passivity and results to the reification of the work of art 
and the spatialization of beauty. 
Art's identification with 'pure' beauty renders it pictorial; 
it makes art an object of vision and perception, but no longer a 
living experience. Art becomes disembodied, that is, it loses its 
amplitude, expansiveness and vitality in favor of the specialized 
perception or of a distinguished visual sensitivity, which can 
specify the point of perfection. In this evolution aesthetic 
experience loses its body, together with its struggle, its passion 
and its falsity, in order to become sight, more specialized, more 
perfect and more ... object 
9 Criticizing the isolation of art in the 
sphere of the aesthetic and the indifference of beauty in its 
bourgeois conception, Surrealism posed the idea of beauty as 
intensity, expressed in Breton's phrase "beauty will be 
CONVULSIVE or will not be at all". 10 and evoked the necessity 
that it be an (immaterial) event of the body. 
Art in the twentieth century is marked by the will to 
overcome its reification and to become something that matters. 
Art strives to become life, and even though that has always been 
9 The question of vision, not merely as a 'natural' but as a culturally 
implicated sense perception, that structures a relation to the world and is also 
structured by it, has been extensively elaborated in cultural theory. 
Nevertheless, the critique to the scopic regime had permeated the whole 
twentieth century in both art and philosophy. See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: 
The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993). For a discussion of 
the entanglement of vision and visuality, as the distinct historical 
manifestation of visual experience in its possible modes, see Hal Foster (ed. ), 
Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988). 
10 Andr6 Breton, Nadja, trans. Richard Howard (London: Penguin Books, 
1999) p. 160. 
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its aspiration, maybe now it has more reasons and chooses more 
complex ways to attain this. Thus, very often art is driven by an 
inclination to touch the viewer - her body. There is a quite 
powerful tendency to physicality expressed in various ways: 
from expressionism to the incorporation of technology in art 
and the reproduction of time in the image, and from the 
installation to performance art, just to mention some few and 
obvious examples. Similarly, the reception of art has shifted 
from contemplation and distance to different models such as 
distraction, interaction, shock etc. In all these expressions art 
seeks to become life, to exceed the walls of the museum and 
regain its vital powers. However, is it enough for art to actually 
touch the body in order to fulfill its role as a promise of 
happiness? 
The aim of this thesis is to grant art life, not in-itself but 
in the singularity of the experience and moreover to indexically 
weave this experience in the body. More specifically, although 
the work of art is in-itself, it can only live in the experience, and 
it lives in the body; it cannot live within the body as a container 
of the innermost substantial self but enveloped in the body as a 
whole, as ungraspable becoming. Art can only touch the viewer 
not simply through perception but rather through affect. Affect - 
which is neither sensation nor affection - forces us to, rethink 
and reinvent the reality of the body. In our account, affect is the 
rhythm of the body. This means that the body is not given as 
capacities, properties and qualities, but it is a constant 
becoming, a singular mode of creating the pathways through 
which it feels, apprehends, and lives the world. Affect as 
rhythm is no more within the body than on the surface, or 
rather it is endlessly repeated at all modalities of being as an in- 
between, at the encounter. 
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With the notion of rhythm we distance ourselves from 
'touch', the evocation of tactility and the haptic eye. A most 
famous and influential account of this is Merleau-Ponty's essay 
on Cezanne's painting 11 However, such an account remains 
implicitly entrapped in the idea of art as mimesis, for it cannot 
avoid assuming that the image of the rotten apples in front of 
my eyes reflects itself in a transcendental consciousness, which 
redistributes it in the sensory modalities. This approach remains 
on one hand an empirical description, which in order to grant 
the communicability of the senses with each other and within a 
whole (or equally the communicability of the painting and my 
body) needs a prior ground of consciousness, even if 
consciousness becomes now the flesh. On the contrary, the 
notion of rhythm that we will try to elaborate, following 
Bergson and Deleuze, attempts to implicate the transcendental 
within the immanence of experience; to envelop consciousness 
within the body itself, in the same way that suspension is 
enveloped in the flow of rhythm. 
Moreover, the consideration of art and aesthetic 
experience as rhythm also distinguishes itself from 
psychoanalytic accounts of art. These latter by referring the 
experience of art to a disruptive unconscious (i) cannot escape 
the model of representation but they only render it unconscious, 
and (ii) they fail to consider how aesthetic experience takes us 
beyond the subject, exemplified in the gaze, to the event. Such a 
theoretical model has been particularly dominant in film 
studies; and despite its relevance to the paradigm of narrative 
Hollywood films, it nevertheless fails to consider how the film is 
11 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cezanne's Doubt", in Galen A. Johnson (ed. ), The 
Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, translation editor 
Michael B. Smith (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993) 
pp. 59-75. 
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not only structured on the basis of a narrative content but much 
more on the level of images, of movement and time and how 
therefore, cinematic experience is irreducible to a model of 
perception/ comprehension and becomes an enveloping 
affective experience 12 
Consequently, in the unfolding of our theoretical 
argument we will interweave the consideration of the work of a 
film maker (Theo Angeolpoulos) and a video-artist (Bill Viola). 
Their work will constitute for us surfaces that will reflect, 
illuminate and test our idea of rhythm. More specifically, 
although these artists work with different media (cinema, 
video) they both create moving images and attribute a primary 
role in the implication of time in the image. Our discussion 
aspires to show how this implication of time assumes an 
expressive role and opens up the experience of film and video 
beyond the image as representation to a rhythm-image of 
intensity. 
Rhythm constantly repeats itself at all levels: on the level 
of the work of art, on that of our encounter with it, or on the 
level of the body. Art as rhythm is not so much the work of art, 
but the event of its experience - the body - in which alone it 
lives. Through the implication of time, cinematic and video 
technologies envelop the viewer and structure experience as 
event rather than as a subject and an object. Nevertheless, 
rhythm does not appear as such anywhere, since it cannot be 
12 Especially film studies have been dominated by a psychoanalytic model of 
interpretation, which fragments the experience in active gaze, passive object 
of desire. Probably the most influential account has been provided by Laura 
Mulvey's, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", in R. Stam and T. Miller 
(eds. ), Film and Theory: An Anthology (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 
2000). As the title already indicates, her analysis only envisages film in terms 
of its narrative content. Currently, she has revised the psychoanalytic model 
through a consideration of time in film. See Laura Mulvey, "Passing time: 
reflections on cinema from a new technological age", in Screen, Vol. 45, no 2, 
summer 2004, pp. 142-155. 
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objectified as a property or quality of the image or of 
technology; it always remains implicated as a mode of 
enveloping the caesura. 
III. The exposition 
In the first chapter we will present the problem in terms 
of the secularization of experience and aesthetic experience. 
More specifically, we will begin our discussion by presenting 
Benjamin's critique of the Kantian concept of experience. For 
Benjamin the new concept (i) would account for an immanent 
absolute manifesting itself indirectly, in distorted or even 
violent ways and therefore (ii) it would also enfold both the 
subject and object of experience. Such a concept of experience 
would also correspond to the creation of a higher form of 
knowledge. We will then elaborate these philosophical points in 
the concrete terms of experience. Following Benjamin's reading 
of the German tragic drama, we will look at how the recognition 
of immanence did not simply alter the metaphysical 
presuppositions, but actually led to the reorganization of 
experience, and redefined the field of art. The Trauerspiel comes 
to appear as the origin of art's secularization and then also 
opens to new possibilities for overcoming it. Finally, we will 
turn to Henri Bergson and we will try to present some of the 
main aspects of his philosophy of time. Bergson first 
distinguished between intensive and extensive states in order to 
establish an irreducible difference in kind between the two. 
Taking this difference in the field of experience he dissociated - 
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in principle - the role of the body from memory in order to re- 
associate them anew in the affirmation of a single reality of 
duration. In this conceptualization, Bergson opened for us an 
entirely new point of view for the concept of experience. 
In the second chapter we will suspend our theoretical 
discussion in order to explore how the Bergsonian ideas about 
temporality, duration, movement reflect themselves in cinema's 
moving-images, and particularly in the work of Theo 
Angelopoulos. Although Bergson himself, witnessing the 
technological evolution of early cinema envisaged it as a 
paradigmatic instance of what he called 'the spatialization of 
time', we will attempt to show that it is again with the same 
technology that new possibilities for the singular experience of 
time become available. More specifically, we will focus our 
discussion on the ways in which time is implicated in the image, 
through the alternation of camera movement and stasis, 
different types of shot and editing, but also colours or music or 
silences. We aspire to show that far from being the 
representation of a narrative content and the perception of 
spatial qualities, the film becomes a dynamic organization of a 
whole, which is implicating the viewer in an enveloping 
rhythm. 
In the subsequent chapter we will return to the 
theoretical elaboration of our argument and we will attempt to 
create a notion of rhythm as the interstices of time and matter. 
However, rhythm is not outside of time and matter, but rather it 
envelops both and grants communicability. We will begin our 
discussion by presenting Giorgio Agamben's account of the fate 
of art in modernity, according to which art's secularization 
founds art on a split and entraps it in circular structure where 
self-referentiality becomes self-annihilation. Agamben evokes 
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rhythm as the original structure of the work of art but, by 
distinguishing between an ordinary and an original order of 
time, he cannot avoid assuming an ontological difference 
between the two. Thus we will turn to Deleuze's account of 
Difference and Repetition in order to develop the notion of 
rhythm as immanent becoming, where difference is in-itself and 
becomes affirmed in repetition (for-itself). The implication of 
difference in repetition as affirmation gains its consistency not in 
the identity of the whole but in a crack; synthesis is a disjunctive 
synthesis. This is the caesura of time and the suspension of 
rhythm. By being an intensity rather than temporality it cannot 
be lived as such (as object) and at the same time it can only be 
lived (as rhythm) in the difference it produces; it is itself the 
condition of transformation. We will conclude the chapter by 
arguing that rhythm is the mode of existence of the work of art; 
that is, the work of art is in-itself but it is also bound to the 
viewer who repeats it. It is repetition, or the event of the 
encounter as an opening to the viewer, which wills the work of 
art and allows it to become. 
The fourth chapter will mark a pause in our theoretical 
analysis and will unfold aspects of the work of Bill Viola. 
Further aspects of time in the image will be presented and 
discussed. Although video also reproduces moving images, its 
technology differs significantly from cinematic technology in 
the way time is incorporated. Video materializes time in the 
electronic signal and therefore creates a different temporal 
paradigm to film. Even though Viola's work also favours 
slowness as a temporal quality of the image, it achieves a quite 
different experiential effect. His video pieces invent various 
ways - ambiguous as well as ambivalent - in order to render 
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time 'touch' the body, and at the same time, they make the body 
the site of art's contestation. 
Finally, in the last chapter we will attempt to create the 
body as a rhythm, prior to sensations, perceptions, capacities 
and actions. In our view, the body does not simply interact with 
the world but it is constantly becoming with the world, in 
implicating the world. It is an affect, a reflective and enveloping 
surface which by giving time, deepens its affection and renders 
more complex its response; it differentiates itself by inventing 
itself in a poly-rhythm. We will sustain our argument by 
presenting the neurobiological account of the body and the 
process of perception. According to Gerald Edelman and Jean- 
Pierre Changeux's evolutionary models, whether at the level of 
morphology or at the level of its actions (i. e. perception), the 
body is not given as something determined in advance. It is 
unveiled rather as a variability which becomes determined in 
experience (action) by selection of neural circuits, which then 
become retrospectively strengthened. In this account, 
perceptual recognition is achieved by the body alone by 
selection rather than by identification with a prior model 
provided by a transcendental consciousness. By creating the 
amplitude of perception, that is the process, the body opens 
itself to the world and is taken by it in order to recover and 
implicate the world in its own becoming. 
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Chapter 1 
Secularization and art: reconfiguring aesthetic 
experience 
I. Introduction 
The Enlightenment's recognition of reason as the 
foundation of valid knowledge has brought about significant 
changes in the field of knowledge and experience. Not only has 
it opened the way for the advancement of science and rational 
thought but it has also restructured the concept of 'experience'. 
This is because such recognition reflects the radically different 
metaphysical presuppositions that found modernity compared 
with those of pre-modern societies. Furthermore this 
reorganization also came to be considered as a crisis in 
experience. 
In this chapter, we shall explore how the new 
metaphysical framework has affected experience. More 
specifically, we will trace the problems that emerged for 
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aesthetic experience, through Walter Benjamin's reading of 
Trauerspiel, together with the possibility of a new 
reconfiguration of experience that Henri Bergson opened. As it 
will become apparent, the notion of time will become central to 
our account. We will begin our discussion by re-examining 
Benjamin's critique of the Kantian concept of experience. 
Benjamin's critique was twofold and addressed the exclusion of 
the absolute from experience and the separation of the subject 
and object of experience. Indeed Benjamin's position is that of 
an immanent absolute but which manifests itself only indirectly, 
and in tortuous forms. 
In the following section III, we will examine Benjamin's 
study of German tragic drama. The book is divided in two 
parts: "Trauerspiel and Tragedy" and "Symbol and Allegory". 
Our discussion will focus on the first in which Benjamin argues 
that the German tragic play is not simply a decadent version of 
Greek tragedy but that it is founded on radically different 
metaphysical presuppositions, which convey a distinctly 
different expression. Our analysis of Benjamin will show how 
the new framework is not external to baroque theatre but 
informs it from within; baroque sensibility is formed by the 
recognition of an immanent world beyond redemption and its 
struggle to come to terms with it; it coincides with art's 'fall 
from truth' which became the founding condition for modem 
art. Our discussion will also aim to reveal how some of the 
principal problems that haunt art in modernity (i. e reification 
and aestheticization) originated in the baroque and are 
implicated in a much broader shift that had taken place in the 
modern era. 
The exclusion of the absolute - the separation of the 
physical from the metaphysical - brought about the 
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secularization of the world and experience. Secularization 
subsumed the world to physical laws identified by science (as 
rational thought) but deprived it from being anything more 
than this mechanistic operation; similarly, it externalizes and 
reduces experience merely to the event lived. Bergson 
attempted to grant the immanence of the absolute in experience 
in the creative reality of time. Thus, he countered the 'spirit of 
rationalism' by insisting upon the difference in kind between 
states that are intensive (states of consciousness) and extensive 
(states of matter). But then, he significantly extended this idea; 
although it appears as if he repeated the mind/body dualism, in 
fact he had radically altered the terms. He acknowledged a 
single plane of images onto which he posed the distinction in 
terms of time and space, virtual and actual. In this 
reconceptualization, he opened up a view of the world as an 
immanent plane of virtual existence and of continuous self- 
creation. 
II. Prolegomena to a coming concept of experience: 
Benjamin reassesses Kant 
The question of 'experience' and its disintegration in 
modern societies of both early and high capitalism forms the 
core of Walter Benjamin's theoretical reflections. This question 
inspired his various writings ranging from language, to art and 
literature, to cities and architecture. As early as 1918, and in the 
essay On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy, he 
programmatically traces the lines of his philosophical 
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preoccupations, concentrating upon the extension and 
transformation of the Kantian concept of experience. This was 
the only explicit formulation and delineation of the main terrain 
of his effort to argue both with and against Kant. 
The concept of experience is intimately linked with 
knowledge, and the relation between the two concepts - that is, 
to what extent we recognize experience as valid knowledge - 
also measures the richness and limits of both notions. In his 
essay, rather than merely criticizing the Kantian system for an 
overwhelming rationalism, Benjamin acknowledged its distinct 
significance among contemporary philosophies, in that he 
discerned that what "mattered was not primarily the scope and 
depth of knowledge but first and foremost its justification" 
[SW1,100]. Kant did not substitute philosophical depth for 
scientific certainty, but rather he conceived of the demand for 
depth as the demand for justification. 13 However, Kantian 
epistemology, under the austerity of the a priori, managed to 
account for the certainty of an a-temporal knowledge, if only by 
sacrificing "the question of the integrity of an experience that is 
ephemeral" and therefore, "singularly temporal" [SM, 101]. 
This quest for certainty becomes especially articulate in 
The Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics in which Kant 
establishes the principle of experience as being borrowed from 
the natural sciences, though he recognized that experience in- 
itself could not coincide with the objecthood of the scientific 
realm. The result of, or rather the prerequisite for, such an 
13 This is one of Kant's most innovative moves in the history of philosophy 
and it can be found in the Kantian distinction between quid facti? and quid 
iuris? If contemplation, reflection etc. are more than just opinions about 
thought at a particular time, then the image of thought retains only what 
thought can claim by right, and not by mere fact. Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
A83/B116; see also Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's support of such a 
distinction in WP, 37-38. 
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identification was a view of experience or of 'a world' that was 
"of the lowest order", "an experience virtually reduced to a 
nadir, to a minimum of significance. " As Benjamin argues: 
"[i]ndeed, one can say that the very greatness of his work, his 
unique radicalism, presupposed an experience which had 
almost no intrinsic value and which could have attained its (we 
may say) sad significance only through its certainty" [SM, 1011. 
The reduction of experience's significance is expressed by two 
complementary movements: the first consists in its 
identification with cognitive experience, while the second, in the 
inevitable stripping from internal criteria of value and the 
subordination of experience to knowledge. 
The first point stresses the increasing rationalization of 
experience. By founding itself on the belief that the standard of 
true knowledge is empirically measurable knowledge, the 
victory of rationalism has simultaneously resulted in the 
banishment from the scope of acceptable theoretical discourse of 
the ultimate questions of human existence - those concerning 
the true meaning of life, man's station vis-a-vis the absolute. 
Such questions were traditionally the province of the now 
discredited field of metaphysics. 14 
Accordingly, the spirit of rationalism dismissed as 
irrational magical practices, religious prejudices, rituals, 
hallucinations and all which cannot be empirically proven and 
verified. But much more than that, what could not be 
14 Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin, An Aesthetic of Redemption (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982) p. 32. However, it was only a certain strand 
of neo-Kantian rationalism - which Benjamin was well acquainted of as a 
student of Heinrich Rickert and a reader of Hermann Cohen - responsible 
for excluding from its horizon the whole field of metaphysics and 
establishing its dominance upon this act of repression. Benjamin's (and our) 
revision of the Kantian notion of experience is addressed more against a neo- 
Kantian rationalist reading than initially engaging with the potential of 
Kant's own philosophy. 
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scientifically (ap)proved was also deprived of existence or 
reality. At best, these came to be considered as psychological 
aspects of an empirical consciousness, systematized into types 
of madness. Moreover, in the rise of rationalism, psychological 
explanations gained significant ground in order to account for 
'disruptions' of rational behavior and action. Even more than 
the natural sciences, it is psychology which stands at the 
antipodes of magic. 
However, what clearly separates psychology from magic 
is not so much the principles of operation, but rather the 
worldviews they respectively express and presuppose. Magical 
practices are only possible in a world which is not yet divided 
into subject and object, where man is intimately connected to 
the world. This has very little to do with the supposedly 
primitive belief in an animate world and much more with the 
coincidence of action and signification in the ritual. 15 Although 
magic and ritual are not possible in a state of absolute unity 
between man and the world, but only emerge in a created 
distance or gap between the two, nevertheless this was not yet 
an objectified world. On the contrary, not only does psychology 
presuppose a subject-consciousness and an object-world, but 
also establishes two realities, namely a subjective or inner, and 
an objective or outer. What was intensively fused in the ritual 
becomes now clearly separated and enclosed; the dissociated 
worlds have no means of communication, but external 
mediators. 
15 Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer's anthropological study in magic was that 
Frazer, entrapped in the mythology of humanity's heroic scientific progress, 
failed to see how the ritual was not science at its naive stage, and therefore 
not a mistaken conception, but something quite different altogether. For ritual 
practices do not stand like causes for the wished results but rather stand 
materially for the wish; see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's Golden 
Bough, ed. by Rush Rhees, trans. A. C. Miles, (Harleston, Norfolk: Brynmill, 
1979). 
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The Kantian organization of the parameters of all 
possible experience, as constituted by the faculties of intuition, 
understanding and reason established in the Critique of Pure 
Reason reflects this segmentation of experience. This 
fragmentation is not a result of Kant's analytic approach to 
experience through the doctrine of the faculties, for he 
acknowledged the de jure character of his distinctions. 
Nevertheless, Kant's most notorious problem lies in the 
complete dissociation of reason and the absolute from 
experience. Critical philosophy admits of the possibility of 
establishing a relationship between intuition and understanding 
following which the materials of sensibility intuited through 
space and time are subsumed under the categories of the 
understanding. It denies, however, legitimacy to any supposed 
direct relationship between intuition/ understanding and the 
ideas of reason, to which alone the absolute manifests itself. 
Benjamin's recasting of the Kantian concept of experience 
consists not only in questioning its structure but also its basic 
assumptions namely, that (a) there is a distinction between the 
subject and the object of experience, and (b) there can be no 
experience of the absolute. 16 These assumptions point towards 
the thesis that the whole Benjaminian project is inspired by the 
idea of an immanent absolute, which "manifests itself in 
spatiotemporal experience, but indirectly in complex, tortuous 
and even violent forms" 17 In this way, he attempts to enfold the 
absolute within experience but in an account capable of 
sustaining its discontinuity. 18 Benjamin's anti-Hegelianism - his 
16 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p. 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 H. Caygill argues that Benjamin's philosophy is an "anti-Hegelian but 
nevertheless speculative philosophy of history" in the sense that his project 
explores "the possibilities of a discontinuous experience of the absolute" 
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refusal to succumb to a developmental history of the spirit - 
does not only reject a linear conception of progress but mainly 
emphasizes, following Kant, the impossibility to grasp the 
infinite through an extension of the finite, or in other words, the 
impossibility of making the absolute an object of knowledge. 
This thesis was most evidently reflected in the clear distinction 
he drew between knowledge and truth, in the 'Epistemo- 
Critical Prologue' in The Origin of the German Tragic Drama. 
The consequences of such a thesis complicated further 
his position in that he aspired to affirm both the immanence of 
the absolute as the possibility of its being experienced, while 
simultaneously granting its non-empirical character. As such, it 
could not be the object of a psychological consciousness, but 
only related to a "pure transcendental consciousness", one 
which is "stripped of everything subjective". Moreover, 
Benjamin accepted the philosophical presupposition that "the 
structure of experience lies within the structure of knowledge 
and is to be developed from it", which means that although he 
had criticized the reduction of experience into cognitive 
experience, he envisaged the development of a new, higher 
concept of knowledge as capable of intimating and establishing 
a new concept of experience: 
The task of future epistemology is to find for knowledge the 
sphere of total neutrality in regard to the concepts of both subject 
and object; in other words, it is to discover the autonomous, 
innate sphere of knowledge in which this concept in no way 
continues to designate the relation between two metaphysical 
entities [SWI, 104]. 
which means that he "refuses the comprehension of the absolute through 
finite categories"; ibid, pp. 2-3. 
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The task does not really consist in extending our 
knowledge but in transforming it into a higher knowledge, 
which will not be established upon (and itself establishing) the 
subject/object division, but will envelop both in a field of 
differentiation. 19 The problem he faces is not how we can arrive 
to know the absolute, but how our knowledge can account for 
the absolute. Ultimately, his argument concerns the possibility 
of creating a concept of knowledge, which will not envisage the 
world merely as a bundle of finite objects, but rather as an 
organization of the finite which implicates the infinite. This is 
defined by his following formulation: 
Thus, the task of the coming philosophy can be conceived as 
the discovery or creation of that concept of knowledge which, 
by relating experience exclusively to the transcendental 
consciousness, makes not only mechanical but also religious 
experience logically possible. This should definitely be taken to 
mean not that knowledge makes God possible but that it 
19 Kant sounds similar to Benjamin when he writes: "[... ] it will be a concern 
of pure reason to guide its use when it wants to leave familiar objects (of 
experience) behind, extending itself beyond all the bounds of experience and 
finding no object of intuition at all, but merely space for intuition; for then it is 
no longer in a position to bring its judgments under a determinate maxim 
according to objective grounds of cognition, but solely to bring its judgments 
under a determinate maxim according to a subjective ground of differentiation 
in the determination of its own faculty of judgment. This subjective means still 
remaining is nothing other than reason's feeling of its own need 
[Bedürfnisses]. " Immanuel Kant, "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in 
Thinking? " in Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. 
Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) pp. 9-10; my emphasis. Deleuze and Guattari point out that "to 
orientate oneself in thought implies neither objective reference point nor 
moving object that experiences itself as a subject"; in WP, 37. The passage 
quoted shows that Kant is not merely the thinker of scientific knowledge's 
certainty, but is interested in a critical metaphysics that allows 'space for 
intuition' something that is unveiled in the 'subjective ground of 
differentiation', indeed termed a feeling [Gefühl]. Benjamin's own 
reassessment of the Kantian philosophy began with his effort to provide us 
with a richer account of such a feeling, that is, a richer account of the 
'Transcendental Aesthetic' in the Critique of Pure Reason, thus his 
preoccupation with experience. 
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definitely does make the experience and doctrine of him 
possible in the first place [SM, 105; my emphasis]. 
Benjamin here retains a critical metaphysics. He is still 
maintaining the tension between understanding and sensibility 
or form and matter, rather than simply collapsing the former 
into the latter, even if what will emerge by the transformation 
into a higher knowledge will decisively affect both concepts 2° 
This can be traced in the short essay The Doctrine of the Similar 
and its revised version On the Mimetic Faculty, where the 
dualism between a subject of experience and an object of it is 
greatly complicated through a notion of experience - going 
between the 'mystical' and the 'material' - which tries to 
incorporate and bring forth a notion of the transcendental that 
makes available immanent totality as something completely 
new: a contour, a rhythm or a warp in experience. 21 
Accordingly, the transcendental has to be conceived in terms of 
the complexity of appearance, and has to lie not in the depths or 
the heights, but on the surface under the novel 
20 Benjamin will entrust this form of knowledge not to science but to 
language. This is because science has to work with a limited concept of 
experience. His theory of language undergoes significant variations in the 
course of evolution of his philosophical and critical thought, ranging from a 
religious/ theological to a materialist conception. Nevertheless, what remains 
constant is his opposition to semiotic linguistic theories as well as to the 
instrumental view which regards language as a means for the expression of a 
content. Instead, for Benjamin, language became a transcendental surface 
(field) enveloping and communicating an immanent absolute. Benjamin s 
theory of language is developed mainly in three essays: Walter Benjamin, 
"On Language as Such and on the Language of Man" (1916) in One-Way 
Street and other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, 
(London, New York: Verso, 1979), pp. 107-123; "The Task of the Translator" 
(1923) in Illuminations, ed. and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, 
trans. by Harry Zohn, (Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 70-82; in the "Epistemo- 
Critical Prologue" in The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, trans. Osborne, 
(London: Verso, 1999), pp. 27-56; and in "On the Mimetic Faculty" in One- 
Way Street and Other Writings, supra, pp. 160-163. Nevertheless, one should 
point out that Benjamin's concept of experience is richer, and thus 
incorporated into his theory of language, and his critique of Kant is not just a 
linguistic meta-critique; see Caygill, supra, pp. xiv-xv, 13. 
21 Ibid., p. 7 
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reconceptualization of it as paradoxically being both bounded 
and infinite. Both of the above essays develop genealogies of 
perception as reading; thus, the transcendental conditions 
would refer here to the possibility of legibility of a surface, in 
other words, to the addressing of the question 'in virtue of what 
can something qualify to be read? ' 
Benjamin transforms Kant's transcendentalism in the 
way he conceives of it as an infinite configuration of surfaces; 
the transcendental becomes a fold in the surface of absolute 
configuration. Perception and experience as reading is not just 
coming from an active reader - as the subject of experience - 
who imposes a reading on the 'read' - as the object of 
experience. Neither is perception the mere receptivity of 
impressions. What is 'read' is always already constituted and 
makes a contribution to its being read by the reader. The thrust 
of the argument is therefore that the transcendental, that is, the 
conditions of possibility of reading itself, are themselves part of 
an infinite set of possible surfaces. 22 This infinite set of possible 
surfaces is not the mere consequence of an intended meaning 
imposed by the subject of experience, but is based on what 
Benjamin calls the discovery of a 'non-sensuous similarity' 
between different and infinite patterns of configuration. In both 
essays Benjamin uses the example of dance in order to highlight 
certain important features of such an experience [Erfahrung]: (a) 
in the experience of dance the most important point is that these 
patterns of configuration are temporal, and have metrical and 
rhythmical aspects, and (b) the dissolution of the distinction 
between subject and object (or the reader and the read) is itself a 
mode of configuration and not just a mediator. One does not 
22 Ibid., p. 4 
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just use dance as a means of perception and reading, but is 
dissolved into that experience. 
Benjamins aspiration was to develop a reflection on time 
and space in which totality is immanent to experience, but 
presented in oblique, distorted forms. Benjamin reassesses both 
Kant and neo-Kantianism in the way he makes an effort to show 
transcendentalism to be both concrete and a priori. Aesthetic 
experience is the topology of the Benjaminian project, and the 
locus of such an exploration would be retrospectively in his 
work on the German tragic drama. 
III. Trauerspiel: art configures its immanence 
Following our discussion, the problem of modernity is 
rooted in the (im)possibility of an immanent absolute in 
experience, and is represented in the subsumption of experience 
to the rules of knowledge or, what amounts to the same thing, 
the dissociation of a theory of knowledge from a theory of life. 
At the core of this reduction lies a significant distortion of the 
concept of time. Clearly, the problem is not merely a dispute 
among philosophers about the authentic meaning of a concept. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in the reality of modernity and in 
the ways it restructures experience primarily through a 
reorganization of lived temporalities. Henri Bergson, as we will 
see later on, was primarily preoccupied, from a philosophical 
perspective, with the elaboration of a new concept for the 
inventive reality of time, instantiated in the notion of la duree, 
Benjamin on the other hand, followed a different route which 
36 
led to the transformation of philosophy into cultural history, 
through the extension of his method of immanent critique. 
The idea of the possibility of an immanent critique 
emerges from Benjamin's reflections on the task of literary and 
art criticism. In the "Epistemo-Critical Prologue", "he is trying 
to determine and to instance, at precisely the same moment, the 
modes of intellection and argument proper to aesthetic- 
historical discourse"? 3 The possibility of criticism presupposes 
criteria and categories which become applied to and test their 
object. However, given the (by definition) singularity of the 
artistic-literary object how is it possible to apply pre-existent, 
generalizing criteria? Benjamin refuses the external application 
of given aesthetic categories, which would "measure" and 
objectify the work of art. Instead, criticism needs to invent the 
criteria which would be integral to each work. Benjamin 
acknowledged and embraced the circularity involved in such a 
stance as that characteristic bond of intimacy binding together 
interpretation and its object. 
Moreover, he redefined the tendency of all philosophical 
conceptualization and criticism vis-a-vis the work as such: "to 
establish the becoming of phenomena in their being" [0,47]. 
Knowledge proceeds to the universal directly and ignores the 
being of truth as embodied singularity; on the contrary, 
criticism of individual works of art aspires to allow for "the 
universal to unfold from within the boundaries of the particular 
itself - the work of art", while at the same time safeguarding its 
distance from its sensuous immediacy. 24 Benjamin's critical 
essays not only mediate between philosophy and art, but also 
extend art history into cultural history in order to embed the 
23 George Steiner, "Introduction" in 0,20. 
24 Richard Wolin, supra, p. 87. 
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work and illuminate its spatio-temporal context in order to 
transcend it. Thus, Howard Caygill argues that Benjamin 
dissolves the unity of the object 'art' by dispersing it spatially 
into the world which "contained and is contained in works of 
art", but also temporally in the past history which renders it 
possible and in the future interpretations which unceasingly 
renew it 25 Benjamin's idea of transcendence of the work of art 
becomes significantly different from the classical notion. Instead 
of safeguarding the absolute value of the work of art for 
eternity, Benjamin distributes it in the world and he therefore 
measures transcendence in dispersion. 
In this first part, a reading of Benjamin's work of literary 
criticism on the German tragic drama will be undertaken with a 
view to regarding it as a moment of immanent critique not of 
the individual artists and works but rather of experience and 
the aesthetic experience in particular, opening up to the 
question of their relation. Particular interest in this work lies not 
only in the imaginative conception and elaboration of its subject 
matter, but equally in that it is mostly here that Benjamin traces 
analytically the origins and problems of aesthetic experience in 
modernity. The intention here, however, is not to provide a 
complete analysis of Trauerspiel, but to illuminate those aspects 
that can be considered to be most expressive and relevant to the 
spatialization (or secularization) of aesthetic experience in 
modernity. 
Benjamin's study The Origin of German Tragic Drama 
constitutes an original reading of the German baroque play, 
whose reception and treatment by the art historical discourses 
of the time had only considered it a minor, rather unpopular 
25Howard Caygill, "Walter Benjamin's concept of cultural history", in The 
Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 91. 
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genre. His reading sets out to define the historic specificity of 
the Trauerspiel by showing the determinate differences from 
ancient Greek tragedy, of which it was commonly conceived as 
an unsuccessful imitator. Yet Benjamin does not merely base its 
specificity in its difference from tragedy, but also in revealing or 
creating its singular Idea, as 'the truth content' that the critic 
extracts from 'the material contents' of the work. 
From early on, and in the course of his study, Benjamin 
draws the line of demarcation between tragedy and Trauerspiel. 
Although it appears to be merely a difference in the content, it is 
in fact the expression of that difference, which will give the 
German drama a distinctly different orientation: 
[... ] the incidents listed are not so much the subject-matter as the 
artistic core of the Trauerspiel. Historical life, as it was conceived at 
that time, is its content, its true object. In this it is different from 
tragedy. For the object of the latter is not history, but myth, and the 
tragic stature of the dramatis personae does not derive from rank - 
the absolute monarchy - but from the pre-historic epoch of their 
existence - the past age of heroes [0,62]. 
The staging of historical life rather than myth indicates a 
society which is developing a secularized conception of the 
world. The Trauerspiel refers us to a world which is now 
realizing its Fall, that is, it is recognizing that rift between 
transcendence and immanence which divides the World, 
introducing a series of fundament dualisms within human 
beings, within their world or between them and the world. 
Compared to the tragedy of Greek antiquity, the German tragic 
drama inscribes itself within a very different metaphysical 
framework. This difference does not merely concern the shift in 
the conception of the 'beyond' but much more significantly it 
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urges a complete reorganization of the conception of this world. 
And as Benjamin shows, the distinctive baroque aesthetic 
emanates from and reflects precisely this struggle with the 
consequences of the Fall. 
The Trauerspiel26 is culturally and historically embedded 
in the early stages of the recognition of a secular world, which 
having changed the metaphysical framework, has also 
completely transformed the physical order. Yet, this is a 
moment when the new world was only beginning and striving 
to rearrange its new structure. It is because the fields are not yet 
demarcated and art is not sufficiently separated from life, from 
ethics and politics, that the shock of the Fall initially results in a 
great, even naive, assimilation of the theatrical to the historical. 
This happened to such an extent that at times "the agent of 
historical execution himself would have been called upon before 
all others for the writing of literature" [0,64]. 
The shock of the separation of the realm of immanence 
from that of transcendence in its vertiginous effects is mostly 
reflected on the idea of catastrophe, which haunts the baroque 
as opposed to the historical ideal of restoration. Benjamin will 
fuse the physical and metaphysical aspects of the Fall in a very 
precise and profound description: 
The religious man of the baroque era clings so tightly to the 
world because of the feeling that he is being driven along to a 
cataract with it. The baroque knows no eschatology; and for that 
very reason it possesses no mechanism by which all earthly 
26 Baroque theatre as a genre, to which the Trauerspiel also belongs, is a rich 
and complex theme. It is customary to delimit the baroque chronologically in 
terms of reference to the history of architecture; in theatrical terms then, the 
baroque age runs from the building of the Teatro Olimpico in Vicenza (1580- 
84) to that of the Teatro La Fenice in Venice (1790-92); see Margarete Baur- 
Heinhold, Baroque Theatre (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967) p. 7. 
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things are gathered in together and exalted before being 
consigned to their end [0,66]. 
A primary consequence of the exclusion of transcendence 
is a disoriented immanence. 27 It was eschatology, as the idea of 
redemption, that was sustaining the world and guaranteeing its 
coherence, and therefore when it was no longer possible it also 
removed the ground from the world. The first reaction of the 
Baroque man was to grasp onto a bare materiality. Because when 
things lose their meaning what remains is not just an empty 
world, but rather the world's overflowing materiality. One of 
the principal characteristics of the baroque is its extravagant 
theatricality. At the very beginning of baroque drama, 
Shakespeare in As You Like It, and Calderon in El Gran Teatro del 
Mundo, gave the clearest expression to a theme that others were 
to elaborate upon and that came to mark the baroque: 'All the 
world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players'; 
the fusion of life and theatre is achieved in multiple ways, 
adding to the meaning of this idea a variety of nuances. 
Tension in the baroque is evidenced in a rather 
idiosyncratic way; although it recognized existence wholly in its 
worldliness, it had not abandoned the desire for transcendence. 
But since it was deprived of its fulfillment in an afterworld, it 
had to seek a secular solution. As Benjamin describes it: 
p Margarete Baur-Heinhold makes a successful comparison between 
Renaissance and Baroque man in the following: "Renaissance man had stood 
firmly in the centre of his universe, confident of being the measure of all 
things in it. Baroque man stood at a frontier, with no such firm ground under 
his feet. He could include both the heavens and the underworld in his 
theatre and see his own figure in comparison with, and measured against, 
divine infinity. " Ibid., p. 7. However, if the baroque man can equally include 
in the same picture the earth, the heavens and the underworld this is because 
he has lost all measure for things; as opposed to the Renaissance, the image 
he is drawing is a disproportionate one. 
41 
[s]ince therefore neither rebellion nor submission was practicable 
in religious terms, all the energy of the age was concentrated on a 
complete revolution of the content of life, while orthodox 
ecclesiastical form were preserved. The only consequence could be 
that men were denied all real means of direct expression [0,79; 
emphasis mine]. 
It was this tension between an assumed immanence and 
the desire for an impossible transcendence which became 
resolved in 'theatricality', releasing a multiplicity of signifying 
consequences. Theatricality becomes the route of perversion, the 
detour introduced in the place of a direct attainment of the goal. 
The theatrical fulfillment of transcendence found its expression 
mainly in two ways. The first consisted in what Benjamin calls 
"the secularization of history in the setting"; just as the world 
had suddenly become meaningless and the human condition 
revealed in all its hopelessness, so historical events were 
conceived, "less as a manifestation of morality than as the 
natural aspect of the course of history, essential in its 
permanence" [0,88]. Having lost the grounding for meaning, 
which also rendered possible the dissociation of levels of the 
world, everything became inscribed into the same single and 
continuous surface. 
Consequently, the historical order becomes flattened 
upon the natural order and the mourning play turns to "natural 
history", that is in the endorsement of a de-historicized 
conception of history? 8 The loss of eternity which would 
ultimately redeem and allow justice for the transience of this 
world was supplanted by a fateless eternal return. In this view, 
28 For an elaborate analysis of Trauerspiel's regression to a de-historicized 
"natural history", countered by a new theory of natural history, which 
attempts "to recover an ethico-theological potential", see Beatrice Hanssen, 
Walter Benjamin's Other History: Of stones, animals, human beings, and angels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
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history ceases to be constituted by actions of historical agents 
and becomes instead the repeated suffering of the hopeless, 
exemplified in the martyr-drama. It was in an image of 
suffering and lament or indeed in a peculiar escapism to nature 
that the inner life of the Baroque man found mystical 
fulfillment. But, as Benjamin points out, "[t]he nature of the 
creation which absorbs history back into itself, is quite different 
from the nature of Rousseau" [0,91]. Thus, this is not a nature 
in a state of grace, but only its imitation; it is not eternity 
reflected in the movement of grace, but rather the timelessness of 
its frozen picture. For what the baroque image mostly lacks is 
movement, which instead becomes substituted for spatial 
simultaneity. Such a substitution is not to be understood in 
terms of an absent conception of the sequentiality of historical 
events, but rather as the sense of an emphatic and equally 
suffocating present, where everything is now. 29 
The first route for an indirect fulfillment of 
transcendence, the one which followed the path of "natural 
history" was expiated either to lament or escapism. There was 
also a second route of resolution, one mostly exemplified in the 
Spanish drama of Calderon, where Trauerspiel - as the 
intersection of mourning and play - attains its perfect form. It is 
not that Calderon brought lightness to the heavy atmosphere of 
the German drama; rather his 'playful' style is novel and 
expresses something profoundly and imperceptibly distinct 
from the 'cheerful'. For Benjamin, works of art "may be 
'cheerful' where life is 'serious', but they may take a playful 
form only when life too, in the face of an intense preoccupation with 
the absolute, has lost its absolute seriousness" [0,82; emphasis 
21 Namely, there is only the one dimension of presence and simultaneity. 
This will become clearer below, especially in our engagement with Bergson's 
concept of time. 
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mine]. He will identify Calderon's genius with that gesture 
which, through the techniques of "the enclosure by a 
framework" and "the playful miniaturization of reality", will 
give rise to reflection. The 'playful' can only be inscribed in a 
world where things cease to be for the first time, and are only 
repeated. In place of mere repetitions, the game is invented in 
order to repeat the first time. Paradoxically then, it might have 
less to do with the cheerful and more to do with the tragic! For 
it neither ignores nor denies the latter, but rather it constitutes a 
mode in which the tragic is affirmed and enveloped "by 
miniaturization". 
Furthermore it is from this tendency that the absolutely 
crucial figure of the 'intriguer' was invented by the Trauerspiel, 
and with him comedy was introduced in the 'mourning play'. 
Yet, the intriguer cannot be identified with a comic figure, for he 
precedes the latter and is most notably incarnated as the 
'demonic fool'. By being "the courtier whose intimacy with the 
tyrant or royal victim makes of him the key witness and also the 
weaver of murderous plots, "30 the intriguer, before comedy, is 
the figure of the 'ambiguous'. Ambiguity, however, does not 
merely refer to things which have lost their inherent meaning 
but rather to the demonic twist infused in an emptied matter. 
Benjamin writes about the intriguer that "[i]t is quite 
appropriate to the secularization of the passion-plays in the 
baroque drama that the official should take the place of the 
devil" [0,126]. The intriguer not only does he incarnate the 
disbelief of the baroque man, but there is also a profounder 
necessity which finds its expression in his figure. The intriguer 
can only appear in the flattened world of immanence, for when 
the dualism of heaven and earth is no longer possible due to the 
30 George Steiner: "Introduction", in supra, p. 18. 
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collapse of their grounding distance, the only option possible is 
a groundless ambiguity, and the intriguer is always the 
'rootless' 31 
If the 'playful' and the intriguer exemplify the demonic 
tendency of the baroque, lament will avow for its melancholy - 
gravity, or the centripetal force of the earth. More precisely, 
melancholy is not identical to lament if only for the reason that 
the former describes a spiritual disposition, while the latter its 
material explication. Lament cannot be conceived without tears 
being shed, but melancholy is marked only by a certain 
pensiveness. Benjamin will give us a most imaginative account 
of melancholy, tracing it through cosmic saturnine forces of 
attraction and repulsion and the physiology of the humours. Far 
from being a psychological condition or pathology, melancholy 
is revealed as an ontological tendency. In its figuration as acedia 
- or that final boredom of the spirit - it permeates the baroque in 
its profoundest and most original instances. 
Although the intimate relationship between acedia and 
creativity (that Benjamin clearly implies, but does not explain) is 
interesting but obscure, it would be too early to attempt an 
elaboration here. Instead, we will limit our analysis to the 
divergent path which explicates melancholy to the characteristic 
baroque lament. In Aristotle's Poetics, the telos of tragedy 
consisted in the catharsis, which would be accomplished 
through the experience and tension of grand emotions (Aristotle 
is very specific about the proper tragic emotions, which are only 
pity and fear) 32 In this conception, catharsis was not identical to 
31 See also H. Caygill, Walter Benjamin, supra, pp. 60-61 on the importance of 
the figure of the intriguer in 0. 
37Fhe Aristotelian definition of tragedy was stated as such: "A tragedy, then, 
is the imitation of an action that is serious, and also, as having magnitude, 
complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind 
brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a 
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the experienced emotions, although these latter served as its 
condition. Moreover, the emphasis was laid much more on the 
tension than on the emotions themselves. This agonal tension 
would culminate in the instance of tragic silence, which kept the 
struggle of the tragic hero unarticulated, inward and impossible 
to share. That is why tragedy is neither about the display of 
great emotions nor about the provocation of an emotional 
response, but something quite different altogether. Benjamin 
says: 
[t]ragedy is a preliminary stage of prophecy. It is a content, which 
exists only in language: what is tragic is the word and the silence 
of the past, in which the prophetic voice is being tried out, or 
suffering and death, when they are redeemed by this voice; but a 
fate in the pragmatic substance of its entanglements is never tragic. 
The Trauerspiel is conceivable as pantomime; the tragedy is not. For 
the struggle against the demonic character of the law is dependent 
on the word of the genius. The evaporation of the tragic under the 
scrutiny of psychology goes hand in hand with the equation of 
tragedy and Trauerspiel [0,1181. 
By characterizing the tragic as "a preliminary stage of 
prophecy" or by ascribing to its linguistic nature, Benjamin 
stresses that the tragic does not belong to the events themselves 
as one of their properties. What is tragic in the event only 
emerges when viewed, in the light of redemption. That is to say 
that the tragic is neither a fact nor its description. It emerges in 
retrospect and transforms the fact into an event, thus redeeming 
narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to 
accomplish its catharsis of such emotions"; Aristotle, Poetics in Richard 
McKeon (ed. ) The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library, 
2001) 1449b 24-28. The term catharsis is probably the most controversial in 
the work and Aristotle never defined it. Clearly, we do not intend to attempt 
an analysis of the Aristotelian notion but only to trace certain connections 
which illuminate Benjamin's position on tragedy and the Trauerspiel. 
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it. For Benjamin, the tragic only has a spiritual or, in a 
Bergsonian formulation, virtual existence. The mental character 
of the tragic was also testified by the role of the chorus within 
Greek tragedy. What characterizes the Greek chorus is its 
detachment from the emotional tension of the events preceding 
its appearance on the stage. This detachment is not a matter of 
indifference or lack of pity but as Benjamin succinctly describes 
it, 
[c]horic diction, rather, has the effect of restoring the ruins of the 
tragic dialogue to a linguistic edifice firmly established - in ethical 
society and in religious community - both before and after the 
conflict. Far from dissolving the tragic action into lamentations, the 
constant presence of the members of the chorus, as Lessing already 
observed, actually sets a limit on the emotional outburst even in 
the dialogue [0,121]. 
Although, the chorus sympathizes with the fate of the 
tragic hero it does not lament; instead its role is to envelop the 
act which preceded it and the coming horror, and thus to extract 
from the matter of the events their mental form in order to 
restore it to the consciousness of the community. In other 
words, the chorus intervenes, like an "interlude", precisely in 
order to suspend tragic tension so that it does not get dispensed 
into lament, but that its energies are concentrated and, having 
been raised into their proper ethical form, are saved for the 
community [cf. 0,121]. 33 
33 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche equates the significance of Greek tragedy 
with the tragic chorus, which combines two forces, i. e. the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian; see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of 
Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York. Vintage Books, 1967) #1-2. 
Benjamin suggests that the Greek chorus is detached and reflective [0,104, 
121] building a bridge between the substance of tragedy and the spectators, 
thus performing a kind of detached philosophical contemplation. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche makes the stronger claim that the chorus is not just a 
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However, for the baroque which has no place for 
redemption and in which everything becomes inscribed on the 
same surface of the present, there can be no prophetic voice 
"coming from the future and sinking into the past" and thus 
illuminating facts from within. The tragic loses its mental 
nuance and becomes equated with the suffering. This is 
exemplified in the martyr-drama where the focus is on the 
staging of the suffering and the representation of emotions at 
the expense of the action. The suffering itself becomes visual 
rather than agonal, it clothes the action rather than being 
clothed by it. Similarly, the chorus "frames" the act, enclosing it 
with lament, or rather emphasizing its 'lamentfulness'. As a 
result the energy of dramatic tension is not preserved into a 
higher form, but it is only physically explicated in mourning. 
The emphatic visualization of suffering is the 
culmination of baroque theatricality. It expresses in the clearest 
way the baroque expansive tendency, which forces it to be 
driven by the desire to touch the viewer. At all levels - that of its 
form, of its content or of the mode of its scenic presentation - 
baroque theatre has only one aim: the intensification of emotions. 
This aspiration also conforms to the spirit of the Counter- 
Reformation, which demanded great emotional intensity in the 
arts as a way of inspiring religious faith. Nevertheless, what it 
achieves is not to create a greater tension but rather to 
externalize it and evaporate it. The baroque externalization of 
bridge, but it forms the only reality, and marks not a philosophical detached 
reflection, but a capacity of self-forgetfulness through self-transformation. 
He defines choric aesthetic experience as 'something different from the 
rhapsodist who does not become fused with his images, but, like a painter, 
sees them outside himself as objects of contemplation'; The Birth of Tragedy, p. 
64. For an account of Benjamin's appropriation and critique of Nietzsche see 
Joseph Westfall, 'Nietzsche and the Approach of Tragedy: Contra Benjamin' 
in International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 333- 
350. 
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passions and affections lacks the exhilaration of a Dionysian 
outburst of life but envelops instead a melancholic gravity: 
mortality. 
The space of the Greek tragedy was essentially 
inwardness (i. e. empathy). This was not so much due to its 
cathartic telos and the rising of logos, but mainly because the 
solution of redemption was pierced by a non liquet, exemplified 
in the tragic silence. The stage itself becomes in the Greek eyes 
the cosmic topos of the event rather than the place of a theatrical 
performance: 
the Greek trilogy is, in any case, not a repeatable act of 
ostentation, but a once-and-for-all resumption of the trial before 
a higher court. As is suggested by the open theatre and the fact 
that the performance is never repeated identically, what takes 
place is a decisive cosmic achievement. The community is 
assembled to witness and to judge this achievement. The 
spectator of the tragedy is summoned, and is justified by the 
tragedy itself [0,119]. 
On the contrary, the Trauerspiel signifies mourning, the 
ceremonious lament. As such it cannot be conceived without an 
audience. The Trauerspiel is addressed, it needs to be performed 
and seen. Every gesture is ostensive; in the absence of a viewer 
it does not stand on its own. To the extent that things, gestures, 
and the world are empty of meaning, they are equally 
substitutable, interchangeable and dependent upon the 
spectator to confer their meaning. Every act is repeatable 
whether it is a life event or a theatrical performance; for, life 
itself has become the 'theatre of life'. The stage of the 
performance -a life performance or a theatrical one - has 
nothing cosmic about it apart from its repetition. It has now been 
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transformed into a traveling topos, as the exact correlative of a 
time which has no moment of revelation, but only unceasingly 
unfolds, without end, entrapping the vain human existence. 
Nowhere does the radical re-organization of the metaphysical 
framework become more intensely expressed in experience, 
than in the conception of time itself. 
To clarify the significance of the contrast put forward 
here: for the Greeks, the event of judgment that was tragedy 
takes place once-and-for-all - even the repeated theatrical 
performance is never staged twice in the same way. On the 
contrary, for the baroque, any event would be only the 
unceasing repetition of the human martyrdom; this is the state 
and the peculiar fate of the creature for which there was no 
redemption (not even curse). Moreover, the vanity of such an 
endless course of life of mere repetition is intricately related to 
and reflected in the baroque conception of death. As opposed to 
the death of the tragic hero, the death of the baroque hero marks 
no "end of an epoch", which means not only that his death 
bears no significant consequences but rather that it bears no 
consequences - apart from the strictly individual - at all. 
Benjamin writes: "[w]hereas the tragic hero, in his 'immortality', 
does not save his life, but only his name, in death the characters 
of the Trauerspiel lose only the name-bearing individuality and 
not their role" [0,136]. 
Consequently, to compare the baroque theatre with 
Greek tragedy and consider it as its declining form totally 
ignores the decisive difference in the socio-historical context 
and the metaphysical presuppositions. Yet the originality of 
Benjamin's argument lies in that he envisages these differences 
not from the point of view of historical correctness, but rather 
from that of expressivity. For the Trauerspiel does not merely 
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emerge in a different context, it expresses a different world-view. 
But what becomes tragic in the baroque is given in an 
illuminated way in the moment of Hamlet's death. The fact that 
his death, the death of the man who was "inwardly destroyed 
because he could find no other solution to the problem of 
existence than the negation of life" came as an external accident 
rather than as a necessity of fate, was devastating in the eyes of 
those who aspired to tragedy [0,137]. It annihilated the 
possibilities for the creation of a tragic effect. However, for 
Benjamin it is the externality of his death that marks the re- 
invention of the tragic by the baroque: 
[t]he death of Hamlet, which has no more in common with tragic 
death than the Prince himself has with Ajax, is in its drastic 
externality characteristic of the Trauerspiel; and for this reason 
alone it is worthy of its creator: Hamlet, as is clear from his 
conversation with Osric, wants to breathe in the suffocating air of 
fate in one deep breath [0,137]. 
What is tragic about his death is not so much the striking 
antithesis between the fateful death he wants and the mere 
accident that 'fate' holds for him but rather something else. In 
the impossibility of fate, as the internal reason for existence, I 
make of mere accident my fate. Hamlet is not like the rational 
man who alone creates and is responsible for his 'fate'; rather, in 
a more tragic and powerful gesture, he affirms accident for the 
sake of fate. 
The absolute exclusion of the metaphysical from the 
physical has deprived the world from its inner luminosity 
resulting in the degeneration of the world and nature to the 
state of mere things. Since existence is deprived of any meaning, 
earthly life also becomes an enduring process of decay. This is 
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what the baroque world mostly seeks: what could radiate things 
again? The new metaphysical framework of the baroque bears 
significant consequences in the field of art, and it becomes 
apparent in the role that art assumes in modernity. 
Benjamin's reading of Trauerspiel, especially the first part 
of the book, illuminates the ambiguity on which resides the 
baroque and which will unfold as a double possibility for the 
future of art. We stated earlier the intense theatricality 
characteristic of the baroque aesthetic. It appears then, that the 
fusion of theatre and life did not aim to revolutionize art as an 
event of life, but rather only recognized life as a theatre of 
repetition and artificiality. The assumption of an emptiness of 
meaning leaves things barely material. Such a bare materiality 
translates in the baroque artwork as an excessive formality. If the 
baroque dissolves the distinction of form and content this is 
because it has flattened, rather than condensed, the content in 
the image. It has not embodied meaning in the image but it has 
only rendered it pictorial. That is why, as Benjamin also claims, 
the baroque, as opposed to tragedy, can be conceived as a 
pantomime. 
The flattening of the mental and the material is 
articulately expressed in the recognition that "these are not so 
much plays which cause mourning, as plays through which 
mournfulness finds satisfaction: plays for the mournful" [0, 
119]. Lament is a very characteristic instance for the 
consequences of this flattening: the substitution of the tragic for 
lament liquidifies the tension between the mental and the material. 
Lament becomes the 'expressive mark' of the tragic, and the 
gesture by which the mental becomes visual does not intensify 
its effects but opens up to their objectification. If the satisfaction 
of mournfulness has nothing to do with original pleasure, this is 
52 
not because it responds to pain, nor because it is less intense, 
but rather because it does not come from an outside, that is, an 
'other', but by turning upon its own image, by rendering pain 
beautiful. It is probably mostly in this gesture that, following 
Benjamin's reading, the Trauerspiel becomes the origin of the 
adventure of art in modernity by redefining the very nature of 
origin [Ursprungl. 34 It gives us the hint for modern art's 
tendency to aestheticization, which is inseparable from its 
reification. 
But at the same moment there is also, in this very 
reification and externalization a will for life bound up with 
active destruction, in order to clear the way for redemption. 
This aspiration transforms reification into a sacrificial 
movement. 
The hereafter is emptied of everything which contains the slightest 
breath of this world, and from it the baroque extracts a profusion 
of things which customarily escaped the grasp of artistic 
formulation and, at its high point, brings them violently into the 
light of day, in order to clear an ultimate heaven, enabling it, as a 
vacuum, one day to destroy the world with catastrophic violence 
[0,66]. 
34 Lack of outside meaning, mere repetition, and Benjamin's dialectical 
reversal in art's excessive form of aesthetic reflection, redefine both art's origin 
and art as origin itself; see below. 
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IV. Bergson and the temporalization of experience 
Benjamin's penetrating insights into experience and art 
have alerted us to a crisis of experience in modernity and have 
allowed us to identify its symptoms in art and the concrete 
terms with which it is posited. The reconfiguration of the 
metaphysical presuppositions has significantly been reflected in 
the conception of time. The idea of eternity made possible the 
once-and-for-all of Greek tragedy. However, once redemption 
could no longer be offered, time also took the form of mere 
repetition. Thus, the conception and experience of time became 
central in modernity. To further this discussion, we will turn 
now to Henri Bergson, whose writings make an important 
contribution to the staging of the philosophical problems 
concerning the natures of time, perception, memory, life and 
evolution. However, we do not intend to address all novel 
aspects and themes raised in his work, but rather to illuminate 
the concept of experience from the perspective of time, memory 
and the body that he opens up for us. Our aim will be to show 
how Bergson first separated the two orders of time and space, 
as differing in kind. At first sight this appears to be the classical 
separation between intension and extension. However, 
Bergson's novelty was that he conceived of experience in terms 
of time rather than consciousness. Translating this distinction 
into memory and perception he gives us an original 
conceptualization of experience, which enfolds the one into the 
other. 
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a. Intensive and extensive states: the critique of spatialization 
Bergson s philosophy is, in all its aspects, principally a 
philosophy of time, affirming its reality in the form of 
continuous change. It is founded upon the idea of duration as 
memory's enduring and becoming, which informs not only 
human life but the whole universe. Duration (la duree) is the 
concept through which Bergson temporalizes experience and 
Being, and shows how the independent consideration of time 
(that is, not merely a dimension of space) renders experience 
irreducible to the sum of the events lived; he demonstrated how 
the reality of experience differs in kind and exceeds the actuality 
of perceptions. However, in order to argue for the inventive 
reality of duration he had first to show how time differs in kind 
from space. As a result, even if he is a philosopher of the One 
(though what'One' is the crucial question), he continually comes 
up with his famous dualisms: matter and memory, mind and 
body, quantities and qualities, intensity and extensity etc. All 
these distinctions are nothing more than the expressions of the 
irreducible difference in kind between the two orders, which 
constitute reality: the order of space and that of time. 
Reality itself is a composite. In all its aspects it gives us 
mixtures of space and time and we are never confronted with 
pure states. How then is it possible to dissociate the composite 
from the pure tendencies which inform it? And moreover, if in 
experience we only encounter composites, what is the reason of 
an abstract decomposition? There are two forms of knowledge 
corresponding to the double order of reality, the intellect and 
intuition: 
55 
[t]he first implies that we move round the object; the second, that 
we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which 
we are placed and on the symbols by which we express 
ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor 
relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to 
stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, 
to attain the absolute [IM, 21]. 
These two ways of knowing differ in that one provides 
us with an external while the other with an internal knowledge 
of the object. But how are we to understand an internal 
knowledge? Does Bergson, in opposition to Kant, argue that 
knowledge of the thing in-itself is possible? Are we still in the 
realm of knowledge, or rather is he evoking knowledge's 
transformation into a higher form? However, these questions 
might anticipate our discussion. The difference between 
external and internal knowledge can be illuminated by what he 
will elsewhere distinguish as objective and subjective 
knowledge: 35 
In fact, we apply the term subjective to what seems to be 
completely and adequately known, and the term objective to 
what is known in such a way that a constantly increasing 
number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea 
which we actually have of it [TFW, 83-84]. 
In a striking reversal of our common understanding of 
these terms, Bergson correlates subjective with absolute 
knowledge, but yet, through the prism of a specific and 
complicated thought. He explains that an object can be divided 
35 Our use of the aforementioned dualisms, which passed from 
intellect/intuition to internal/external and subjective/ objective knowledge, 
does not imply that they are equivalent. 
56 
mentally in infinite ways without altering its general appearance; if 
these subdivisions are possible, it is because they were already 
present, even before their realization, in our image of the object. 
These subdivisions are actual rather than virtual, even without 
needing to be realized, because they were perceptible in 
advance. What we call an 'object' is a closed system not because 
it is bounded, but because it has already structured the relation 
between the perceptible and its perception, not as a becoming 
but as a transposition of being from the state of the possible to 
that of the real 36 But in this conception time is subordinated to 
space - it has become a parameter - and the future only 
measures a distance from the present rather than a radical 
openness. 
Moreover, although the internal subdivisions of the 
image we have of the thing do not essentially alter it, in a 
reverse analogy, everything that comes to be added externally 
in this image also produces a novel image of the thing. 
Consequently, the object can be divided infinitely by producing 
only differences in degree. In the Bergsonian account, a 
difference in degree does not so much distinguish the smaller 
from the larger but rather it is defined by the relation it 
establishes between the part and the whole. In the case of such 
differences, the part only offers a partial view of the object and 
the latter is identical to the sum of its parts. As such, objective 
knowledge is necessarily bound up to its relativity, which 
36 What is the relationship between the possible and the real? Bergson 
paradoxically explains that it is a fundamental illusion to believe that the 
possible precedes real existence. Thus, in asserting that the possible is only 
the mirage of the present in the past, he claims that the possible is something 
more: the combined effect of reality once it has appeared and of a condition 
which throws it back in time. Essentially, it is the real that makes itself 
possible, and not the possible which becomes real. See H. Bergson, The 
Creative Mind: An introduction to metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New 
York: Citadel Press, 2002) pp. 91-106 at 101,104. 
57 
means that for its verification or modification, it is subject to the 
empirical facts. Verification in this case consists in measuring 
the identity of the image of knowledge with the fact. 
To be sure, the experienced sensation of my feelings is 
subjective neither because it is internal nor because it belongs to 
a subject but rather because it is itself a 'subject' in a very 
particular way. Bergson uses the example of a complex feeling, 
which simultaneously entails a plurality of simple elements: 
'but, as long as these elements do not stand out with perfect 
clearness, we cannot say that they were completely realized, 
and, as soon as consciousness has a distinct perception of them, 
the psychic state which results from their synthesis will have 
changed for that very reason' [TFW, 84]. This means that a 
feeling, or else duration, can be, and it is indeed, a multiplicity 
but a non-numerical one, which, as Deleuze has argued, "does 
not divide up without changing in kind, it changes in kind in 
the process of dividing up" [B, 42]. Thus, a feeling very concrete 
in its intensity may be experienced, permeated by the complex 
of love and hate. However, as soon as there is an attempt to 
divide the feeling in the distinct tendencies that inform it, it 
becomes clear that the attempt itself has already changed its 
nature. For neither love nor hate considered in-themselves have 
anything to do with feeling as a complex whole. Moreover, 
anyone who has experienced such a feeling knows that the two 
tendencies, although apparently contradictory, do not cancel 
each other out, but make the feeling all the more intense. We 
need therefore to admit that the two intensities differ without 
opposing each other, without standing in a relation of the 
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positive and the negative; 37 they are both positivities, two 
genuine intensities which differ in kind. 
It can be seen that the discussion about the nature of a 
feeling, a conscious state or a duration, becomes more complex 
when explaining what it means to call a feeling 'intense', or 
` more intense' as a feeling is always of an intensity. Is it then our 
expression a mere tautology? Or, does a feeling express a 
difference in degree between two intensities? Bergson fiercely 
criticized the idea of quantitative differences between conscious 
states, arguing that when a feeling endures by varying its 
intensity, what is experienced is not more or less of the same 
feeling, but a qualitative change. A feeling endures, what makes 
it continuously passing into something else, transforming the 
whole of a psychic state [TFW, 10]. 38 As opposed to extensities, 
which increase or reduce in magnitude without altering the 
image of the whole, intensities do not add up forming a greater 
intensity of the same kind but endure in time, what coincides 
with the qualitative change of the whole. 
37 Both forms of the 'negative' as deterioration (i. e. disorder) and opposition 
(i. e. nonbeing) were rigorously criticized by Bergson. He argued that: "there 
is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as 'not existing' than 
in the idea of this same object conceived as 'existing'; for the idea of the 
object 'not existing' is necessarily the idea of the object 'existing' with, in 
addition, the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality 
taken in block" [CE, 286]. Moreover, 'negation' necessarily presupposes an 
affirmation to which it draws upon. Thus, the difference between the two is 
that an affirmation proposes a judgment on an object while "a negative 
proposition expresses a judgment on a judgment". It is therefore "an 
affirmation of the second degree" because "it affirms something of an 
affirmation which itself affirms something of an object" [CE, 288]. He will 
conclude that "the idea of Nothing, if we try to see in it that of an 
annihilation of all things, is self-destructive and reduced to a mere word; and 
that if, on the contrary, it is truly an idea, then we find in it as much matter as 
in the idea of All" [CE, 298]; see also The Creative Mind, supra, pp. 97-100. 
38 The discussion of psychic states as intensities, which cannot be considered 
from the prism of quantitative differences applicable only to magnitudes, 
takes place in the first chapter of TFW, 1-74. Bergson does not restrict his 
argument to deep-seated psychic states but also extends it to sensations and 
muscular effort. 
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Moreover, the consideration of numbers reveals that the 
difference between intensity and extensity cannot be drawn on 
the basis of the opposition of a unity and a multiplicity. 
Duration is a unity enfolding a multiplicity of conscious states, 
but the number is "a collection of units", or "the synthesis of the 
one and the many". Since in both the order of space and that of 
time we are encountered with the 'synthesis' of unity and 
multiplicity, what is at stake each time is the identity of the 
particular process of common formation, or the mode of their 
entwinement. Bergson explains how a numerical multiplicity is 
formed by the addition of identical units. However, these units 
also need to be in some way discrete in order to be added, for 
otherwise they would only be a single unit. Bergson concludes 
that this necessary difference is provided by thinking the units 
as juxtaposed in space rather than in temporal succession [TFW, 
77]. In the latter case, we would only be faced with the 
repetition of single units rather than with a multiplicity. 
Consequently, numerical multiplicity can only be conceived in 
terms of temporal simultaneity and spatial juxtaposition. 
As opposed to the order of space where every moment 
remains external to each other, the intensive states of 
consciousness, as they are lived rather than symbolically 
described, are constituted as a multiplicity of moments 
"succeeding each other" that is "melting into one another and 
forming an organic whole" [TFW, 128]. It is precisely for this 
reason that the living organism, a feeling, or a work of art, 
constitute "organic totalities", as Jankelevitch argues. Spiritual 
realities are internal to themselves twice-fold, because they 
perpetuate themselves and because they totalize themselves; 
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mechanisms remain external to themselves 39 States of 
consciousness exist only in a flowing continuity where each 
moment contains everything that has preceded it and is 
pregnant with what follows it, while at the same time it does 
not simply add itself but informs the whole. 
In Time and Free Will Bergson will grant a psychological 
reality to duration in the same way that unity is attributed to a 
simple act of the mind rather than to things. Thus, although 
external things change, "their moments do not succeed one 
another, [... ] except for a consciousness which keeps them in 
mind" [TFW, 227]. However, the psychological account of 
duration in Matter and Memory will open itself up to a virtual 
ontology of time and a new conception of the genesis of space 
and extensity. 
b. The doubling of reality and the body 
In the 'Introduction' to the English translation of Matter 
and Memory, Bergson states the aims of his book as the 
affirmation of the reality of spirit and the reality of matter. As its 
title already indicates, it is a book haunted by the question of 
the mind/body dualism. This is the problem that Bergson will 
address in the form of the relation between perception and 
memory. The "decisive turn" of dualism emerges for Bergson at 
the particular moment of human experience. But the idea filling 
the entire book is that experience extends beyond its human 
39 Vladimir Jankelevitch, Henri Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1959) p. 13. 
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form from both directions; it goes "beyond the decisive turn" 
twice. For Deleuze, "dualism is therefore only a moment, which 
must lead to the reformation of a monism" [B, 291. 
If we conceived the idea of Matter and Memory in the 
form of a diagram, it would be given to us in the form of the 
circle, although an idiosyncratic one, which in the process of 
following it would have doubled upon itself in such a way that 
its beginning and end would occupy the same point but they 
would not coincide. The two instances of monism cannot 
coincide because they are of a different nature since, as Deleuze 
rightly argues, the first is an actual point of departure while the 
second is the "virtual image" of this point, "which finally gives 
us the sufficient reason of the thing, the sufficient reason of the 
composite, the sufficient reason of the point of departure" [B, 
28-29]. In our view, the relation between the two instances is 
particularly important; it illuminates why the simple assertion 
of Bergsonian monism remains insignificant unless one 
accounts for what has happened in the process so that the simple 
fact of monism is not enough by itself but has to be repeated 
and affirmed. However, this question will only receive a 
preliminary and incomplete answer here. 40 Yet, what we want 
to show in this part is how Bergson, through the discussion of 
images, perception and memory, proceeds from an uncertain 
monism, to its dissociation in a double order of reality in order to 
end up to a doubling reality. 
When considering the problem of perception and 
representation, the two main currents in modem western 
philosophy (materialism and idealism) begin by dissociating 
matter (as the extended substance) and consciousness (as the 
40 This will recur in Chapter 5 of this thesis not in relation to the Bergsonian 
method but in relation to the neuronal processes of the body. 
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unextended or inner). According to the Cartesian dualism, 
material bodies or things only partake of the extended physical 
world, and their properties and relations are subject to the study 
of geometry. On the contrary, ideas are formed in the mind and 
they are immaterial, since this latter has no other property apart 
from thinking or being conscious. Following this view, to 
perceive is to form an idea in consciousness, which means that 
perception is unextended, since it has no spatial properties or 
relations, and inner because it is only present in my 
consciousness. Consequently, if perception takes place 
somewhere other than the object then it is its representation, 
purporting to correspond to the thing. 
However, how can we grant this correspondence? If the 
two orders (the mental and the physical) are separated, and 
equally the possibility of representation entails the possibility of 
misrepresentation, how can we assert that what we know of the 
world is indeed the world and that we are not the victims of 
systematic illusions? If perceptions as our terminals to the 
world have become interiorized in our consciousness, what 
access do we have to external reality and how can we test the 
correctness of our perceptions and the effectiveness of our 
actions? This is how Bergson describes the problem: 
[f]or realism, in fact, the invariable order of the phenomena of 
nature lies in a cause distinct from our perceptions, whether this 
cause must remain unknowable, or whether we can reach it by 
an effort (always more or less arbitrary) of metaphysical 
construction. For the idealist, on the contrary, these perceptions 
are the whole of reality, and the invariable order of the 
phenomena of nature is but the symbol whereby we express, 
alongside of real perceptions, perceptions that are possible. But 
for realism as for idealism, perceptions are "veridical 
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hallucinations", states of the subject, projected outside himself 
[... ] [MM, 68]. 
As opposed to both traditions, Bergson considers 
perception of matter and matter itself before the schism initiated 
by realism and idealism, between thing-in-itself and appearance 
for my consciousness. Instead, he views the world as "an 
aggregate of images" where my body is an image among others, 
acting and reacting upon one another in all their elementary 
parts according to the physical laws of nature. As such, the 
world for Bergson is granted an existence that is something 
more than what the idealist calls a representation, and yet 
something less than what the materialist calls a thing; existence 
is placed in-between the thing and its representation. 
The account of matter and extensity as an image is not to 
be equated with the Platonic view of the world as mere 
appearance of an external true existence, nor more generally 
with the idealist conception, which subsumes the world to a 
mind that will entertain it. On the contrary, for Bergson, the 
brain as well is nothing more than an image among others and 
as such it "is part of the material world; the material world is 
not part of the brain" [MM, 191. 
For Bergson, who assumes the common sense view of the 
world, "the object exists in itself, and on the other hand, the 
object is, in itself, pictorial as we perceive it: image it is, but a 
self-existing image" [MM, 10]. The world is in-itself without 
being dependent on my perception; my perception does not 
come prior to the world, it anticipates it. However, at the same 
time the world is indeed pictorial as we perceive it. What is the 
meaning of this double temporal relation of my perception to 
the world? As F. C. T. Moore suggests, things in the world "are 
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images because they exist in a space in which they are capable 
of being pictured ('our' world); they exist in themselves because 
their existence does not depend upon their actually being 
pictured. '-'41 Bergson therefore begins by accounting for a 
fundamental duplicity in the mode of things' existence: 
everything that is, exists in-itself, but also, it is perceivable, it 
opens itself to the outside. 
Moreover, although Bergson uses the term "images" and 
even "pictorial", we should not restrict our understanding to 
the pictorial qualities of things; rather, we should extend our 
interpretation to include all kinds of physical signals of the 
thing, perceivable by our senses. Bergson's images are real 
objects, rather than fictions, really possessing the qualities they 
possess and are perceived as possessing; his luminous universe 
really acts upon us. The view of matter as an assemblage of 
images bears then a double signification: on the one hand, it 
establishes as Bergson's starting point an ontological monism; and 
on the other, it initiates us to his theory of the immediacy of 
perception, which does not have to go through the intermediary 
of representation. 
The universal plane of images, which act and react upon 
each other, is a plane of action, where the difference of forces is 
played out. It is the plane of heterogeneity and pure difference. 
In this universe of indiscriminate images however, there is one 
that can be distinguished: the image of my body. What makes it 
distinct from all other images that surround me, is that "I do not 
know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by 
affections" [MM, 17]. My body is part of the aggregate of the 
material world, receiving and restoring movements back in the 
41 F. C. T. Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) p. 24. 
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world, yet, with the only difference being that it appears to 
choose, relatively, the manner in which it will respond. Choice, 
however, does not come from conscious representation and 
decision but from action. For Bergson my body is 'an 
instrument of action' alone and 'cannot give birth to a 
representation' [MM, 20]. As an instrument of action the body is 
oriented to utility; it is selectively sensitive to the environment 
according to what may serve its vital needs and ends. 
It is important to note, however, right from the start that 
these needs and ends are not essentially pre-existent. They are 
immanent to life itself, which for Bergson becomes a 
cosmological notion rather than being restricted to the 
individual life of the organism. As such, life consists in the 
tendency to action, understood beyond the merely human 
scope; it is the tendency to become actualized. Needs are not 
conceptions of lack, but conceptions of life and positivity for 
they aid and aim to action. 42 Consequently, my body which is 
only actual (that is, my ability to act) generates perceptions as 
real actions. Perception then does not consist in forming a 
representation of the world but in a process of selection from the 
world of those movements that might be useful. 
However, selection is not the only movement of 
perception but it is simultaneously bound up with reflection. 
42 Creative Evolution is clearly the book where Bergson elaborates his 
philosophy of life and evolution. But equally this idea permeates MM. Thus 
he states: "Whatever the nature of matter, it may be said that life will at once 
establish in it a primary discontinuity, expressing the duality of the need and 
of that which must serve to satisfy it" [MM, 198]. However, for Bergson life is 
not installed as primary need but rather need emerges as expression of life. 
This is apparent when he writes: "Living matter, in its simplest form and in a 
homogeneous state, accomplishes this function [of receiving and utilizing 
movements] simultaneously with those of nourishment and repair. The 
progress of such matter consists in sharing this double labor between two 
categories of organs, the purpose of the first, called organs of nutrition, being 
to maintain the second: the second, in their turn, are made for action [MM, 
64]. 
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The selection of a useful movement from the world is only 
possible because it coincides with the reflection of my possible 
action upon the world. Perception as selection does not only 
receive a movement from outside, it equally expresses, in 
exactly the same manner, my possible action to the outside; 
selection follows the criteria of utility. However, these criteria 
are neither conceptual nor externally given but emerge from the 
requirements of action and are immanent to it. Perception, 
therefore, is not merely reception but comprises simultaneously 
a double movement: a centripetal movement of selection of the 
movements received and a centrifugal movement of reflection 
of possible action. 
Although Bergson ties reflection to perception he does 
not intellectualize it nor does he render it a representation of the 
mind in the idealist sense. There are two main reasons testifying 
to this position: first, because the representation born in 
reflection adds nothing new to the object, it only eliminates its 
part which cannot serve my action. That is why Bergson insists 
that "there is for images merely a difference of degree, and not 
of kind, between being and being consciously perceived" [MM, 
37]. Consequently, it is not that Bergson denies any role to 
representation (as a centrifugal movement) in perception, rather 
his thesis consists in asserting that if perception is a photograph, 
it is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things 
[MM, 38]. The Bergsonian radicalism consists not only in the 
fact that he externalizes perception, for a materialist could 
account for that as well; instead, his position is more complex 
because he manages to render perception both external (in the 
objects rather than in us) and to account for its duplicity in the 
form of a centripetal and a centrifugal movement that it 
embodies. In this way, perception of matter is granted its 
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correspondence to matter (rather than merely to our mind and 
our hallucinations) but, by reflecting our possible action upon 
things, it has also become our perception. 
It is in this way that my body as centre does not 
introduce a split between consciousness and the world but 
rather doubles its order. Both realism and idealism confess that 
the same images may simultaneously participate in two 
systems: one belonging to science where every image relates 
and varies to itself, and thus possessing an absolute value, and 
the other (the world of my consciousness) where every image 
varies in relation to this centre. But the crucial question is not if 
there is one or two systems, but how the two systems relate to 
each other. As opposed to subjective idealism (which derives 
the world from consciousness) and contrary to materialistic 
realism (which derives consciousness from the world), Bergson 
operates a very different method. He begins from the world as a 
plane of heterogeneity; but he also acknowledges that this is 
only an indifferent difference. My body, however, renders 
difference significant and this is expressed in its selection. But 
my body is not derived from the world, it is implicated in the 
world as an image acting and reacting upon others; but also, it 
implicates the world because in its perception it reflects its possible 
action [MM, 25]. The difference between the two systems is itself 
reflected in the difference between perception and conscious 
perception. 
There is one more issue we need to address in relation to 
perception: what is the role of the brain and how is it able to 
transform perception into conscious perception? Bergson insists 
on the material identity of the brain to the body. As such, the 
brain is only oriented to action rather than to knowledge and 
does not give birth to representations. The only thing it adds to 
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perception is analysis of the movement received and selection of 
the movement executed. The evolution from the simpler to the 
more complex living organism consists in the latter's greater 
capacity to analyze its environment. In the simple living 
organism, the organs of action coincide with the organs of self- 
preservation, and perception with movement; in fact simple 
organisms do not have specific sensory and motor organs but 
this ability is blended and expanded on the surface of its body 
in a single property, i. e. contractility [MM, 55]. The 
undifferentiation of organs and abilities results in the 
organism's limited range of possible actions upon its 
environment. On the contrary, the complex organism having 
developed specific sensory and motor organs it has achieved 
two things: first, it has analyzed perception from movement and 
second it has also analyzed perception itself to various and 
specific sub-modalities (sight, hearing, smell etc. ). 
Bergson expresses a most original idea when he makes 
conscious perception correspondent to the measuring of the 
distance of possible action: 
[t]o the degree that my horizon widens, the images which 
surround me seem to be painted upon a more uniform background 
and become to me more indifferent. The more I narrow this 
horizon, the more the objects which it circumscribes space 
themselves out distinctly according to the greater or lesser ease 
with which my body can touch and move them [MM, 21]. 
Conscious perception brings us closer to the world, or 
reflects our closeness. But what exactly is the meaning of this 
closeness? According to Bergson it is clear that the closeness of 
conscious perception equals nothing more than an increased 
possibility and capacity for action. There is nothing virtual in 
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pure perception, even if this latter only exists in principle and in 
reality it is virtualized because it is mixed with memory. 43 The 
reflection of possible action is not virtual, even if at times 
Bergson expresses himself without distinguishing between the 
two terms 44The reflection of the possible action is the reflection 
of the capacity for action, which may not be realized yet 
concretely, but it is nevertheless present, or inscribed. That is 
why perception lies no more to the sensory than to the motor 
centers; an injury to the nervous elements, whose role is to give 
efficacy to the disturbance received, "by diminishing our 
possible action, diminishes perception in the same degree [MM, 
42]. That is why "perception is no more in the sensory than in 
the motor centers; it measures the complexity of their relations, 
and is in fact, where it appears to be" [MM, 46]. 
Following our earlier discussion, to the degree that the 
sensory and motor centers are not identical, perception does not 
coincide with action. But to the extent that they both emerged 
from the dissociation of a prior single property, i. e. contractility, 
they do not stand in opposition but the one is implicated in the 
other even after the dissociation. The centripetal movement of 
the sensory and the centrifugal movement of the motor organs 
43 Bergson accepts the fact that "there is no perception which is not full of 
memories". Perception is infiltrated by memory in a double way: first, 
because with the immediate data of our senses we constantly mingle 
thousand details of our past experience which may be useful in the present 
situation, and in fact, the greater our memory becomes the more it tends to 
invest our present perception. Furthermore, perception is itself memory 
because no matter how brief we consider it to be it always occupies a 
duration, contracts and prolongs a plurality of moments [MM, 33-34]. 
+4 This is because in Matter and Memory Bergson has not really emphasized 
terminologically the difference between the possible and the virtual. 
However, his discussion of the possible and the real in Creative Evolution will 
illuminate sufficiently the structuring principles of this pair and the 
difference between the virtual and the actual. It is mainly Deleuze who will 
take up and give a systematic use to the term "virtual". See also note 24 
above and Brian Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect' in Parables of the Virtual: 
Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2002) pp. 23-55 
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are the actualizations of the implicit tendencies of contraction 
and expansion. This kind of analysis has been rendered possible 
because of the brain. Its role is restricted to that of "a kind of 
central telephonic exchange: its office is to allow communication 
or to delay it. It adds nothing to what it receives" [MM, 301. It is 
this delay introduced by the brain which gives rise to the 
indetermination of action. When the response of action comes 
temporally close to the movement received, when it comes 
immediately, it is a reflex action and it is almost extracted by its 
cause, to which it stands in direct proportion as its effect. On the 
contrary, the interval of the brain by allowing for 
indetermination in my response foretells of the spirit, in the 
form of the freedom of a will 45 Quite clearly, Bergson does not 
locate spirit in the brain but rather the interval of the brain 
allows it to appear, like movement captured and rendered visible 
in the development of a photograph. 
c. Duration and experience 
On the antipodes of perception and the body, which is 
oriented to action, interested and therefore only actual or 
objective, stands memory or duration, which is, wholly virtual, 
inactive and spiritual. Duration for Bergson is essentially 
memory, consciousness and freedom. However, he went on to 
give a novel account of memory which he persistently opposed 
45 Thus, it is not an empirical indetermination, nor an indetermination due to 
our lack of knowledge. Perhaps it would be better to follow Deleuze here 
and talk about determinability instead; see Gilles Deleuze, (1996) 'Immanence: 
a Life... ' Nick Millet (trans. ) in jean Khalfa (ed. ), An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (London: Continuum) pp. 170-173. 
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to the common empirical, psychological and psycho- 
physiological conceptions. Bergson's thesis is that duration 
differs in kind from perception and he elaborates it against both 
currents of thought which fail to consider this difference: 
associationism and the psycho-physiological accounts. 
He confronts associationism and its view that we reach 
memory gradually, associating our perceptions with ideas 
connected through the principles of similarity and contiguity. 
His critique consists in that associationism substitutes for the 
'continuity of becoming, which is the living reality, a 
discontinuous multiplicity of elements, inert and juxtaposed' 
[MM, 1341 and consequently comes to regard memory solely at 
its final stage of actualization in the memory-image. As such, it 
assumes that memories are stored images, which the present 
perception comes to associate with. Remembering consists in 
the sequential attachment of perception to ready-made images, 
rather than in the process of formation of such images. 
Associationism therefore results in the identification of the 
memory image with sensation and the latter with a weak 
perception. By reducing psychical life to sensation and 
perception as the difference between weak and strong states of 
intensity, it totally excludes memory from the horizon of 
experience. But the absurdity of this position becomes apparent 
if we consider a weak perception: we can easily realize that it 
cannot be confused with memory in the same way as adding a 
plurality of memories we will not create a perception. 
Moreover, concerning the principles of similarity and 
contiguity, on the basis of which associationism explains how 
images attach to each other, Bergson argues that we can always 
detect similarity and contiguity between memory-images, but 
this is only a common fact insufficient in itself to explain why or 
72 
how the particular image was chosen and therefore they cannot 
serve as principles. The incapacity to explain the particular 
choice is due to the fact that it only attributes to memory a 
speculative interest, an existence for-itself, and fails to see how 
memory has an interest for us and is therefore related to the 
activity of the will; in other words, "its error is that it overly 
intellectualizes ideas" [MM, 164]. The critical point of Bergson's 
opposition to associationism is not merely the advancement of a 
different conception of memory, but rather that it has two 
crucial and concrete aims: first, it expresses the need to secure a 
place for heterogeneity within experience, which associationism 
lacks as it has substituted all difference with differences in 
degree. But also, in a subsequent move Bergson wants to grant 
for memory and spirit not only a purely speculative interest, but 
ultimately a vital interest, for us 46 
But associationism only corresponds to one aspect of the 
critique. Bergson also requires securing his position vis-a-vis the 
materialist assumption, which localizes memory in the brain. 
This view is most intensely expressed by science, especially the 
various psycho-physiological accounts which consider memory 
to be a cerebral function. The fundamental Bergsonian thesis 
concerning memory regards it as of a wholly spiritual (or 
virtual) nature; as such, it does not need and cannot be 
contained somewhere materially - namely, in the brain. Memory 
is indeed always preserved and never lost, but preserved in- 
itself, within time. However, in order to sustain his claim 
46 See below Chapter 5 for the argument that we have a practical, rather than 
cognitive or speculative, relation with the environment. This might give us 
an idea about why Bergson is not a vitalist in the traditional sense. Bergson 
rejects the doctrine of internal finality inherent to each organism that 
haunted traditional vitalism; see John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) pp. 62-63. 'If there is finality 
in the world of life, ' Bergson writes, 'it includes the whole of life in a single 
indivisible embrace' [CE, 43]. 
73 
Bergson has to respond to the pathological fact of the 
destruction of memory due to concrete lesions of the brain. 
Therefore, he discusses different cases resulting to disorders of 
memory and even aspects of aphasia and memory 'loss'. His 
hypothesis is that 'the disorders of imaginative memory, which 
correspond to local lesions of the cortex, are always diseases of 
recognition, either visual or auditory recognition [... ] or of the 
recognition of words' [MM, 1071. By considering pathologies of 
memory as failures of recognition, Bergson locates the problem 
not to memory itself but to the activity of the body. 
Moreover, he distinguishes between two causes of the 
lesions, corresponding to the double movement entailed in 
recognition: the first lies in the incapacity of the body to adopt, 
under the influence of the external stimulus, the precise attitude 
that will allow to choose among the memories; in this case, what 
is affected by the lesion are the mechanisms which continue, in 
an automatically executed movement, the stimulation received. 
The second cause involves the cortical centers which "prepare 
voluntary movements by lending them the required sensory 
antecedent, centers which, rightly or wrongly, are termed 
image-centers"; [MM, 108]. In the first case, the lesion has 
affected the movements of the body which intend the 
stimulation to the brain, while in the second, it has distorted the 
movements by which memories become extended in action, that 
is they become images. In both cases, the problem can indeed be 
located, but as a problem of fixing attention and therefore 
effectuating recognition rather than a loss of memory. Bergson 
does not deny that pure memory, in order to become actualized 
in a memory-image, is dependent upon the action of the body. 
On the contrary,, he accepts that remembering is doubly bound 
to activity in a centripetal and a centrifugal movement which 
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render recognition possible. But memory cannot be reduced to 
conscious remembering; if with the concept of duration Bergson 
invents the being of an unconscious memory, this is clearly 
distinguishable from a Freudian unconscious 47 
Similarly to his theory of perception, according to which 
perception takes place at the object rather than in ourselves, we 
grasp the image of the past where it is in itself, and not in 
ourselves, in our present. This is how he describes the act of 
recollection: 
[w]henever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some 
period of our history, we become conscious of an act sui generis by 
which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace 
ourselves, first, in the past in general, then in a certain region of 
the past -a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a 
camera. But our recollection still remains virtual; we simply 
prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate 
attitude [MM, 134]. 
This act sui generis is the act of intuition, which in the 
Introduction to Metaphysics he had described as an act of 
intellectual sympathy which offers us an internal and intensive 
knowledge of things. In Matter and Memory he does not engage 
with a discussion of intuition, but he significantly indicates it in 
terms of a leap in order to emphasize its proper discontinuity. 
Intuition here becomes the simple (in the sense of indivisible) 
act which takes us at once in the ontological dimension of the 
past. The necessity of the leap in a pure past points to the 
difference in kind between the being of the past and that of the 
present, between pure memory and pure perception. In the 
47 Freud's unconscious denotes a psychological reality, which is outside 
consciousness, but Bergson's unconscious "is used to denote a 
nonpsychological reality - being as it is in itself" [B, 56]. 
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same way that Bergson had defined the present as sensori- 
motor and therefore only actual, he also equates the past with 
the spirit and grants it, in principle, a wholly virtual existence. 
As Deleuze describes it, this 'past in general' "is not the 
particular past of a particular present but that is like an 
ontological element, a past that is eternal and for all time, the 
condition of the 'passage' of every particular present. It is the 
past in general that makes possible all pasts" [B, 56-57]. This 
pure past transcends the idea of a psychological past, lived by 
the subject of experience, in order to evoke a kind of primordial 
or immemorial past, a past that has never been lived and has 
never been present, a past which has always pre-existed the 
present, placed as already there. Bergson's idea of a pure past in 
which we are placed by a leap, already indicates that his 
conception of memory leaves the field of psychology altogether, 
in order to address it not as a psychological function but rather 
as a being of memory. What is most idiosyncratic about the idea 
of a pure past is that its being is not posited as existent but 
rather as already pre-existent. As Keith Ansell Pearson points out, 
the pure past or pure memory is, like pure perception, a theoretical 
hypothesis designed to enable a 'superior' empiricism to pursue 
various lines of inquiry and to overcome the limits of 
associationism. Pure memory shows us that there is a movement at 
work in the actualization of memory-images, we do not just pass 
from one isolated perception or memory to another. 48 
Consequently, the idea of the pure past in Bergson has a 
double purpose: on one hand, it establishes the difference in 
kind between perception and memory and therefore clearly 
48 Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and 
the Time of Life (Routledge: London and New York, 2002) p. 174; emphasis 
mine. 
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opposes itself to the homogeneous order evoked by 
associationism. But also, by evoking the pure past as always 
pre-existent (rather than formerly existent) Bergson does not so 
much create an outside, transcendent reality, but rather 
accounts for the conditions of possibility of all empirical pasts 
and their recollection; he accounts for the passage of time and the 
ability to represent what has passed. 
To clarify, let us ask the question when is a recollection 
formed? The common view holds that a recollection is formed 
after perception has ceased to be, and therefore that memory 
succeeds perception. However, such a conception necessarily 
assumes that "the course of our conscious existence must be 
composed of clear-cut states, each of which must begin 
objectively, and also objectively end" [ME, 158]. However, the 
division of our psychic life into states has nothing to do with the 
lived reality of time and everything to do with the retrospective 
accounts given by the intellect. Consequently, if we consider a 
recollection as simply following perception we can only hold a 
spatialized conception of time, which mistakenly substitutes for 
the continuity of our psychic life events, their discontinuous 
descriptions. However, if time is other than space, then 
recollections cannot follow this order. Instead, Bergson will 
account for the intensive being of memory by arguing that "the 
formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of perception; 
it is contemporaneous with it" [ME, 157] 49 Thus, a perception can 
become memory only because it has already doubled as a 
49 He will explain that if we do not realize, or have consciousness, of the 
parallel formation of memory with perception it is because the characteristic 
note of consciousness is action according to interest; but we do not need the 
memory at the moment we perceive the thing. Therefore "practical 
consciousness throwing this memory aside as useless, theoretical reflexion 
holds it to be non-existent"; see Henri Bergson, Mind - Energy: Lectures and 
Essays, trans. H. Wildon Carr (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1975) p. 160. 
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memory at the time it is taking place as perception. Similarly, 
how would a moment pass if it was not passing at the same time 
that it is present? Bergson establishes the duplicity of the 
present, a present that is only at the moment that is passing, in 
passing, the fugitive present. 
This is then, as Deleuze argues, "a fundamental position 
of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: the 
past is 'contemporaneous' with the present that it has been" [B, 
58]. We are led to assume that in the present that is, there is an 
implicated has been of the present, in order that the present 
might pass. Thus, the present is not only sensori-motor and 
therefore active, as Bergson had initially defined it, but it is now 
also revealed in its parallel constitution as memory. This is then 
how the present also becomes the "most contracted degree of 
the past". It is this passing present, which becomes the 
condition of the temporalization of a present constituted in 
action. Otherwise, this latter would only expire itself in space, at 
the moment of the deed, without ever being possible to redeem 
itself in the life of memory. 
The paradox of the contemporaneity of the past with the 
present that has been gives us then the passing present as an 
effect. This is also how Bergson in Matter and Memory goes 
beyond Time and Free Will; in the latter work he had argued for 
the reality of time and duration as succession; now, however, he 
gives us the conditions for succession, as virtual co-existence. Not 
only is the past the most contracted degree of the present but 
the whole of the past co-exists with itself. In the interval 
between the present, occupied by the sensori-motor mechanism 
of the body and a pure past of the totality of memories "there is 
50 See also Maria Lakka, 'Duration, Rhythm, Present' in PH: The Warwick 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 15,2004, pp. 18-33. 
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room, [... ] for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life, 
figured by as many sections AT, A"B", etc., of the same cone" 
[MM, 162]. In each of the planes, the whole past co-exists with 
itself but in different degrees of tension, contracted towards 
spirit or relaxed towards matter. 
Each time an attempt to retrieve a recollection is made a 
leap is made on to a certain plane. Thus every act of conscious 
remembrance necessary involves a division of duration. The 
inverted cone gives us duration in a dynamic schema and reveals 
that: 
[f]or Bergson, duration was not simply the indivisible, nor was 
it the nonmeasurable. Rather, it was that which divided only 
by changing in kind, that which was susceptible to 
measurement only by varying its metrical principle at each 
stage of the division [B, 40]. 
My leap into the past always gives me the whole of the 
past but in a different degree of contraction and relaxation. This 
difference in the tension does not alter the contents of the past 
but the movement of duration. As opposed to an empirical 
composite, which divides itself in pure tendencies duration is 
"simple, indivisible, pure"; and "the simple does not divide 
itself, it differentiates itself. "51 If in duration the whole past co- 
exists with itself this is not a repetition of the same; on the 
contrary, what co-exists and is repeated is the constant 
movement of the past's differentiation. Duration coincides with 
this unceasing repetition of its difference. 
51 Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson s Conception of Difference" in John Mullarkey 
(ed. ), The New Bergson (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1999) p. 49. 
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Duration is for Bergson the intensive form, in which the 
past is preserved as a whole. Duration as pure memory is never 
lost and yet there is nowhere that it is contained; it is preserved 
in itself, in time. Deleuze, who re-invented Bergson in a radical 
way, recognized in the notion of duration the reconfiguration of 
the Kantian sense of time: 
Bergsonism has often been reduced to the following idea: 
duration is subjective, and constitutes our internal life. And it is 
true that Bergson had to express himself in this way, at least at 
the outset. But, increasingly, he came to say something quite 
different: the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time, 
grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, 
not the other way round. That we are in time seems like a 
commonplace, yet it is the highest paradox. Time is not the 
interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we 
are, in which we move, live and change. Bergson is much closer 
to Kant than he himself thinks: Kant defined time as the form of 
interiority, in the sense that we are internal to time (but Bergson 
conceives this form quite differently from Kant). [... ] Subjectivity 
is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. 
The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective [C2, 
82-83]. 
V. Conclusion 
Benjamin criticized Kant's exclusion of the absolute from 
his concept of experience and his division of the event of 
experience into a subject and an object of experience. Instead, 
his aspiration was to create the concept of experience as an 
immanent totality which enfolds the absolute. Driven by a 
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similar concern against the spatialization and reduction of 
experience, Bergson founded the totality of experience (a 
heterogeneous totality or difference) in the intensive states of 
consciousness and the redemptive character of memory. Yet his 
thesis is that memory can never be lost but that it persists 
beyond cerebral lesions and conscious remembering, it is even 
when it cannot become actualized, created an account of 
memory beyond psychology, an ontology of memory as an in- 
itself. However, if memory endures in-itself, does it make any 
difference whether we remember or not? What happens in the 
passage from the virtual to the actual? Unless we consider this 
passage to action, we will not be able to see how the ontology of 
duration is a virtual ontology that needs to be created and in the 
third chapter of this thesis we will address the becoming (rather 
than the being) of duration through the notion of rhythm. 
Similarly, is it experience that becomes reduced in 
modernity or is it only the concept of experience? Experience 
does not cease to form itself as a whole and to envelop all 
fragmentations. Nevertheless, Benjamin did not diagnose the 
atrophy in experience by comparing it to an original wholeness 
as if experience could be quantified and measured, but in its 
communicability; 52 in modernity "it is as if something that 
seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, 
were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences" 53 
Trauerspiel laments the meaninglessness of the world, the 
gap of incommunicability that has separated being from the 
world. The lost intimacy now becomes the intensive cling to 
matter. In the annihilation of all distance which freely weaves 
52 This condition is not acknowledged by Howard Caygill in Walter Benjamin: 
The Colour of Experience, and therefore for him the atrophy of experience 
remains the atrophy of the concept of experience. 
53 Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller", in Illuminations, supra, p. 83. 
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the past and the future, in the creation of an overabundant and 
suffocating present, one may discern a double tendency 
beginning with an ecstatic rush to death. But there is also in this 
ecstatic instance of self-annihilation, and especially in its 
ostentatious character which extends the work to the viewer, a 
quest: 'look at me! ' The baroque quest to be seen is not so much 
the instance of narcissism, but mainly the work's handing itself 
over to the viewer to redeem it. Since art can no longer be 
bathed in truth's light of redemption, it is now only the viewer, 
who can look, endow the work with a life and thus redeem it. 
For Benjamin, baroque's affirmative instance is the 
moment of allegory, which is not just a literary trope but an 
embodiment of the baroque mode of expression. Greek tragedy 
finds its expression in the symbol which incarnates a whole 
meaning, the fulfilment of the wish, the instant of revelation. 
But in the case of Trauerspiel earthy life can find no fulfilment, 
and the instant can no longer be once-and-for-all, but another 
repetition and succession. The momentariness of the symbol is 
the immanence of meaning and being. But in allegory the two 
are separated and allegory draws upon the general; it is "a 
successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic 
representation of ideas" [0,165]. As such it introduces 
temporality, so that "from a long and patient process of 
deciphering, [... ] we may begin to cross the dialectical chasm 
between the natural and particular (i. e the material) and the 
ideal or meaning. Allegory is just a different way of moving 
from the particular to the general" 54 
With Trauerspiel we witness the instance where art's fall 
from truth opens the way to the immanence of experience. In 
the next chapter we will look at the work of Theo Angelopoulos 
54 Scott Lash, Another Modernity A Different Rationality, supra, p. 337. 
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and will try to show how cinema - by incorporating time in the 
image - unfolds images and creates the experience of the film as 
a visual rhythm. 
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Chapter 2 
The Experience of Time in Theo Angelopoulos' 
Cinema 
Slowness is the rhythm of 
memory and pleasure 
Milan Kundera, Slowness 
I. Introduction 
Witnessing the advent of early cinema, Bergson envisaged it as 
a paradigmatic instance of what he called 'the spatialization of 
time'. In the example of cinema (which reproduced movement 
by the addition of static points or frames), he saw the 
concretisation of the operation performed by the intellect in the 
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way it comprehends the world 55 Nevertheless, the history of 
cinema and its evolution as an art form makes us question and 
resist Bergson's characterization, and his critique, which is 
addressed to the intellect rather than cinema, holds true in 
relation to the technology. But to the extent that film is also an 
art form, it reveals that technology opens up possibilities and 
restrictions which do not determine the aesthetic outcome of the 
course of their actualization. 
Although early cinema perceived the possibilities of the 
medium mainly as the visual reproduction of movement, later, 
with Italian neo-realism, it gradually became aware that 
movement could also open to time, and to the non-linear 
temporalities of percepts, affects and thought, beyond what was 
represented as a visual content, and as spatial movement to 
something that would nevertheless be experienced. 
In this chapter, we will consider the work of Theo 
Angelopoulos in order to show how cinema arrives to be not 
merely the perception of images and represented movement, 
but to create the intensity of an experience. More specifically, 
we will discuss his work from the perspective of the experience 
of time in the images, and therefore we will attempt to think of 
film not so much as the construction of a narrative but as the 
organization of a temporal and variable whole. Angelopoulos' 
films are characterised by a distinctive temporality - "time is his 
poetic medium"56 - and in them, time creates ruptures in the 
55 For Bergson, the cinematograph extracts "from all movements peculiar to 
all the figures an impersonal movement abstract and simple, movement in 
general: we put this into the apparatus, and we reconstitute the individuality 
of each particular movement by combining this nameless movement with the 
personal attitudes". And in general, so proceed perception, intellection and 
language [CE, 322-3231. 
56 Wolfram Schutte, «Evas Tonoyp&cpoS Xpovotaýt6cviij » ow EvXXoyucb 
Tbpo too 410 (D&Onß&X Ktvr patoypcpov OeooaXovixr1c, O6&, pos 
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narrative sequence, giving rise to a unique temporality that 
renounces the conventions and taboos of filmic time but 
manifests a dedication to Reality. 
Walter Benjamin argued that mechanical reproduction 
destroys the aura of a work of art and thus challenges the idea 
of authenticity on which art was founded for a long period of 
time. He posited that photography (and especially cinema) 
shifts the paradigm of art's reception from contemplation to 
shock 57 However, the evolution of cinema has defied - or 
rendered more complex - Benjamins insight. Angelopoulos' 
cinema has been characterised as a "cinema of contemplation" 
which reveals itself in striking images and singular duration 58 
Slowness - which is characteristic in his films - is a 
contemplative temporal mode, in the same way that Benjamin 
considered distance as a contemplative mode of spatial 
perception 59 However, in our view, Angelopoulos' shots of 
extended duration bear also a subsistent materialist sense. What 
we will try to show is how the particular uses of various types 
of shots do not simply imply a non-linear structure of time, but 
rather they are successful in implicating in the physical 
perception of movement, of qualities and of content, an 
intensive experience of rhythm of a whole. 
First, we will introduce some aspects of the relation 
between moving-image and perception in order to reveal how 
Ayye)airovAos (exö. Kaoiavuwiry 2000) pp. 91-105 at 104. Also in Theo 
Angelopoulos, Reihe Film 45, Carl Hanser Verlag, (München, 1992). 
57 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction", in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn 
(Fontana Press: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992) pp. 211-244. 
58 Andrew Horton, The Films of Theo Angelopoulos: A Cinema of Contemplation, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). About the general 
characteristics of Angelopoulos' cinema see especially the "Introduction: The 
Voyage beyond the Borders". 
59 Thus one of his definitions of aura described it as "the unique 
phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be" in Walter Benjamin, 
supra, p. 216. 
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film opens perception to intuition by incorporating movement. 
Then we will turn to Angelopoulos' work and will begin by 
arguing that his films abstain from the conventions of realism 
and psychology that structure narrative cinema, in order to 
create an intensive/ temporal relation to reality. Following this, 
we will elaborate this point in terms of the singular expression - 
or rhythm - he creates for different types of shots, particularly 
the long shot and the long take, the sequence-shot and the out- 
of-field. Then we will address some motifs of The Travelling 
Players, aspiring to show how they structure the singular 
rhythm of the film at different levels or modalities. Finally, we 
will conclude this chapter by suggesting how Angelopoulos 
attempts to envelop in the physical movement of the images an 
ontology of time. 
II. The moving-image and perception 
In contrast to its early popularity and accessibility as a 
form of entertainment, cinema has generated a long dispute 
between theorists, historians and filmmakers, concerning its 
identification as an art form. Film is problematic in two ways: 
on one hand, cinema, like photography, fuses art with 
technology, and the mechanical character of its production and 
reproduction, challenges and apparently annuls the primacy of 
artistic skills. On the other hand, it incorporates a plurality of 
means of expression that it borrows from the 'pure' arts. 
Its hybrid form makes it difficult to specify the nature of 
its artistic expression. Although the modernist doctrine of art 
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was founded on "the medium-specificity thesis" (the idea that 
each art form, in virtue of its medium, has its own exclusive 
domain of development") cinema resisted an essential 
classification and pointed to the redundancy of such an 
approach to art 60 But at the same time, avant-garde practices 
mainly consisted in experimentation with the medium, and 
although they did not seek to define an essential nature for the 
art form, they played, tested and challenged the possibilities 
and restrictions the medium posited. In other words, there 
appears to be an intrinsic relation, rather than merely a 'use' 
relation, between the emergent art form and the material 
technology that renders it possible. Our analysis of 
Angelopoulos' films will be based on this conception and will 
also try to illuminate the tangible ways of its unfolding. 
The innovation of cinematic technology was that it did 
not only capture the image of reality, but also its movement. 
Cinema reproduces movement from stasis, by projecting 
twenty-four frames per second. The inscription of movement in 
the image increases the illusory effect, which not only relies 
upon the photographic resemblance of the static image, but also 
that it reproduces the flowing images of everyday experience; it 
therefore produces a different perceptual effect. 
The film movement appears in many guises. Jean Mitry 
cites aspects of cinematic movement as such: the movement of 
represented objects within the camera frame, which is nothing 
more than recorded movement mechanically reproduced; the 
rhythmic movement determined by the type of shot, e. g. pan, 
track, etc., and more specifically, the dynamic relationships 
which each shot maintains with the preceding and succeeding 
60 Noel Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) p. 25. 
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shot 61 The last point emphasises that what is 'in the shots is 
less important than understanding how they are linked, 
grouped and interconnected. To understand the linkage of 
images (whether linear or non-linear) is not so much a matter of 
following the narrative structure, and of understanding the 
cognitive content of the film, but rather of viewing the tensions 
created in the interval between the images, and the intensities 
created in the gaps. 
Let us however make a small detour. Bergson insists that 
movement is distinct from the space covered by it, but that we 
continually confuse the two. The reductionist error is based on 
the formula where movement equals immobile sections plus 
abstract time. According to this view, which originates as the 
result of modern scientific revolution, movement becomes 
spatialised, while time is recomposed from immanent material 
elements (sections), which replace the qualitative privileged 
instant with the quantitative any-instant-whatever [C1,14]. 
However, the cause of the confusion is not only conceptual but 
also perceptual. It lies with the capacities of the eye itself and 
the primary role we often attribute to it in our experience; or 
better, the confusion originates when we isolate each of the 
senses and abstract from real experience. 
Moussinac had observed quite early that, "though our 
eyes can appreciate the difference between colours and between 
shapes and between relative distances in perspective, they 
cannot appreciate rhythmic qualities in the movement they 
perceive - they cannot see movement in movement" 62 Our 
visual perceptions refer to space, and the eye is only capable of 
perceiving spatial relationships. Since the essential characteristic 
61 Jean Mitry, The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema, trans. Christopher 
King (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997) p. 91. 62Cited in jean Mitry, supra, p. 116 
89 
of movement is precisely non-spatial, then movement is not 
seen, but nor is its perception localisable in any other of the 
sense organs, although they may effectively get hints of it. 
Movement can only be wholly perceived, which does not 
require all the body as the sum of its parts, nor the sum of sense 
impressions, but rather the body (or a part of it) as a whole. And 
similarly, movement cannot be segmented and reconstituted by 
fixed points because it bears the duration of a whole. The 
perception of movement therefore is non-localisable but 
immersive. But then movement is no more perceptual than 
intuitive; it requires the intuition of the body. 
We can now return to think about the meaning or effect 
of movement in cinema. In the first case, the movement of 
represented objects refers to the movement within the frame or 
set, which modifies the relationship between its parts. This 
movement is primarily seen, in that it is a representation 
(although it is not totally deprived from intensive qualities). In 
the second case, movement concerns the shot, the moving 
camera, and has a double effect: it both translates the 
modifications of the parts of the set, and expresses a change in 
the state of the whole. This kind of movement is both seen, in 
the former case, and also wholly perceived, or intuited, in the 
latter; the difference is now produced on the level of affection 
[C1,19]. 
Moreover, from the moment that movement is not 
recorded as the traversing of space, but is inscribed in the image 
and its articulations as mobility, there is an emphatic transition 
from the spatial to its temporal dimension, where movement 
becomes less extensive and more intensive and it envelops 
rhythm. Rhythm becomes apparent only at the moment film 
becomes emancipated from the requirements of subject matter 
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to fulfil its aesthetic function; from the moment the image is not 
extended into action but suspended in the interval which opens 
it up to time. 
III. Beyond realism and psychology 
Angelopoulos' films belong to a cinematic tradition 
which challenges the established conventions of classical 
Hollywood films, and these latter are founded on a principle of 
reality, or 'reality convention', which does not simply mean that 
cinema needs to represent real or realistic events, as would be 
the case for realism; instead it is a profounder convention which 
may willingly incorporate also fictive events but on condition 
that they appear as real. Such appearance of reality is 
principally achieved in the structure of film as a narrative 
content. The narrative is constructed by events which are 
connected logically in terms of cause and effect and which 
unfold in a linear order. Consequently, the value of the images 
lies mostly in the content of the representation - it describes the 
image of reality and it can only reproduce perceptual 'cliches' 
but fails to create a Reality. In other words, the reality 
convention does not so much concern the faithfulness to reality, 
but rather its conception as a container of contents, its 
objectification. 
However, Angelopoulos renounces this fundamental 
convention. He does not do this by introducing fantastic 
elements, or by reproducing an imaginary or purely subjective 
reality, but mainly by descending upon it, by stretching realism 
91 
to its limits. But how does film stretch realism and what 
happens at the limits? 
According to Deleuze, the principle for the creation of 
time-images which go beyond the reproduction of perceptual 
cliches, is the 'breaking' of the sensori-motor image, which 
inserts an interval. He writes: 
A cliche is a sensory-motor image of the thing. As Bergson says, 
we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we 
always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are 
interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to 
perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs 
and psychological demands. We therefore normally perceive 
only cliches. But, if our sensory-motor schemata jam or break, 
then a different type of image can appear: a pure optical-sound 
image, the whole image without metaphor, brings out the thing 
in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or 
unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be 'justified' 
for better or for worse... [C2,20] 
Let us then explore how Angelopoulos breaks the 
sensori-motor image, first by considering how his films go 
beyond a psychological realism. There is a narrative in the film 
and his images always begin from reality, which they strive to 
describe. In this description the characters of the film do not 
hold a primary position anymore than the harshness of the 
walls of old houses, the colour of the stones, the rain or the 
sound of steps on the tiled streets do. Everything makes part of 
the same plane. 
His preference for the descriptive rather than the 
expressive or affective image becomes apparent primarily in his 
extensive use of the long shot and the depth-of-field, as opposed 
to the restrictive use of medium shots and the scarcity of close- 
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ups. One of the main values of the close-up lies in that it 
provides us with a tactile, sensuous impression of objects, or an 
expressive quality of characters, by which we become 
emotionally implicated to the spectacle. On the contrary, in the 
wide-angle shot, the camera, filming from a distance, comprises 
a wider range of things and persons within its frame, with the 
result of, on one hand, taking up the role of the observer rather 
than the participant in the action, and on the other, providing us 
with information rather than emotion. 63 At a first glance then, it 
appears that this type of image aspires to give us, a realistic 
reproduction or an objective view of reality. But this is not 
exactly the case in his films. 
Moreover, his films also take us beyond psychology. The 
scarcity of close-ups is due to the absence of dramatic scenes of 
psychological significance. Dialogues do not play a central part 
as a vehicle for the revelation of his characters' thoughts, 
intentions, or feelings. In fact, they are rare, and they are either 
reduced to the basic or tend to the poetic. Most of the time we 
have very little information about the history, relationships, 
everydayness, fears, or demons or dreams of the characters; we 
may not even know their names. It has been argued that 
Angelopoulos' figures are not psychological entities but 
63 Jean Mitry defines and differentiates the two types of shot as following: 
"Because it has nothing in it other than logical information, the wide angle 
turns us into pure observers of the objects it puts in front of our eyes and 
distances us from the drama it presents, by interposing an actual distance 
between us and it. We participate on a purely intellectual level. We are 
moved by the action and by the resulting facts, ideas or feelings and hardly 
at all by the objects as 'objects', nor by the way they are presented (unless the 
plastic qualities of the image provoke an appropriate emotion) [... ] In the 
long-shot, the individual component parts are eclipsed by the vast number of 
interrelationships between them. [... ] In the wide-angle shot, since 
relationships of movement take precedence, perception is directed toward 
comprehension rather than consciousness released from intellection; with the 
effect that though in the close-up, comprehension must first of all pass 
through emotion, here emotion is the result of comprehension. " Jean Mitry, 
The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema, trans. Christopher King (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1998) p. 134. 
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symbols. TM His characters testify to the possibility of creating 
consistent entities, which are not based on significant 
psychological traits constitutive of subjects. However, to 
consider them as 'symbols', misses in our view the concreteness 
of their existence, a material harshness they embody. It 
intellectualizes their reality (as well as our relationship to them) 
and most significantly, it renders them absolute entities while, 
in our view, they are fragments, which attain their consistency 
by remaining riddled. 
Let us take as an example the Travelling Players, probably 
Angelopoulos' most acclaimed film. This is an epic film, a 
meditation on Greek history - yet without being a 'historical' 
film - narrated through the journey of the travelling players. 
The story unfolds at three levels or circles which both disrupt 
and complement each other: the turbulent historical and 
political events in Greece of the years 1939-1952, the course of 
the travelling players during those years, and the resurgence of 
the ancient myth of Atreides. It is characteristic that the only 
character who has a name in the film is Orestis, alluding to the 
myth. Orestis is a partisan during the civil war, fighting in the 
mountains with ELAS (Greek National Liberation Party, formed 
by the communists). He is the only character who bears a 
symbolic existence; he is the symbol of the revolution. He 
appears at a few, critical instances, even though he permeates 
the film, especially through his sister and his comrades; 
Angelopoulos reserves for him a different kind of existence. The 
absence of a name for the rest of the members of the group 
reveals the absence of the individual, and the travelling players 
embody existence in collectivity. As Frederic Jameson precisely 
described it: 
64 Nikos Kolovos, O6&)pos Ayy nowlos (A9tjva: Aty6i« pcoS, 1990) xX. 20. 
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[i]n fact, this ungainly procession up the street, uneven couples 
and groups moving at different rates of speed, and with unequal 
effort, yet the directors of the troupe mixing democratically with 
the rest, after the fashion of the circus - this seemingly random 
collection, whose personnel is renewed and transformed like an 
old photo album with the temporal discontinuities (Agamemnon 
dead and alive; Aegisthus inexplicably absent; Orestes and Electra 
together and then apart again), has as its 'philosophical' function 
to disqualify categories of reception that have been formed in an 
overestimation of the individual, or individualism. The hieratic 
stiffness of these inartistically garbed figures in ungainly 
movement has rather the mission of foregrounding that 
unrepresentable thing, the collective. 65 
Collective existence is neither harmoniously pacified nor 
equalised by Angelopoulos, but it has been rendered differential 
and distributive. The film is not about heroes, nor about anti- 
heroes (although we are allowed to favour some, and to criticise 
or dislike others, and Angelopoulos also takes a stance); there 
are only figures of a concrete reality who endure and struggle 
with it, yet to different degrees: some capitulate more easily, 
others persist, and there are few who live tragically the 
consequences of their resistance. These characters are revealed 
to us through their actions. They are not presented to us as 
individuals but rather as roles they come to play within a more 
general, historical dynamic, and they individualize their role in 
concrete experience. That is also why they repeat the myth. 
However, within this differential whole, the figure of 
Orestis' sister (Electra) is differentiated as singular or as a 
singularity. Although most of the times she remains at the back 
65 Frederic Jameson, "The Past as History, the Future as Form", in The Last 
Modernist: The Films of Theo Angelopoulos, ed. Andrew Horton (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood; Trowbridge: Flicks, 1997) p. 86. 
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of the action -a silent witness - she is nevertheless active, and 
she recurs and appears at many instances throughout the film. 
She inhabits a borderline of existence where she both lives the 
events and witnesses them. Similarly, rather than initiating 
action, she is like an 'actor-medium', in the Deleuzian 
expression, "capable of seeing and showing rather than acting" 
[C2,20], an affective surface which reflects the events. 
Things are quite different in Angelopoulos' later film The 
Beekeeper, which as the title indicates, follows a main figure, a 
protagonist, as he leaves (or is left by, or both) his family, home, 
and town, travelling towards the south. However, this is a 
strange protagonist who is not really acting but is rather 
revealed to us while driving his truck in provincial roads, in 
taking care of the bees, in things he does not do, and in silences. 
Yet, his silences are filled not only by solitude but also by the 
tension of despair and of passion. In the young woman he meets 
on the road there is something 'magnetic', however, she has 
nothing 'special'; she is without past, without name, without 
plans, but only a (sad) appetite and a future. 
Thus in Angelopoulos, even when the film follows the 
actors, such as is the case mostly in The Beekeeper and less in The 
Travelling Players, still the focus is not on the actors, nor on their 
lives. Rather they are vehicles, and through them something 
else is allowed to emerge. But this is mainly rendered possible 
by his particular implementation of time. 
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IV. The interweavement of space and time: the long shot, the 
depth-of-field and the sequence 
a. The continuity of long shots and long takes 
Angelopoulos' filmic style is largely characterised by the wide 
use of the long take, panning and tracking shots, the depth-of- 
field, and mainly the sequence-shot. Duration and temporal 
continuity, which are favoured over montage, become 
interrupted by the intersection of frontal or static shots, and still 
images. As we will attempt to show, such temporal organization 
and editing of the images (rather than narrative organization) 
also results in a different mode of perception and appropriation 
of the cinematic image. 
A significant aspect of Angelopoulos' use of the long shot 
is the revelation of the landscape; there is a fascination with 
Greek and Balkan landscape and the landscape of the south in 
general. However, this is quite different from the Mediterrenean 
cliche; it is mainly about a harshness of the south, about a 
desertness as it is mostly apparent in the Reconstruction but also 
in The Travelling Players. In these films the landscape reflects the 
characters' lives, and the characters reflect their landscape of 
stone. The one is not a metaphor for the other but the one is 
enveloped in the other, and the long shot achieves to enfold 
within a single plane the animate and the inanimate, man and 
nature, the rain and the stone. This is no longer a plane of 
objectivity and a descriptive image, but rather it is a plane of 
intimacy, where man is part of nature. Nevertheless, this is not 
the image of a 'harsh' nature but rather of a variable, 'poly- 
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rhythmic' nature that does not cease to unveil its power and 
beauty in different expressions. Thus in The Beekeeper, there are 
variations of landscape-images, from the cold and rainy images 
of the beginning of the film, to night scenes of petrol stations on 
the highway. However, the eye of the camera is also taken in a 
medium close-up shot of the beehives amongst wild flowers, 
which open to the sky, and the viewer can almost smell thyme. 
Angelopoulos' fascination with this image of nature will also 
become expressed at the end of the film: Spyros returns to the 
bees, lies on the soil and there is a close-up of his hand tapping, 
in a slight yet intense movement, to the earth. Becoming 
attuned. And from the close-up of the tapping hand and the 
earth, we are taken to a circular panoramic shot of the sky and 
the dance of the bees, and we create our lines of flight by 
becoming in tune with the earth. 66 
Colour plays a significant part in his films, even if they 
are not colourful films. Colour is not only a means of 
representation or of a plastic synthesis of the image, but it 
carries and evokes a whole atmosphere, an era, or an inner 
landscape. Colour does not strike us, it is silent and powerful 
like mesmerism, which penetrates our memory-images and 
gives an evocative sense of the film. It does not attain a symbolic 
value but becomes the chromatic residue, a material quality of 
memory. Thus, it has been noticed that in his historic films, such 
as Days of '36 'and The Travelling Players, the dominant colour is 
ochre, a distinctive colour of the '30s neoclassical buildings in 
Greece. And we also recognise it through a series of paintings of 
that period, especially through those of Yiannis Tsarouhis, 
66 See also Gilles Deleuze: "It is in the earth that we die and atone for our 
birth. [... ] The earth as primordial time of the autochthonous" [C2,115]. 
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where the chromatic nuance itself refers us equally to the urban 
landscape and the political climate of that era. 67 
But the use of colour also goes beyond historical 
reference. In his later films there is a chromatic inclination to 
colder, lighter colours such as pale blue and grey fading 
towards white. Rather than evoking strong colourful contrasts, 
Angelopoulos' sense of colour is that of tonalities. Tonalities 
evoke colours as becomings, degrees of an intensity, which 
unfolds continuously passing into something else. They are 
enveloping atmospheres, fugitive colours, not anymore as 
qualities of the image but as variations of humidity. Similarly, in 
the long shots of the sea, the rain and the mist (in Voyage to 
Cythera or in Ulysses' Gaze) we have gradually passed from the 
landscape, to nostalgia, to the monochrome, to a line of flight. 
This effect is not only produced by a very attentive 
implementation of photography but also by a particular 
implication of time. Angelopoulos' preference for continuity 
rather than juxtaposition is mostly apparent in the temporality, 
and the linkage of the shots. Thus as opposed to rapid editing 
he prefers the long takes, and rather than the montage-effect he 
structures the dialectical image in the continuity of the 
sequence-shot, to which he arrives to give a singular expressive 
significance. But what is the effect of maintaining a temporal 
continuity? Andre Bazin had defined cinema as "objectivity in 
time"68 This is a striking formulation, for although we might 
67 For a more detailed analysis of the 'chromatic periods' of Angelopoulos' 
films see Etprlvr1 Er&0q, Xdpos Kai Xpbvos orov Kivrjparoypdpo rot) O& pov 
Arr ; co&tooa (ExS. Atybx£ptoc ., 
1999) pp. 77-91. Also Etpijvrl Eiaerl, «Me to 
Xpcavajpa too Oo&Wpou AyytXbriouXou: Ot £txaoru LS avacgn oets too 
c voOktxl xat nos anorortdvoviat oto ipyo tou», ozo EuXXoytxö T6po too 
41- Oeonp&X Ktvr)patoyp&pou ecooaxovüu1l , ©opos Ayy. X66ro&os (exS. Kaotavtdirj, 2000) pp. 169-172. 
68 Andre Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967) p. 14. 
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assume that there is an objectivity in space (in terms of 
resemblance), how could we conceive of an objectivity in time? 
Is there an objective temporality of looking at a landscape, or a 
movement, or a face? Isn t temporality actually only subjective, 
as Bergson had argued with persistence? 
Bazin explains this point through an analogy between the 
photographic and the cinematic image thus: while a photograph 
preserves the instantaneous image of the thing, film preserves 
"the image of duration, change mummified as it were"; film 
preserves time 69 More precisely, this is already the function of 
photography, which "does not create eternity, as art does, it 
embalms time, rescuing it simply from its proper corruption"? ° 
For Bazin, the ontology of the photographic image (and 
therefore the filmic image as well) does not reside on some 
likeness to the image of reality. Through light, photography 
captures a material duration of the instant and preserves it in a 
mummified form on the film; photography is an index of reality 
rather than a representation. But at the same time, the selected 
instant extracted from the living duration in which it was 
initially born, becomes an instant in its own right and can be 
reinserted or unfold in different durations. It opens itself up to 
the repetition of experience and can become a new reality. 
However, film takes a significant step further and reproduces 
not only an instant but a duration; 'objectivity in time' means 
that we are given not only the image but also its duration, and 
therefore cinema structures our perception not only spatially 
but also temporally. 
Thus, the long takes of empty landscapes, or of man and 
landscape, during which few things happen, challenge the 
69 Ibid., p. 15. 
70 Ibid., p. 14. 
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common paradigm of perception. Following Bergson and 
Deleuze, when movement becomes only subordinated to time, 
when it is not anymore translated into an empirical succession 
in space, it opens up to duration. Angelopoulos' extended 
temporalities of the non-significant removes the focus from the 
content of perception, and allows for time to pass, thus making 
of time an autonomous filmic event. Since the object of 
perception does not significantly change, perception of the 
image becomes suspended, turns back on itself, and becomes 
intuition of duration or self-affection. The image that we 
perceive is no longer there for what it represents, but it only 
exposes itself and unfolds. It is in these long shots, where the 
camera's eye lets itself rest on things and landscapes and waits, 
until something - something almost imperceptible - begins to 
happen. This may be the entry of a character in the frame as the 
initiator of an action, but mostly it is the emancipation of matter 
itself. As Jameson puts it: 
[t]his is as in Bazin or Kracauer, an ontology of stone and rain, depth, 
the tangible and the resistant. [... ]Image is too subjective a term for 
the weight and solidity of these constructs, or for the texture of the 
walls themselves, and the cobblestones (emphasis mine) . 
71 
It is because the camera - not the director nor the 
audience but the camera as an (in)distinct; third 
(un)consciousness - can waste time on nothing and lie in wait 
for nothing, that something emerges, that the stones or the 
walls, the depth, the mist and the rain (re)collect a past and a 
memory, which cannot be limited to our memories but tend 
beyond them to pure memory as the time of matter. Time is not 
71 Frederic Jameson, supra, p. 84. 
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only the medium but also the end for Angelopoulos' 
representations; it becomes an indexical thread of the cinematic 
image which takes it beyond representation and which makes 
us, instead of being forced into a fictional reality, experience its 
virtuality in the camera-reflection. 
In the question how can one - through art or cinema - 
represent reality, Angelopoulos understands the apparent 
betrayal and it seems that it is only time that can rescue it, only 
in time things are rescued. When he chooses to let his camera 
rest longingly on the steps of the protagonists, or on the empty 
landscapes, he seems to suggest that since we cannot know 
things in-themselves, since the real does not cease to exceed or 
evade and resist our representations, we can only give things 
time and let ourselves be subsumed in their unfolding rhythms. 
In that singular instant in the flow of time where the camera, 
between being a third consciousness and a no-consciousness, 
between observing things and being absorbed by them, between 
being a camera-eye and becoming pure matter, in that between 
or in that simultaneity where time cuts space, is born a 
difference, as a primal sperm of life, where things emerge. 
b. Continuity and non-linearity: the sequence-shot and the 
depth-of-field 
Angelopoulos' long takes, sequence-shots and depth-of- 
fields are all expressions of a dedication to spatio-temporal 
unity rather than the segmentation of montage. By reproducing 
extended, almost real temporalities of actions, his images favour 
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an ambiguous realism rather than the intense stylistics of action 
in montage. The principle of montage was most systematically 
developed by the Soviet school in the 1920s, which "has 
stipulated this as the nerve of the film"? 2 Eisenstein considered 
it to be the essence of cinema, and it is true that montage is both 
a fundamental 'technical' principle (editing) but it is also a 
powerful and contested idea (effect-montage). Thus different 
conceptions or styles of montage have been developed, 
although the principle is based on the selection and 
juxtaposition of two shots. In Eisensteins dialectical conception, 
meaning (or the idea or the whole) is created as a sparkle or as 
an explosion of the tension created in-between the juxtaposed 
shots. His principle of montage constructs the event as a 
dynamic effect in the mind of the viewer, rather than as a mere 
addition of partial views which would only give its 
description. 73 However, montage is not the only way of 
connecting two shots. 
Orson Welles had paradigmatically used the depth-of- 
field in order to organise the parallel action or focus on the 
foreground and the background in a single shot, where one 
comments or complements the other. Drawing upon Welles and 
Italian neo-realism, Bazin theorized and praised the function of 
the depth-of-field for producing an image of excessive realism. 
Part of his argument was that because the wide-angle shot 
comprises a larger picture of reality and gives us more 
information about it, it allows the viewer a greater freedom to 
organize his perception in the image himself. Moreover, he 
72 Sergei Eisenstein, Film Form, in Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (eds. ) Film 
Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings (New York/ Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) pp. 15-42 at 28. 
73 "But in my view montage is not an idea composed of successive shots 
stuck together but an idea that DERIVES from the collision between two 
shots that are independent of one another". Ibid., p. 28. 
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argued, montage presupposes of its very nature the unity of 
meaning of the dramatic event and rules out ambiguity of 
expression, while on the contrary, depth of focus reintroduces 
ambiguity into the structure of the image at least potentially. 74 
Jean Mitry criticised Bazin for a 'naive' conception of objectivity; 
the cinematic image is always mediated and the depth-of-field 
is no less restrictively organised in order to force the viewer to 
follow the diagonal or gap. 75 Bazin's argument, however, is 
more complicated and points to something different than a 
simple faith on the immediate relation and identification of the 
cinematic image to reality. 
Moreover, for Bazin "montage as used by Kuleshov, 
Eisenstein, or Gance did not show us the event; it alluded to 
it". 76 It is true that in the case of effect-montage, the editing of a 
series of fixed shots also gives us an impression of continuity, 
but it is a continuity reconstructed intellectually rather than 
perceived and experienced as such. It is a continuity of action, of 
which we are given concrete aspects, fragmentary views whose 
counter-position makes us reconstruct the whole. Nevertheless, 
this is not simply an intellectual reconstruction; on the contrary, 
the juxtaposition of images in montage, which points to the 
gaps in-between rather than to the image's own content, 
produces tensions and 'hits' upon bodily impulses. Thus the 
montage-effect aims at effectuating a physical, direct impact, a 
shock effect that opens a way to the unconscious?? 
74 Andre Bazin, supra, pp. 35-36. 
75 Jean Mitry, supra, pp. 169-172. 
76 Andr@ Bazin, supra, p. 23. 
77 The capacity of the technique of montage to disclose a third meaning 
beyond the two juxtaposed images, not through discourse nor thought, but 
through an almost physical impact and response, was very appealing and 
widely used by the Surrealists at the beginning of this century. Besides the 
fascination with movement, although explored in different ways, is 
characteristic in all avant-garde artistic movements of that era. See Walter 
Benjamin, "Surrealism" in One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. by 
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Angelopoulos' case is relatively singular in this respect. 
Profoundly influenced by Welles, he also favours integration of 
action in a single shot rather than splitting it in two. Although 
the use of depth-of-field per se is not frequently, there are certain 
scenes of stark beauty and power. The wedding scene in The 
Suspended Step of the Stork, invents a paradigmatic use of deep 
focus: in a sombre yet surprising tableau the bride and her 
followers are on the riverbank in the foreground and her groom 
and his followers on the opposite distant shore. There is no 
music on the soundtrack, the only sound is that of the water 
flowing. The scene is captured in sharp, deep focus, which 
allows us to see everything simultaneously, it lasts over six 
minutes and its unique power lies in its use of cinematic space 
and time alone. It is an Orthodox wedding, and the ceremony is 
taking place in the Greek part while the groom across the river- 
border in the other country repeats (but without a priest) the 
actions performed in Greece. Andrew Horton has described the 
scene as "the most obvious case of 'touching' beyond the 
physical". 78 
The static camera witnesses the instance; its stasis, the 
silence and the water flow do not simply invest with solemnity 
the actions performed. Rather this is a temporal stasis, a 
standstill of action itself. The movements recorded are not 
invested but rather disinvested, suspended from the 
Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London and New York: Verso 2000) 
pp. 225-239. Experimental and avant-garde cinematographers, such as 
Eggeling, Hans Richter and Walter Ruttman by creating abstract films, as 
well as Fernand Leger and Henri Chomette in a more concrete way, also 
explored montage in a very imaginative and original way in order to 
produce rhythm as the essence of pure cinema. Indeed they created very 
rhythmic images but "an art, which was the exact antithesis of cinema". On 
the early avant-garde and cinematic rhythm, see Jean Mitry, supra, pp. 109- 
120. 
78 Andrew Horton, The Films of Theo Angelopoulos: A Cinema of Contemplation, 
supra, p. 176. 
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temporality of action; they lose their object or their aim to 
something, and become movements in-themselves or rituals. 
These are already shadows of action which are simultaneously 
repeated on the other side of the riverbank. It is like a virtual 
image of reflections, which are not unfolding in time but rather 
they flash in time's interval. Although it appears like a static, 
spatial shot, the depth-of-field defies space and simultaneity 
and opens up to a polyrhythmic temporality; enveloped in a 
single time - the camera's point of view - it unfolds a double 
temporality of the foreground and the background which is also 
rendered discontinuous by the diagonal of the river. 
Consequently, the ambiguity of reality entailed and 
preserved with the depth-of-field according to Bazin, has 
nothing to do with a faithfulness to the image of reality as Mitry 
wrongly criticised him for stating. Rather the ambiguity evoked 
is related to the discrepancy created within the image; the 
diagonal slices the image and organises it as an intensive- 
temporal whole which is enveloping different temporalities, 
rather than framing it as a spatial container of contents. It is not 
a matter of what are the contents (movements or things) but of 
how they are organised in the whole (shot). Angelopoulos 
envisages depth beyond space as an opening to time, to 
memory and repetition. The deep focus creates a dynamic, 
sharpened space and Angelopoulos moderates the contrasts 
created by implicating the image in light tonal colours ranging 
from white, to grey and blue, and mostly by rendering the 
whole scene enveloped in silence while letting it slip away with 
the sound of the water flow. He thus allows for space to be 
enveloped in duration and sound, or in suspension and pure 
time. 
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However, Angelopoulos does not make a wide use of the 
depth-of-field. Instead, he temporalizes Welles' idea and 
maintains his fundamental principle of spatiotemporal unity by 
inventing a singular implementation of the sequence-shot. 
Generally speaking a change of shot involves a change in the 
field of view and, inversely, a change in the field of view 
produces a change of shot. The sequence shot is a 'method' 
where editing does not take place by joining end to end 
different shots taken at different times and different places, but 
"takes place in the camera producing the same sequence of 
shots in one single continuous movement, in the course of one 
take". 79 
In the sequence shot, the whole scene is rendered in one 
single shot, in one long take. Since it often replaces editing, it is 
also usually allied with the mobile frame. Thus, in the case of 
the sequence, the long take may involve panning and tracking 
camera movements, craning or zooming changing vantage 
points that substitute for the shifts of view supplied by editing. 
Thus the sequence shot is not merely another type of shot but 
rather it creates its own internal logic. It does not only develop a 
beginning, a middle and an end, but mainly it may have "its 
own internal pattern, its own development, its own trajectory 
and space"80 
But let us elaborate this point and the significance of such 
spatiotemporal unity by presenting a most characteristic and 
complex sequence shot from The Travelling Players. The 
sequence begins with a frontal shot of the group entering the 
courtyard and then follows them by changing position as they 
traverse the courtyard; when they walk up the stairs the camera 
Jean Mitry, ibid., p. 64. 
80 David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction (Boston: 
McGraw Hill, 2004) p. 287. 
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is no longer tracking but from the same point it revolves 
elliptically inscribing in its movement the wall, the stones and 
then catching again the travelling players at the balcony and 
following them as they leave the scene (to the rooms); then, in a 
low angle shot the camera traverses the whole empty balcony 
and stops at the other end, awaits while the members of the 
group reappear in the frame (initiated by the off-screen sound 
of the steps); the camera frames from a low angle the travelling 
players' look at something which remains outside the frame. 
Still frame. Then the camera leaves the group it begins again to 
revolve and inscribes in the passage the other part of the space; 
it stops after having completed half a rotation and remains still. 
Two actors appear and recite; the off-screen voice of the father, 
who subsequently enters the frame and the camera follows him 
for one last time. 
This sequence does not merely perform a choreographic 
camera movement but it also implicates in it a unique temporal 
structure. The sequence begins as an actual description of the 
travelling players entering the space. However, when the 
camera starts moving and tracking, this space description 
becomes destabilized for we no longer just observe but we also 
become implicated in this movement and therefore in the 
described space. The mobile camera does not describe 
movement in space but it mobilizes space itself, and creates an 
unusual disoriented sense. The camera tracks the balcony and 
stops, waits and then frames a look at an off-screen space. This is 
a moment of suspension, a leap from the dimension of the 
physical to something else. Suspension is only initiated by the 
stillness of the camera and of the actors; it is however, 
completed by reflecting through the look an invisible space. 
Stillness becomes an oscillation over a void. 
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The camera recovers its movement not linearly but in 
rotation, which creates retrospectively the vertiginous sense. The 
vertigo of suspension cannot be actually experienced as such 
but only enfolded in active recovery. The camera stops at an 
empty space and the appearance of the actors - outside of the 
earlier context - completes our disorientation. The rotation has 
not only transferred us at a different space but also at another 
time. Where are we? The off-screen voice of the father is thrown 
as a fragile connecting thread between the balcony and the new 
site, between the past and the present, between life and 
theatrical performance. When he enters the scene we have come 
back to the plane of action. 
As this analysis has aspired to show the mobile camera 
attaches the viewer to its movement. Moreover, by inscribing 
the movement of the shifting point of view, it embeds both 
change and point of view in the spatiotemporal whole. 
Therefore, rather than being a disembodied gaze which takes up 
different viewpoints in an abstract space - that is a space merely 
viewed but without the body's sense of space, the viewer is now 
made to assume a concrete bodily existence in the image, 
transmitted through the intuition of camera's movement. In the 
tracking shot, the camera no longer describes movement but, 
since it is itself becoming movement, it also transmits it as a 
flowing sensation. Moreover, the continuous shot does not 
reproduce the action as a readymade product and therefore as 
mere description, but by following its spatiotemporal unfolding 
and also by becoming this unfolding in movement. The passage 
from the static long take to the mobile frame renders not only 
the representation of the action visual, but a whole process of 
formation as well as a becoming. Similarly to the depth-of-field, 
the sequence-shot preserves the unity of space and time in the 
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action and that is why, as Bazin had argued, it delivers us a 
present taking place. Conversely, montage in its segmentation 
gives the impression of a ready-made reality, a kind of 
presentification. The sequence-shot goes a step further: by 
temporalizing such unity through camera mobility, it makes 
presentation also a becoming. 
c. Beyond the visible: the out-of-field 
Cinema creates tension not simply with the images 
themselves but also in their implication in movement and time; 
the temporality of the image also opens it to what remains 
outside of it. There is a powerful dialectic in Angelopoulos' 
films between what is contained in the frame and the out-of- 
field, between action and silence, the visible and the invisible. 
However, this is not so much a dialectic, as opposition of two 
terms, but rather a relation of parts or aspects of a whole. What 
remains out-of-field is enveloped in the film even if it remains 
invisible; it opens the film to contemporaneous different 
modalities of existence. The various uses of the out-of-field are 
once more related to the problem of representation and attempt 
to create a different sense for something that may be present 
without being actual. Moreover, if the frame also envelops an 
outside of it, this does not eliminate the tension of the passage 
from the visible to the invisible. The latter is not merely an 
extension of the former, and the role and function of the out-of- 
field assumes various significations and expressions. 
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In Days of '36 Angelopoulos made wide use of the out-of- 
field, not only for artistic reasons but also pushed by the 
practical need to escape censorship 81 Things happen in rooms 
beside corridors, behind closed doors, in whispering, while the 
camera remains fixed on an empty space. The other space, 
where the action is taking place but which is kept out of our 
field of view, is only suggested to us by indicative elements. 
And even though we do manage to follow the narrative 
sequence, at the end, what is most significant in the film is not 
what has happened behind the door, but that dictatorships are 
always about closed doors, whispers, allusions, about the 
impossibility of talking freely. In this case therefore the interest 
does not anymore lie in the content of the unseen, of what was 
kept in secret, but the out-of-field becomes the form of the secret 
itself as an expressive form of dictatorships. Originating from a 
particular historical dictatorship as a material condition, 
Angelopoulos achieves a reflection upon its practices and he 
thus moves from a historical narrative of what happened to the 
political analysis of how it happens. 
In another case, the out-of-field is used as an extension of 
the narrative, standing within it rather than outside of it and 
serving purposes of dramatic tension. An example of such a use 
could be found in The Travelling Players in which the camera is 
still and frames the theatrical stage. The father, coming out from 
the drawn curtains, announces the beginning of the play, which 
is to be interrupted a few instants later by the sound of 
aeroplanes' sirens and their bombarding. The lights go on and 
off, we listen to the audience's screams and their running away, 
81 The film is about the coming to power of Metaxas' dictatorship in 1936. In 
fact, however, it is but a disguised allegory for the dictatorship of 1967-1974, 
and since the film was made during those years Angelopoulos could never 
have made it unless he adopted this allusive form. 
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while the camera remains fixed upon the stage even after all 
action is ended. Although it has taken place outside the camera 
frame, it is still in a space continuous with it, in its extension, a 
space perceptible and definable. The empty space is filled by the 
sounds that surround it and the static shot inscribes a 
movement, which remains within the bounds of our perception. 
Yet, the choice of keeping the representation out of vision, and 
presenting it only in its sound, presents the event as an echo, as 
the physical and psychological palpitations it creates. The still 
frame of emptiness freezes us, deprives us from participating in 
action and movement by actually seeing it, and only transmits 
the tension of the event. Letting time pass in silence releases the 
tension in order to give rise to contemplation. 
In The Beekeeper Angelopoulos uses the voice-off more 
ambiguously. Spyros is sitting on the cinema stage where he 
and the young woman have spent the night, after a failed 
attempt of sexual intercourse. The sequence begins with a close- 
up and then the camera zooms out to a medium shot. There is 
no movement in the image but rather a fossilized sense; 
movement as a sign of life becomes initiated by her off-screen 
voice. The voice-off brings an interruption to the actual visual 
image; the interruption in space (where does her voice come 
from? ) doubles itself as an interruption in time, as a memory. 
He raises his look to the off-screen space and then he replies, 
what tells us that she is actually in that space and time. 
Nevertheless, her absence from the frame makes them inhabit 
distinct spatio-temporal planes. It is not so much that their 
worlds do not communicate but rather that her voice reaches 
him as from somewhere other than the actual space, her voice 
opens to another world. She asks him to sing a song and he 
whistles a tune; whistling unfolds like a thread in-between the 
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on and the off-screen. The camera changes view in montage 
(reverse-shot) but we are faced with an empty dark space. Both 
voices are now off-screen and we become suspended by a 
dialogue that takes place nowhere. This is no longer a 
discrepancy between sound and image, or action and memory 
as modalities of existence, but a sudden leap to a pure time. She 
gradually appears from depth and from darkness, naked, 
coming straight to the camera, and we hesitate to decide 
whether she is real or imaginary, now or in the past, looking at 
the camera or looking at him. The next instant frames her from 
the back walking to him. 
The beginning of the same film is a utopian voice-off. A 
high angle shot of a long table and roseleaves spread on the 
white tablecloth; a courtyard paved with mosaic tiles, it is 
raining. The sound we hear interweaves the sound of the rain, 
music and the narration of a story about the dance of the bees to 
a child. In terms of the narrative we understand due to the 
following shot that it is the scene of a wedding and the rain has 
made the guests move inside the house. The story of the bees is 
a memory of his father, a beekeeper, narrating. The bees, the 
rain, dance and the past recur in the film even if in different 
contexts and masks. But this is an image of the origin of the film, 
which only reveals by disclosing, memory and utopia, a 
weaving from which the real (the story of the film) will be 
unfolded. 
The out-of-field is not simply a negation or a non- 
coincidence between the visual and the sound; some times it is 
the space that surrounds the camera frame which can be 
defined mainly by a previous or following action, and other 
times it is a space that remains indeterminate, a non-space. 
Much more, it refers to what is neither seen nor understood but 
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is nevertheless perfectly present [Cl, 16]. Angelopoulos invents 
different expressions for the out-of-field. The out-of-field is the 
secret, but it leaves behind it the content to become itself the 
form. At other instances the out-of-field is inserted as a gap in 
order to maintain the tension of the event by preventing its 
explication in movement (the visual image). The secret becomes 
the intensity of the event which is transmitted rather than given. 
And then the out-of-field comes to create lines of flight, to 
invent different temporalities and planes, to redeem the 
encounters that failed this time, to grant that there is always 
repetition in the image. 
V. The Travelling Players: repetition and suspension 
Up to this point we have attempted to show how 
different types of shot and editing create different perceptual 
effects for the viewer and also how they envelop an intensity 
and rhythm which open the perception of the film to variable 
layers of experience. In this part we would like to consider 
certain aspects or motifs of The Travelling Players - not in- 
themselves but in how they relate and structure the whole, and 
how they create a sense or an idea of the film. 
The narrative of The Travelling Players constitutes an 
account of Greek history during the years 1939-1952 presented 
through the journey of the troupe. History is not represented 
directly as the events themselves but rather indirectly as it is 
lived by the members of the group. And there is also the motif 
of the myth, the ancient myth of Atreides, which becomes 
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replayed in the life of certain members of the troupe. The three- 
level narrative structure indicates already a non-linear 
composition of the film which unfolds by creating lines of 
intersection. 
Angelopoulos' non-linear conception of history is 
exemplified in the sequence shot. Thus the film begins with the 
camera slowly tracking backwards, and following the troupe 
through a small town as a megaphone in the background 
broadcasts political information; we are in 1952. The troupe 
continues walking past the town square, there is no cut but a 
continuous shooting but it is now 1939 and Metaxas' 
dictatorship (this information is given to us from the blaring 
speakers). The troupe is fifteen years younger, and there are 
clearly more members now. At first, this appears to be a 
dialectical conception of time and history, and it is true that 
Angelopoulos' considers his use of the sequence-shot as the 
embodiment of the Hegelian dialectic. Nevertheless, in our view 
his singular implementation of the sequence-shot defies the 
dialectical conception in favour of something else. 
As we have already discussed the sequence inscribes the 
event in continuity rather than in the static juxtaposition of 
montage. The extension of 1952 to 1939 in a single shot-rather 
than in the montage of two shots - does not primarily aim to 
juxtapose and make apparent the opposition between the two 
historical instances. 82 First, it envelops the two moments in a 
82 On the two poles stand a free but decimated Greece (1952) and a 
dictatorship (1939), the latter having been the culmination of another series 
of political and military mistakes. In-between the two there are four years of 
war and German occupation, followed by western intervention for the 
establishment of democracy, which ended up in a three years civil war 
between the Right and the Left. The narration of a member of the troupe - in 
the form of a monologue facing the camera - of how he came to Greece from 
Asia Minor when the Greeks and the Turks exchanged populations makes 
another leap in the past from 1940 to 1922 to unfold another forking path of 
history. 
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single process of formation. History is not an intellectual 
synthesis created by the juxtaposition of events but rather it is 
an enveloping living process, which ascribes continuity to 
events, although there is neither linearity nor direct causality 
between them. Instead 1952 and 1939 relate by echoing each 
other and by repeating. 
However, this is not a mythic repetition of the same, and 
Angelopoulos does not give us a mythological account of 
history. On the contrary, the motif of the circle and of repetition 
in time, the insertion in the narration of historical and political 
events of the ancient myth of Atreides, all these elements do not 
translate history into a mythical destiny, but on the contrary 
turn myth into history. The Travelling Players is very much about 
the forking paths of history, crisscrossing over time and space; it 
reveals a history, which is neither linear nor teleological but 
may move forward and backwards, and which bears gaps and 
repetitions. The present historical moment is always the most 
contracted degree of the past, of the whole past. 1952 does not 
echo 1939 by resemblance, as if they were two different points 
or stages of historical time, it echoes it because it bears it and 
because the one is enfolded in the other. 
The crisscrossing in time does not constitute a flash-back. 
The conception of the flash-back presupposes that one has 
secured the present and that the past is only at our back while 
the future stands in front; it corresponds to a linear conception 
of time. However, in The Travelling Players there is not a single 
present point processing to the future and leaving behind the 
past. There is instead only constant mobility, temporal 
variability; time becomes a slippery surface rather than a 
pathway which constantly fuses past and future in its present. 
That is why in The Travelling Players (but also in all his films) we 
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are always in a present tense, even if the past is being 
unfolded 83 Moreover, by participating in a present, the past is 
not determined in advance but it opens itself to new 
interpretations, considerations and becomings. 
The flowing rhythm of the long shots and the sequence 
becomes interrupted by the insertion of static shots of narration 
or theatre. This dialectic between the flowing image and the 
frontal shot, aims at both implicating us in the flowing sensation 
of the image and distanciating us from it. In the first case we are 
immersed in the image and experience its duration, while in the 
second the scene becomes like a theatrical stage, we are back in 
the place of the observer who looks at it. This is a technique of 
distanciation, resounding the Brechtian techniques in the epic 
theatre; the aim is to break with the illusion and make the 
audience critical and thoughtful about the spectacle instead of 
letting themselves be mesmerised by it. The interchange of 
movement and stasis interweaves the flux of self-forgetfulness 
with the coming to a standstill where tension becomes released 
and constellates into critical thought. 
A characteristic example of the technique of distanciation 
is given at the scene of Orestis' sister rape. The representation of 
the rape is not given realistically; all actors remain dressed and 
they rather imitate a rape instead of enacting it: The purpose of 
the scene is to create the tension of the event, and therefore to 
stage it as real, but without the sentimental participation of the 
viewer, without the identification sought for by realism. The 
following shot frames Electra at a river bank after having been 
raped. She gets up, walks to the camera and starts narrating the 
bloody events of December 1944 that split the Right and the Left 
83 Barthelemy Amengual, «Mta IIoultuaj tqS Iotoptas» ono ©oowpos 
Ayy11&ovAos: EvAAOrIK69 T6yos (0wanß&X Ktvripatoypacpou Oeoaaxovim ls. 
Fx5. Kaatavtcbus, 2000), pp. 23-36 at 25. 
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and led to the civil war. In this way, Angelopoulos de- 
dramatizes the scene of the rape, but also he attempts to reclaim 
the tension created then in order to connect it and release it as 
historical reflection. 
But the most remembered (because most repeated) 
frontal shots are those of the stage where the troupe performs 
the pastoral play. It is always the same play they perform and it 
always remains unfinished. This repetition does not have a 
dramatic significance, it is rather like a recurring motif; it 
punctuates. As it is a theatrical play rather than an event in real 
life, it stresses a repetition of the same, a mechanical aspect of 
repetition. At the same time however, it is repetition which also 
grants continuity, which allows something from the past to 
recur in the future, it gives it a chance to live again. At the end 
of the film Electra remakes the troupe with old and new 
members, and the little boy, grown into a young man, comes to 
play the part of Orestis; he continues him. 
The film begins and ends in almost exactly the same way 
but with a reversed chronology: the troupe stand with their 
suitcases at a train station and we hear one say in voice-over: "It 
was the autumn of '52 we arrived at Aigio. We were tired, we 
had two days to rest". The final shot appears identical, the same 
location and the same voice-over, but we are now in 1939 and 
with all of the travelling players as they once were. This is not 
memory or nostalgia for the past. Nor is it a mythical repetition 
that takes place in history. Repetition in The Travelling Players is 
the motif, which reveals something that resists, something that 
still persists and something that opens for us a future. 
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VI. Conclusion: towards an ontology of time 
Angelopoulos conceives of the filmic unit that is the shot 
as a living cell with inhalation, expression and exhalation. 84 The 
shot is not merely an image but a rhythm; an unfolding in time. 
Temporality is not added to the image but it is the image, its 
singularity and expressiveness; for without time all images 
would be the same. In this conception empty temporalities are 
no less important than temporalities filled with action; they are 
"musical pauses" or necessary parts of the time of the living. 
There is a strong but also ambiguous sense of realism in 
his films. Angelopoulos is not interested in giving us realistic 
representations of the events but nevertheless he is committed 
to this reality and to the present (or at least it is at these 
instances that his films become powerful). However, this reality 
is not determined and this present does not cease to be fugitive, 
already gone and utopian. Moreover, things do not have a 
duration but they are a duration, which unfolds in different 
ways at different contexts. One cannot measure that duration 
and reproduce it, in the same way that rhythm as a temporal 
periodicity cannot be identified to metrical spaces. For rhythm 
is itself the internal principle of temporal organization. The shot, 
or the film as a complex and variable shot, does not reproduce 
the image of things or of reality but it invents the rhythm that 
allows some new reality to emerge. 
Angelopoulos' ontology of time is epitomized in a 
sequence-shot from The Travelling Players. It is the end of 1944. 
The Germans withdraw their occupation troops from Greece 
84 Interview of Theo Angelopolulos, «Ot etK6ves yevvtoiSvtat ota taýt5ta», in 
ibid., pp. 189-202 at 194. 
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and the people celebrate the liberation gathered ät Syntagma 
square. The camera witnesses English, American and Russian 
flags from the back of the scene and songs are heard on the 
loudspeakers. Sudden gunfire interrupts the song and the 
crowd disperses to the surrounding streets. The camera begins 
to rotate capturing people as they run and disappear and it 
returns to the square after having inscribed a 360 degrees circle. 
The camera observes, still for quite a long time three, or four 
dead bodies remaining on the empty square. A Scottish man 
with a bagpipe crosses the square; one of the dead men (a 
member of the troupe) gets up and runs. The camera begins 
again a second rotation from the left; it now captures people 
coming over from the streets. The camera completes the circle 
and comes to frame the people and the red flags from behind. 
In this sequence, comprising two full rotations and a long 
(for cinema) silence in an empty space, Angelopoulos gives us 
the national enthusiasm for the liberation and the faith to 
western allies, the betrayal by the western powers, and the 
communist reaction, which resulted to the bloody events of 
December 1944. The sequence not only gives us the continuity 
and reflection of the two events, but it arrives to translate 
historical time into the time of the camera: the time of belief and 
of betrayal, the time of persistence and the time of active 
recovery. 
But then in these rotations and in that empty space, 
Angelopoulos condenses not just historical events but the 
historical course itself as ontological process of time's 
constitution. For most films the scene would have ended after 
the first rotation, for that would be enough to describe the 
events. However, for Angelopoulos historical time is not just the 
course of the events, and mainly the event has not ended when 
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it no longer takes place. It continues, it persists on the empty 
stage, in an empty time. It is this faith in the continuing life of 
the event that keeps the camera fixed to that space. It awaits, it 
rests its belief in the event that will return. The empty time is 
filled with the tension of what has just happened but also a 
tension coming from the future; awaiting redeems the past in 
the faith to the future. As Nagisha Oshima named it, this is "the 
filming of dedication", which is a filming of hope 85 
And still, if hope is the dedication to this empty stage, 
then it does not belong to the future or to the imagination. In 
Angelopoulos it belongs to the present itself and the forces it 
may arrive to release. His profound materialism or ambiguous 
realism is necessarily connected to the long duration of his 
images. Slowness allows the relaxation of the gaze, which thus 
spreads itself to the matter of the images. But rather than 
staying true to the quality of slowness he also invents it as 
rhythm; in The Travelling Players slowness becomes the 
resistance of matter. Similarly, the sequence-shot as a type of 
shot achieves to envelop the event in spatiotemporal unity 
through the movement of the camera. However, Angelopoulos 
has not only implicated a suspension in the continuity of 
movement but he arrived to invent such a use for this 
technique, which would make the physical (the particular 
camera movement) implicate the metaphysical, in a sequence 
shot. 
85 Nagisha Oshima, "H xtvrrpcnoypig la, q tqS tAntöas", in eo&poS 
Ayy 16zouao . Ei 
)XoyucbS Tbpos, supra, pp. 242-244 at 244. 
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Chapter 3 
Rhythm: the interstices of time and matter 
I. Introduction 
The secularization of art has redefined the field of art and 
urged the invention of different foundations. Art has fallen from 
truth but is now open to experience and the redemptive power 
of memory, and therefore now - more than ever - art requires a 
viewer. At the same time, secularization has also resulted in the 
split of a work of art into form and content. But how is it 
possible to reintegrate the two in the singularity of an artwork? 
What is the role of the viewer? Is he the one who gives 
consistency and determines the work or is it possible to invent 
some other kind of necessary participation which would open 
up space and time for art's 'becoming'? How is the experience 
of art an event that envelops both the viewer and the work in a 
whole, beyond a subject/object dichotomy? 
In this chapter we will argue that a work of art is a 
rhythm that communicates itself as a whole. Rhythm is not an 
inherent property of the work of art and therefore it is not of the 
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order of the element, nor is it attached to the work's spatial or 
representational components as a quality. Furthermore, it 
cannot even be identified with the dynamic movements of the 
camera themselves. In all these cases we remain in the plane of 
action but rhythm happens elsewhere; whether at the level of 
form or content, rhythm is enveloped and enveloping as an 
expressive mode of being of the work of art. This means that it 
is virtual - not an essence to be recovered but a tension that 
needs to be activated and created anew in the concrete 
experience. 
We will begin our discussion by presenting Giorgio 
Agamben s account of the fate of art in modernity. For 
Agamben the modern work of art is founded on a split - its own 
split that has consequently structured it in a circular movement 
of self-referentiality and self-annihilation. Agamben points to 
rhythm as the original structure of the work of art that would 
allow its communicability. However, Agamben's account of 
rhythm evokes an 'in-between' of two orders of time and it 
therefore appears to retain an ontological difference between an 
ordinary and an original temporality. We will then turn to 
Deleuze's Difference and Repetition in order to develop a notion 
of rhythm as implicated in immanent becoming. 
Thus we will begin by recounting the Deleuzian argument 
of intensive difference as the reason for empirical differences. 
Both qualities and extensities are the explications of this 
'intensive quantity', as Deleuze calls it. However, the intensive 
(or difference) can neither be perceived of nor thought of as 
such. Yet, at the same time it can only be lived or sensed, by a 
transcendental exercise of sensibility (as Deleuze calls it) in its 
repetitions, that is, in the extensities that explicate it and the 
qualities that reflect (but only by explicating the reflection) on 
123 
the surface. But the intensive is not only explicated in extensities 
and enveloped in qualities but it is primarily enveloped in-itself, 
that is, repeated for-itself; thus it is not only difference but also 
repetition. It doubles itself and in this movement of 
envelopment it creates its own temporal space, in which 
difference is enveloping. This is the operation of a passive self 
as the condition of an active 'I". 
But how might a split self recover its unity, and the split 
artwork gain consistency? We will argue then that rhythm is a 
whole but only on condition that it is cracked. The crack of 
rhythm corresponds to a caesura of time - an imminent death 
and self-forgetfulness urged by a will - which is opening to the 
future. Such power of suspension is like a centrifugal force which 
expels extensities, qualities and everything that has become 
reactive, the common flow of time itself, and by selecting anew 
it recovers the active forces and comes back to repeat again. 
Suspension is a power rather than an instance, since it undoes 
temporality and cannot be lived as such but is enveloping in the 
transformation it has rendered possible. 
Finally, we will conclude this chapter by suggesting how, 
after art's secularization, rhythm might be the immanent mode 
of being of the work of art, which wills to live and awaits the 
viewer to activate this life. 
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II. Self-referentiality as self-annihilation: Agamben on the 
modern work of art 
a. The dialectic of the split 
In The Man Without Content, Giorgio Agamben traces: the 
cultural, historical and ideological process of the separation 
between form and content in art; the emergence of aesthetics as 
the science of art; and the identification of art with the beautiful, 
conceived as "that which gives us pleasure without interest" 
(Kant) rather than "une promesse de bonheur" (Stendhal, 
Nietzsche), which would link it with an idea of happiness, as 
"an unlimited growth and strengthening of the vital values" 
[MWC, 2]. Clearly, the problem that activates Agamben's 
thought and underlies his project is the 'separation of the fields' 
thesis, of aesthetics, ethics and politics, of art and life - the split 
that haunts modernity since the Enlightenment era 86 His 
discussion is situated within a much wider philosophical and 
artistic tradition, engaging with the question of the reunification 
of praxis and poiesis. Although his argument unfolds at the level 
of art and aesthetic experience, his thought is incited by an 
ethical and vital concern. 
Central to his account is the description of the cultural 
process which led to the recognition of autonomy of the work of 
art and the consequences it entailed. The birth of aesthetics as a 
distinct philosophical discipline did not itself establish the 
86 For the 'separation of fields' thesis see mainly Anthony Cascardi, 
Consequences of Enlightenment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) and J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
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separation of art from other aspects of vital activity, but rather, 
it came much later, in order to institutionalize the split that had 
already taken place in the organization and conception of 
experience. In the case of the work of art, the split is expressed 
in the distinction between form and content, exemplified by 
Agamben in the literary figures of the 'Rhetorician' and the 
'Terrorist'. The former "dissolve[s] all meaning into form and 
make[s] form into the sole law of literature" while the latter 
refusing to bend to this law, "pursue[s] the opposite dream of a 
language that would be nothing but meaning, of a thought in 
whose flame the sign would be fully consumed, putting the 
writer face to face with the absolute" [MWC, 8]. But if the quest 
for absolute form ends up with a rarefied image of beauty - one 
that has explicated all movement of grace - that for absolute 
meaning ends up by burning all meaning into the form of the 
flame. Both cases testify to what Agamben rightly declares: 
[t]he couple signifier-signified is, in fact, so indissolubly part of 
our linguistic heritage - of our language conceived metaphysically 
as c(avij arlpavma [phone semantikej, as signifying sound - that 
any attempt to get over it without moving at the same time beyond 
the limits of metaphysics is destined to fall short of its aim [MWC, 
10]. 
Both language and art are systems of representation 
communicating something other than the material that contains 
them, in that they are founded on a distance between signifier 
and signified, representation and reality. The whole problem 
(i. e. 'how to represent') and challenge (i. e. 'how to make 
present') art faces is related to how it negotiates itself with this 
distance. Artistic creation is driven by the desire to overcome 
the distance between art and life: the portrait wants to free itself 
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from the canvas, the bathers want to be heard laughing and the 
sun reflecting on the water wants to touch the eyes' skin. But, 
one cannot just ignore this distance without seeing the work of 
art liquefying itself and seeping through one's hands. 
Moreover, the work of art is a duplicity: not itself and the 
reality it represents but rather two co-existent facets: 
[t]he side that faces the artist is the living reality in which he 
reads his promise of happiness; but the other side, which 
faces the spectator, is an assemblage of lifeless elements that 
can only mirror itself in the aesthetic judgment's reflection of 
it [MWC, 11]. 
The recognition that the work of art bears an aesthetic value, 
rather than any other kind of moral or religious value, was 
decisive for the dissociation of the artist's and the spectator's 
role in relation to the work. While the reality of the artist is the 
living reality of production, the spectator is left with an image, 
an embodiment of beauty as a thing in-itself. The experience of 
the spectator in front of a work of art becomes more and more 
reduced and specialised to the identification of "the point of 
perfection"; the capacity for such identification characterizes the 
man of taste. As Agamben clearly shows, the split of the double 
reality of the work of art isolates the spectator and assumes for 
him an increasingly passive role. Excluded from production, the 
experience of the work of art is restricted to the act of reception, 
and far from being the participation in the event of truth, it 
becomes the mere perception of beauty. This isolation will 
entrap beauty in the vicious circle of self-referentiality, which 
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will reify it into taste and will pervert it into bad taste 87 a pure 
movement of fetishization. 
At the same time, the figure of the artist is dissociated 
from his experience in the eyes of his society, which exalts his 
work as the product of a genius, the pure formal principle of 
creativity, and freed from the contingent matter of experience. 
In the eyes of the artist his split subjectivity is expressed in the 
dissociation of his experience from the work. The artist loses the 
intimate unity with his material and becomes tabula rasa in 
respect to it; "every material being indifferent to him if only it 
does not contradict the formal law of being simply beautiful and 
capable of artistic treatment" 88 But having lost the intimacy of 
the material, the work is no longer the immediate expression of 
his faith or truth and becomes the instance of self-alienation. 
The modern artist is "the man without content", i. e. not the man 
who is all form, but the one doomed to inhabit himself only as a 
radical split. 
So long as the artist lives in intimate unity with his material, 
the spectator sees in the work of art only his own faith and 
the highest truth of his being brought to art in the most 
necessary manner, and a problem of art as such cannot rise 
since art is precisely the shared space in which all men, 
artists and non-artists come together in living unity. But 
once the creative subjectivity of the artist begins to place 
itself above his material and his production [... ] [elverything 
that the spectator can still find in the work of art is, now, 
mediated by aesthetic representation, which is itself, 
independently of any content, the supreme value and the 
most intimate truth that unfolds its power in the artwork 
itself and starting from the artwork itself. The free creative 
principle of the artist rises up like a precious veil of Maya 
87 MWC, chapter 3. 
88 G. W. F. Hegel, cited in ibid., p. 36. 
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between the spectator and such truth as he can attain in the 
work of art, a veil of which he will never be able to take 
possession concretely, but only through the reflection in the 
magic mirror of his taste [MWC, 36-37] 
In this passage Agamben eloquently describes the 
determinate consequence for the fate of art - the separation 
between form and content. Art can be seen to lose its intimation 
with the material of experience and to cease to express the truth 
which creates the cosmic topos where artists and non-artists 
come together in unity. Losing the power of expressing 
something, it reduces and encloses itself in-itself, that is, to the 
creative act, which emptied from content and in order to sustain 
itself becomes fetishized in the birth of the genius. On the other 
side the spectator is left in front of the canvas, which no longer 
communicates anything other than itself. The aesthetic response 
then is invented in order to fill the abyss of incommunicability opened 
up by the split. 
By renouncing its symbolic existence, as the embodiment 
of truth, the work of art loses its unity and becomes fractured. 
From that point on, art will move into recognising and striving 
to inhabit itself as split. Indeed, we would argue that modernist 
art (from Baudelaire to Proust, Joyce and the Impressionsits) 
represents this movement in an exemplary way, summarized in 
Rimbaud's famous phrase 'I is an other', which critically 
culminated into the Surrealists' experimentations with 
subjectivity, the unconscious and art (although Surrealism 
stands on the verge of a new twist that art will take, especially 
after Duchamp). If the artist is still able to connect somehow his 
experience to the work, to inhabit his own production, this can 
now take place in a negative manner, through the work's 
embodying the split. 
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Yet, the vicious circle has no ending. On the contrary, it 
engages art in the vertiginous movement of negation and self- 
annihilation. Thus, compulsively emptying itself to lay bare its 
split, art will come to cease to inhabit a split self, but to be itself 
only the split. This is the moment of Minimalism and 
Conceptual art, which Agamben describes as the moment when: 
becoming aware of its shadow, art immediately receives in 
itself its own negation, and in bridging the gap that used to 
separate it from criticism, itself becomes the logos of art and of 
its shadow, that is, critical reflection on art, non art [MWC, 50]. 
Conceptual art actualised one of the implicit tendencies 
in Duchamp's gesture, namely that 'art is the idea'. Duchamp 
became aware of the split founding the aesthetics of modem art. 
His 'readymade' strips art bare: not in order to show its 
supposed emptiness or superfluity, but rather in order to ask 
and risk what sustains the split of art; his gesture is an open 
question about art's justification. By exposing the split, 
Duchamp rendered visible the whole mechanism that had come 
to inhabit it: art museums, institutions, collectors. Duchamp's 
gesture of exposure, contracts with an amazing economy 
laughter and critique, simplicity and great risk. Later on, this 
tendency was taken up by conceptual art but, unfortunately, 
most of the times it was further developed only in the direction 
of laughter and institutional critique. 89 
The artist's principle of creativity corresponds with the 
spectator's principle of aesthetic judgment: it marks the passage 
from the latitude of experience to a more specified and 
89 Simplicity and risk, however, seem to be more difficult to become 
incorporated in contemporary art. Although very often contemporary art 
strives to shock, it is difficult to produce a real effect since shock is also 
appropriated by the institution and art market and has become standardized. 
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intensified perceptive-conceptual attitude. From the revelation 
of truth, to the appreciation of beauty as the judgment on art or 
non-art and then to the question 'what makes something art', 
aesthetic experience unceasingly ascribes to itself a more 
enclosed, self-referential and intellectualised role. The enclosure 
of art in-itself does not augment its 'intrinsic' value, but on the 
contrary, it empties all value so that it can be freely subjected to 
the external imposition of value, such as is successfully 
attributed to it by museums, institutions, collectors and an ever- 
expanding art industry. Art then can only succumb to the 
general movement of fetishization and commodification. 
Agamben, borrowing from Hegel, will characterise the vicious 
circle of art's entrapment, from which it has no means to escape 
but only to negate with laughter: 
[a]t the extreme limit of art's destiny, when all the gods fade in 
the twilight of art's laughter, art is only a negation that negates 
itself, a self-annihilating nothing [MWC, 56] 
Consequently, the reality of art in modernity is not only 
that of a split between form and content, which consequently 
generates a series of polarities. Much more than that, the split 
becomes the foundation of modern art; it comes to be the formal 
principle of its existence. If the split opened up an abyss, which 
renders communication impossible and creates the vertigo of 
nihilism, is there any way to overcome it? Rather than ask 
whether art can transcend itself, which would be to anticipate 
an open future, we should rather address a different kind of 
question: what could grant the communicability of art? 
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b. The originality of rhythm 
As opposed to the reified conception of the work of art, 
which divides it into the components of form and content, 
Agamben argues that rhythm is "the original structure of the 
work of art". The question which immediately arises is, 'what is 
rhythm'? The problem had already appeared in ancient Greek 
philosophy and Agamben begins his analysis by drawing upon 
Aristotle's Physics. In Book II, Aristotle introduces rhythm 
negatively, by the privative expression rö apptiOytorov [to 
arrythmiston], meaning that which itself lacks rhythm. Nature is 
rb npthrov appvOpiorov, [to proton arrythmiston] that which is in 
itself shapeless and without structure, inarticulate matter 
subtended to any shape and mutation; that is the prime and 
irreducible element (oro{X, -iov [stiheion]), identified by some with 
fire, by others with earth, air or water. In contrast to rd npchrov 
appiüyiorov [to proton arrythmiston], pvOp65 [rythmos] "is what 
adds itself to this immutable substratum and, by adding itself to 
it composes and shapes it, giving it structure" [MWC, 95] 
(emphasis mine). 
Agamben borrows from Lalande the philosophical 
definition of structure derived from the psychology of form and 
summarized as follows: 
[i]n opposition to a simple combination of elements, a whole 
formed by phenomena in solidarity, such that each 
phenomenon depends on the others and can be what it is 
only in and through its relation with them [Lalande, cited in 
MWC, 95]. 
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In Lalande's definition structure, as the whole, implies 
two things simultaneously: first, that the whole exceeds the sum 
of its parts, and second that every part exceeds itself by 
participating in the whole. But what causes this surplus and 
what is the nature of it? Aristotle notes that this 'something else' 
cannot be of the order of the element or of the ensemble 
constituted by elements, for in that case we would be entrapped 
in a problem of infinite regress. Anticipating Bergson, Aristotle 
conceives and initiates us to the co-existence of a parallel and 
maybe more essential dimension than that of space and the 
order of extensity, an order radically different from that of 
division. He does not arrive to call it time and intensity but 
identifies it instead with Form (popgrl Kai ei5os [morfe ke eidos]). It 
is the order of Form that is both the cause of being (atria roa eivat 
[etia tou ine]) and the ovoia [ousia], "the principle that gives 
origin and maintains every thing in presence" [MWC, 97]. 
Aristotle thus reverses the order and instead of conceiving 
nature as elementary matter, r6 appvüpio-rov [to arrythmiston], he 
suggests its primal, Formal existence as pv0p6s [rythmos]. 
Aristotle's conception of structure as rhythm (pvOy6 
[rythmos]) rather than element (apiüpbs [arithmos]) differentiates 
him significantly from his predecessors, the Pythagoreans. In 
opposition to them, Aristotle conceives the difference between 
the two formally. Rhythm bears the quality of the essence, which 
is sufficient to make it something other than the element and not 
simply of another quality. In the end, elemental difference - 
even if it is not simply a material difference but rather a 
difference in the material - can only remain a quantitative 
difference, one which works through the more and the less, 
even if it produces qualitative differences. Rhythm on the other 
hand, pertains to a different order of being, which also means to 
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a different logos. Consequently, rhythm has a different principle 
of existence (logos), it precedes the order of extensity but by 
being itself ovoaia [ousia], it also informs this order by giving it its 
principle of origin. Rhythm not only gives the inarticulate a 
shape, but it also brings it into presence, marking the transition 
from non-being to being. But what does it mean that rhythm is 
the principle of origin of everything that is? 
Origin should not be confused with a beginning or 
starting point, which would render it into the minimal 
quantum. Benjamin conceived it thus: 
[o]rigin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, 
has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The 
term origin is not intended to describe the process by which 
the existent came into being, but rather that which emerges 
from the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an 
eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows 
the material involved in the process of genesis [0,45]. 
Benjamin's concept of 'origin' attempts to overcome and bridge 
the dualism between historical contingency and the a-historical, 
transcendent Ideas, which grant the singularity of the absolute 
in its endless repetitions. 90 
Agamben identifies origin with rhythm and argues that 
rhythm is not structure as minimal quantum and primordial 
element, but it "is instead ovoia, the principle of presence that 
opens and maintains the work of art in its original space" 
° For a very interesting discussion of Benjamins theory of origin, which goes 
against historicism and Neo-Kantianism see, Beatrice Haussen, Walter 
Benjamin's Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings and Angels 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998) pp. 24- 
48. 
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[MWC, 98]. Rhythm appears to introduce into the eternal flow 
of time a split and a stop: 
[w]hen we are before a work of art or a landscape bathed in 
the light of its own presence, we perceive a stop in time, as 
though we were suddenly thrown into a more original time. 
There is a stop, an interruption in the incessant flow of 
instants that, coming from the future, sinks into the past, and 
this interruption, this stop is precisely what gives and 
reveals the particular status, the mode of presence proper to 
the work of art or the landscape we have before our eyes. 
We are as though held, arrested before something, but this 
being arrested is also a being-outside, an ek-stasis in a more 
original dimension [MWC, 991. 
He identifies this ek-static suspension in a more original 
dimension with the double capacity of the work of art to give 
itself and withdraw itself at the same time, to be gift and reserve 
at once. 91 For Agamben, the suspension implicated in rhythm, 
throws us into a more original time, where time ceases to be the 
flow of lived time and becomes the ecstatic instance, pure 
intensity before or beyond any time. 
But how do we transcend our temporality for this 
original time? Probably it is less a question of transcending, of 
one becoming exterior to oneself and to one's duration (duree), 
than of `being transcended' or overwhelmed by the multiplicity 
of durations that haunt us from within. As Merleau-Ponty 
remarks on the philosopher's intuition: "It is not necessary for 
91 Ek-stasis in Greek means outside-of-stasis but also from-stasis that is, 
outside of the order of stasis: not movement -which is the appearance of time 
in space - but intensity. Agamben's reading of ek-stasis as the capacity of the 
work of art to give and withdraw itself at once, points precisely to its 
intensive mode of being. 
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him to go outside himself in order to reach the things 
themselves; he is solicited or haunted by them from within" 92 
art does not force us to go outside the flow of everyday time to a 
more original time, as if time bears two dimensions. Maybe the 
difference is not between a more original and a less original 
time; time is original, and the difference would only be between 
the order of time and that of extensity, between action and 
memory or else between our modes of inhabiting time. Time is a 
unity that holds itself and in-itself the multiplicity of durations, 
the different ways that beings participate in it. Art then 
instantiates and reveals our interiority in time. 
Aristotle has insightfully conceived rhythm as marking a 
transition between non-being and being, the process and ground 
of what appears. Agamben, inspired by Benjamin, has argued 
that the mode of presence of the work of art is an in-between, 
ek-stasis, gift and reserve at once. The transition from non-being 
to being is not continuous passage but ecstatic rupture. 
Although Agamben recognises the intensive being of the work 
of art, he does not give us the transition from the intensive to 
the extensive, or how the former is implicated in the latter. It 
seems that for him the difference between rhythm (or Form) 
and matter remains external (ek-stasis) from a less original 
(flowing) to a more original (intensive) time. Ultimately, 
Agamben's account seems to grant an ontological difference 
between rhythm and its opposite; it is reserved for the original 
experience of the work of art. Our drawing upon Deleuze then, 
will aim at pointing to an internal, rather than ontological, 
difference of rhythm, one which is created rather than given or 
unveiled. 
92 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. J. 
Wild et al. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963) pp. 14-15. 
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III. Intensive difference 
One of the principal aims of Difference and Repetition is to 
provide an ontological account of difference as the reality 
informing the actual world and all change. However, the 
creation of an ontology of difference - as opposed to ontological 
difference - is a move which significantly challenges the order 
of western philosophical thought. It requests from us to try to 
think of difference as primary and real rather than subsuming it 
to a primary order of identity. But at the same time, if it is 
difference alone which constitutes the reality of the world - the 
only reality which endlessly repeats itself, its ontology - isn't 
then the expression 'ontology of difference' a contradiction in 
terms? Indeed, either the expression becomes devoid of 
meaning or we need to re-invent the concept of ontology in a 
totally new way that would account only for an ontology of 
becoming, a virtual ontology where creation and destiny would 
necessarily and beyond contradiction co-exist. 
Deleuze's philosophical argument engages critically with 
some of the most significant conceptions of difference in the 
history of philosophy and, which at the same time, structures 
itself by unfolding simultaneously at several levels of exposition 
(philosophical, scientific, artistic), though it is not our intention 
to reproduce his entire argument here. Instead, we will attempt 
to illuminate aspects of his ideas by creating a notion of rhythm, 
as the dramatization of the concepts of difference and repetition. 
It appears there is a most profound Bergsonian influence 
(even if it is not the only one) informing Difference and Repetition, 
despite Deleuze's relatively limited discussion of Bergson. Thus, 
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Bergson appears principally at two instances in the book: first, 
in the elaboration of the passive synthesis of the past, where 
Deleuze evokes the Bergsonian idea of an ontological, a priori 
past, as the condition of passage, and second, in the description 
of the process of formation of actual reality (extensities and 
qualities) as an "assymetrical synthesis of the sensible". 
It is true that Bergson distinguished between two orders 
of difference: differences in kind and those in degree. It is 
duration that grounds and bears all qualitative difference, 
whereas extensity only produces quantitative differences. But as 
he argued that real difference subsists only in qualitative 
difference while quantitative differences reduce it to the same, 
he transformed the two orders of difference in a single order, 
where all difference was taken up by duration. Although it was 
Bergson who performed the movement of enveloping the 
difference between the two orders as a difference within the 
single order of time, we are indebted to Deleuze for the 
recognition of the Bergsonian act as the invention of internal 
difference. 93 
Deleuze takes a step further by stating that difference is 
not a difference in time but in intensity, in a move which 
appears to counter Bergson who had argued against the 
quantification of intensive states 94 Deleuze will criticize 
Bergson on this point, stating that his critique of intensity, 
93 One of Deleuze's formulations of the meaning of internal difference is the 
following: "Duration, tendency is the difference of self from self; and what 
differs from itself is immediately the unity of substance and subject" in Gilles 
Deleuze, "Bergson's Conception of Difference", trans. Melissa McMahon, in 
John Mullarkey (ed. ), The New Bergson (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) p. 48. 
94 See Bergson's critique of intensity in TFW, pp. 1-74, and also earlier in this 
discussion Chapter 1, part Na. 
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[a]ssumes qualities ready-made and extensities already 
constituted. It distributes difference into differences in kind in 
the case of qualities and differences in degree in the case of 
extensity. From this point of view, intensity necessarily 
appears as no more than an impure mixture, no longer 
sensible or perceptible [DR, 239]. 
Deleuze's critique of Bergson is correct but provisional, 
since Bergson in Matter and Memory went beyond this point. 
Nevertheless, it serves as a starting point for the elaboration and 
illumination of the Deleuzian position on the creation of reality. 
Although the empirical world is constituted by qualities and 
extensities, in reality these are not given as such since the 
beginning, but rather they are products of a formative process. 
Therefore, there also comes a moment in Bergson when he 
himself raises the question of the double genesis of quality and 
extensity. But if we assume qualities and extensities as ready- 
made we can only arrive at a notion of difference as 
contradiction, contrariety or diversity, in all cases however a 
difference that is given but its reason remains external. Both 
extensities and qualities, considered simply as given in 
themselves, cannot ultimately escape the laws of identity - the 
former in the order of equivalences, and the latter in that of 
resemblance. However, the Deleuzian thesis considers that 
difference cannot be reduced to these phenomena but rather it is 
that which produces them, it "is that by which the given is 
given, that by which the given is given as diverse" [DR, 2221. 
Prior to these empirical differences lies a primary 
difference, which carries its reason within itself and resides in the 
differences that belong to intensity, which inform both qualities 
and extensities and constitute the real nature of difference 
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(differences of level, temperature, pressure, potential etc. ). Both 
differences of degree and of kind are the explications of this 
primary difference - the former in extensity and the latter in the 
qualities which fill extensity. What produces them however 
(and is neglected) is what Deleuze calls 'the intensive', the entire 
nature of difference. It is the intensive (the Unequal in itself) 
which makes the expression "difference of intensity" a 
tautology (intensity is difference) and which is the reason of the 
sensible [DR, 2221. Intensity is not an element, nor is it a 
difference between elements but rather it is differential in itself, 
doubled in-itself indivisibly, a resonant disparity. 
The condition of that which appears is not space and 
time as Kant would have it, but this intensive difference, or 
disparateness, which precedes them and cannot be divided into 
elements that are disparate 95 Prior to things, their properties 
and qualities, a multiplicity of vibrations, speeds and delays, 
shocks of difference, resonances and dissonances are in play as 
the reason of being. In our view, there are two points which are 
crucial for the Deleuzian conception of intensity, namely: (a) 
what does it mean that intensity is the reason of the sensible? Is 
it identical with its cause? And (b), how is intensity both 
95 Deleuze writes: "Every intensity is E-E', where E itself refers to an e-e', and 
e to e-t' etc.: each intensity is already a coupling (in which each element of 
the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order), thereby 
revealing the properly qualitative content of quantity. " [DR, 222] In a 
footnote he cites Rosny and his two theses concerning intensive quantities: 
(1) "resemblance presupposes difference; it is differences that resemble one 
another; (2) difference alone allows us to conceive of being" [DR, 329]. Thus 
although Deleuze following Rosny speaks of elements such as E, E' etc. the 
emphasis is upon the differential power between them rather than on them. In 
fact the identity of the elements is fabricated retrospectively by the 
differential power and its spatialization. This is also why it should not be 
confused simply with an analogical relation, which creates difference 
secondarily based on comparing the identity of elements. That is why they 
are interchangeable and refer to other pairs (e-e', c-e'... ) while only the power 
returns. The only Same is the differential. 
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indivisible and dispersed? Although both questions are 
important, they cannot be answered at this early stage. 
Let us begin though with a simple example: the colour 
red only appears as such in experience but in reality it 
corresponds to a particular frequency of light energy. Red as 
quality is a translation of light frequency that is, the contraction 
of a multiplicity of durations operated by human perception. 
Moreover, science can measure and inform us about the 
particular frequencies corresponding to every colour. Is that all 
there is then and consequently the Deleuzian difference just a 
philosophical confirmation of the scientific principle of energy? 
Is the intensive an actuality of the same order with extensities 
and qualities only prior to them? Is duration measurable, 
outside the scope of the wave-length of our perceptions but 
within the wave-length of chronometers? Besides it is Deleuze 
himself, who as opposed to Bergson, calls it 'intensive quantity'. 
Deleuze will insist that what he is arguing for is a 
transcendental principle of energy rather than the empirical 
scientific principle, which is only a local manifestation of the 
former. His critique against Carnot's and Curie's principles 
reflects Bergson's recognition that experience always gives 
mixtures and that we only know forms of energy which are 
already localised in extensity and extensities already qualified 
by forms of energy. 
It turns out that, in experience, intensio (intension) is inseparable 
from an extensio (extension) which relates it to the extensum 
(extensity). In these conditions, intensity itself is subordinated to 
the qualities which fill extensity (primary physical qualities or 
qualitas, and secondary perceptible qualities or quale). In short, 
we know intensity only as already developed within an 
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extensity, and as covered over by qualities. Whence our 
tendency to consider intensive quantity as a badly grounded 
empirical concept, an impure mixture of a sensible quality and 
extensity, or even of a physical quality and an extensive quantity 
[DR, 2231 
Deleuze's argument is twofold: (1) Energetics can only 
(and necessarily) identify energy by combining an intensive and 
an extensive factor. It cannot give purely 'the intensive' because 
it can only grasp it as it partly explicates itself in extensity. Thus, 
to return to the example of the colour red, science can identify it 
as a frequency only by spatialising differential vibrations, by 
relating the intensive to its extensive counterpart, in the same 
way that we measure movement by the distance covered and 
time by space. Red, however, is already an implicated duration in 
the quality that envelops it. But (2) the problem is not only due 
to the shortcomings of scientific thought or to the insufficiency 
of human perceptual apparatus. It is a real problem 
corresponding to the tendency that intensity itself has to deny 
itself by becoming explicated in extensities and underneath 
qualities. In both cases, however, the question is whether 
Deleuze is invoking a different form of energy, to which science 
has no access at all, or a different concept of energy from the 
existing scientific one. 
Deleuze's disagreement with the scientific view becomes 
most articulate when discussing the problem of entropy, or the 
second law of thermodynamics, and in order to illuminate 
Deleuze's concept of energy we need to recuperate briefly the 
scientific position that he countered. Thermodynamics was born 
out of the interest in heat's possibilities for producing 
'mechanical energy' through the transformation of matter and 
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the determination of changes of state. It was founded on the 
principle of the conservation of energy throughout the various 
transformations, known as 'conversions', undergone by 
physical, chemical, and biological systems: 
[t]he idea of conversion, which postulates that 'something' is 
quantitatively conserved while it is qualitatively transformed, 
generalizes what occurs during mechanical motion. [... ][T]otal 
energy is conserved while potential energy is converted into 
kinetic energy, or vice versa. Joule defined a general equivalent 
for physicochemical transformations, thus making it possible to 
measure the quantity conserved. This quantity was later to 
become known as'energy' % 
This idea, by viewing all natural phenomena as a 
continual conversion of living force (i. e. kinetic energy) and 
heat, into one another without anything being lost, provided the 
basis for the unification of the whole of nature. In this 
conception, energy was the underlying reality, which was the 
sufficient cause of natural phenomena and change, but which 
remained constant and invariable throughout the modifications 
it produced. But the principle of the conservation of energy, 
which also had far-reaching cultural implications, could only 
represent those aspects of nature that are peaceful and 
controllable, but could not account for any genuine natural 
power of creation or destruction. As Prigogine and Stengers 
point out: "[e]nergy conversion is merely the destruction of a 
% Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue 
with Nature (London: Heinemann, 1984) p. 108. 
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difference, together with the creation of another difference. The 
power of nature is thus concealed by the use of equivalences" 97 
It was the concept of irreversibility that was the most 
original contribution of thermodynamics. Irreversibility 
concerned the recognition that the combustion of chemical 
energy producing the heat flow which was consequently 
converted into work, did not give an absolute equivalent 
quantity of energy at the final stage, but part of the energy 
consumed was not usefully exchanged but externally 
propagated as heat. This led to the formulation of a new 
principle: the existence in nature of a universal tendency toward 
the degradation of mechanical energy. This recognition in 
physics also entailed a different cosmology according to which, 
[t]his world is described as an engine in which heat is 
converted into motion only at the price of some irreversible 
waste and useless dissipation. Effect-producing differences in 
nature progressively diminish. The world uses up its 
differences as it goes from one conversion to another and 
tends toward a final state of thermal equilibrium, 'heat death'. 
In accordance with Fourier's law, in the end there will no 
longer be any differences of temperature to produce a 
mechanical effect 98 
Fourier's law stated that heat flow is proportional to the 
gradient of temperature; it applies to all states of matter and to 
all kinds of constitution of bodies. It therefore considers 
difference in temperature as the condition for the production of 
heat flow and therefore work. Consequently, the problem of 
entropy is a problem of the cancellation of difference. This is the 
97 Ibid., p. 111. 
98 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
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most general and central content of Carnot's, and Curie's 
principles of energetics: "difference is the sufficient reason of 
change only to the extent that change tends to negate 
difference" [DR, 223]; energy pays the price of heat indifference 
for the change it produces. 
Deleuze's conception of difference as the unceasingly 
organising principle of the world and his refusal to consider 
sameness as a reality of the world need not only account for the 
order of equivalences but also for the equalisation of difference. 
He considers intensive quantity to be the primary difference 
which informs the order of identity, and consequently he is also 
forced to accept that equality and resemblance are not our 
ficticious constructions or reductions, but that intensity appears 
to cancel itself in the qualities that envelop it and the extensities 
that explicate it. 
In short, there would no more be qualitative differences or 
differences in kind than there would be quantitative differences 
or differences of degree, if intensity were not capable of 
constituting the former in qualities and the latter in extensity, 
even at the risk of appearing to extinguish itself in both [DR, 239] 
(emphasis mine) 
In the movement of explication as the actualisation of the 
virtual, or else in the process during which energy is 
transformed into motion, intensity, (i. e. difference) measures the 
time of an equalisation. However Deleuze will not 
straightforwardly contradict it. Difference, which is violence as 
the principle of change, tends to be tamed when explicated 99 
99 Deleuze says that difference in-itself is unthinkable. "It seems that it can 
become thinkable only when tamed - in other words, when subject to the 
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Moreover, "the hard law of explication is that what is explicated 
is explicated once and for all" [DR, 244]. In other words, the 
movement of explication appears to neutralise irreversibly. Is then 
Deleuze adhering to the scientific principle of entropy despite 
all his attempts to escape it for the vitalist principle of a 
difference which affirms itself? Is the passage into action as a 
state of existence necessarily compensated by a partial death 
and an irretrievable loss? l00 
The question of 'loss', 'lack', and 'difference' as signs of 
ontological difference that mark earthly existence as a fall, 
haunts Western thought whether scientific, philosophical or 
psychoanalytic. However, it also entraps Deleuzian thought (if 
simplistically interpreted) as a renunciation of the actual in 
favour of the virtual. Instead, as we will attempt to show, 
actualisation is a necessary prerequisite for the continuing life of 
the virtual. At this point however, it suffices to say that if 
explication takes place 'once and for all', this is not an argument 
against actualisation as being entropic. However it does force us 
to recognise that from a purely spatial order of extensities and 
qualities we cannot go back and reconstruct the energy that has 
created them and animates them. If the movement of explication 
is irreversible, this is because from the explicated we cannot 
recover the implicated. 
four iron collars of representation: identity in the concept, opposition in the 
predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception" [DR, 262]. 
100 In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud had argued that the individual 
(ego) is born out of a separation: although "originally the ego includes 
everything, later it separates off an external world from itself". It gives rise to 
the reality principle and "serves the practical purpose of enabling one to 
defend oneself against sensations of unpleasure", with the price of losing the 
prior state of intimacy and unboundedness. Every expansive living attempt 
(love, religion, art, ideology etc. ) are (failing) attempts to restore that stage. 
Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents", in The Standard Edition of 
the Complete psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI, (1927-1931), 
(London: Vintage, The Hogarth Press, 2001) p. 68. 
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But for Deleuze the state in which intensities are 
enveloped by the qualities and extensities that explicate them, 
only concerns a secondary order of implication or degradation. 
It is in this order that difference in intensity is cancelled by an 
equalisation of the highest and the lowest. This order however, 
is only possible and grounded upon a primary implication 
designating the state in which intensity remains implicated in 
itself, at once both enveloping and enveloped - not enveloped in 
qualities but primarily in-itself. This time difference is affirmed - 
the highest as well as the lowest - and this order mediates 
between the intensive and its explications, revealing the 
tendency of intensities to become explicated (or externalised) 
and sustaining these intensities from being cancelled in their 
explication. 
Consequently, extensities and qualities constitute the 
order of the actual - the former explicating the difference and 
therefore taking it outside itself, and the latter reflecting it on 
the surface; "a reflection which betrays it by explicating it in 
extensity". It is the scattered reflection of difference in qualities 
that constitutes contrariety. And for Deleuze, although 
contrariety in the quality may constitute the sensible being par 
excellence, by no means does it constitute the being 'of' the 
sensible: 
[i]t is intensity or difference in intensity which constitutes the 
peculiar limit of sensibility. As such, it has the paradoxical 
character of that limit: it is the imperceptible, that which 
cannot be sensed because it is always covered by a quality 
which alienates it or contradicts it, always distributed within 
an extensity which inverts and cancels it. In another sense, it is 
that which can only be sensed or that which defines the 
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transcendent exercise of sensibility, because it gives to be sensed 
thereby awakening memory and forcing thought [DR, 237] 
It is alone the transcendent exercise of sensibility that can 
sense the imperceptible, that is the being of the sensible rather 
than a sensible being. The imperceptible for Deleuze is not that 
which is beyond all perception and experience, but that which 
cannot be an object of perception. It is that which does not 
become external to itself without cancelling itself. But far from 
being incommunicable, it is the communicable as such which 
transmits itself only in 'clothing' itself. We can distinguish then 
three acts of envelopment of difference: first, difference is 
enveloped in the qualities that reflect its image by explicating it 
on a surface. Second, difference is always enveloped in-itself, 
clothed or masked; the intensive is and envelops itself at the 
same time. And third, difference is enveloping, it is that force 
which subsists and affirms itself in the movement of 
actualization. 
Moreover, what remains very important in Deleuze's 
difference is that although he distinguishes the two orders of 
implication, we should not comprehend the higher or primary 
order as something totally different from the secondary order. 
The transcendental principle of energy is not a different kind of 
energy or of a different order than the empirical. For as soon as 
we conceive the transcendental principle of energy as belonging 
to a different order than the empirical, we have already fallen 
back to an ontological difference and evoked a new kind of 
Platonism. If on the other hand, we consider it to be a different 
form of energy, prior to the form which is accessible to science, 
we risk getting entrapped in the problem of infinite regress that 
already Aristotle had identified. But nowhere does Deleuze 
148 
seem to suggest a similar thing; he claims instead that "energy 
or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle, not a 
scientific concept" [DR, 241] (my emphasis). It is this 
fundamental conception of energy as transcendental principle 
that makes Deleuze literal, and not metaphorical, when talking 
about rhythms and vibrations. And yet, literal should not be 
confused with empirical. The higher order of difference is the 
reason of the empirical order - it creates the actual order of the 
sensible and it is enveloping in it. In the following part, we will 
show how an enveloping difference affirms itself in repetition 
rather than cancelling itself. 
IV. The repeated difference of rhythm 
We are accustomed to consider repetition as the 
reproduction of the same, but Deleuze will inexorably change 
this view for us. He distinguishes between two kinds of 
repetition: a bare or material repetition of the same and the 
disguised or spiritual repetition of difference. The former is the 
overall or abstract effect, the latter is the acting cause; the former 
is the given, the latter is that by which the given is given as 
such. Metric or cadence repetition as a regular division of time 
(an isochronic recurrence of identical elements) corresponds to 
that first instance of repetition. However, the second instance 
does not simply entail a different repetition, or variation from 
without; irregular periodicity belongs to pulsed time in just the 
same way as regular periodicity or repetition of the same does. 
Rhythm, however, is the inexorable clinch of difference and 
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repetition, non-pulsed time which lies at the heart of every 
cadence. 
[A] period exists only in so far as it is determined by a tonic 
accent, commanded by intensities. Yet we would be mistaken 
about the function of accents if we said that they were 
reproduced at equal intervals. On the contrary, tonic and 
intensive values act by creating inequalities or 
incommensurabilities between metrically equivalent periods or 
spaces. They create distinctive points, privileged instants which 
always indicate a poly-rhythm. Here again, the unequal is the 
most positive element [DR, 21] 
Moreover, Deleuze does not merely say that there are 
two kinds of repetition, cadence-repetition and rhythm 
repetition, but that in every case "the first [is] only the outward 
appearance or the abstract effect of the second" [DR, 21]. (Poly- 
)rhythm lies always in the heart of every cadence, and the 
formless in the heart of every form; it is the vital, positive, active 
process. Following the Bergsonian paradigm, this thesis 
renounces sameness as the reality of the world. Sameness 
would only belong to us, as the result of the reductions that our 
perception and thought operate upon the world in order to gain 
effectiveness. But is that what Deleuze tells us to do, namely, to 
open ourselves to the difference of the world? Certainly, 
openness forms an important aspect of his whole philosophy, 
but unless he gives the reasons why difference is better than 
sameness, the requirement for openness would remain a 
romantic statement 101 It seems, however, that Deleuze goes far 
beyond such a claim. If he is aiming to state, or even prove, that 
l01 'Better', therefore, cannot have a moral connotation for this would entail 
sheer moralism. 
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difference is the reality of the world, intensive quantity being 
the reason of everything that is, why does he also employ the 
concept of repetition? Why is difference in-itself not enough but 
has also to be affirmed, repeated for-itself? 
Deleuze begins the chapter on repetition by repeating 
Hume's thesis: "repetition changes nothing in the object 
repeated, but does change something in the mind which 
contemplates it" [DR, 701. He takes us into the heart of the 
problem by explaining that, considering the rule of 
discontinuity or instantaneity of repetition, the fact that a new 
instant does not appear unless the old one has disappeared - 
hence the status of matter as mens momentanea - how can we say 
for every repetition it is 'the second', 'the third', or even 'the 
same'? In other words, the paradox of repetition is that it 
presupposes that, on one hand, the instances are distinct so that 
they can be repeated, and, on the other, that they are bound 
together, i. e. that they are somewhere retained. Hume's 
response then, which Deleuze supports, is that they are bound 
in the mind which contemplates. Repetition produces a 
difference in the mind of the experiencer, it is not an objective 
property of the repeated things since there is no causal 
relationship between the members of the series. Thus, when AB 
are repeated in a series they do not produce a causal 
relationship necessitating their repetition. If I expect B to appear 
after A this can only be because repetition has changed 
something in a contemplative mind, rather than in A or B 
themselves and the fact of their appearance. 
Hume claims that the successive instants AB are retained 
in the imagination, which he identified as a contractile power. 
However, this contraction is neither memory nor reflection but a 
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synthesis of time. The succession of instants does not constitute 
time anymore than it causes it to disappear, instead time is 
constituted in an originary synthesis. Although this synthesis 
(which Deleuze calls a 'passive synthesis') is constitutive, it has 
to be distinguished from an active (conscious) synthesis, in that: 
[i]t is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind, which 
contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. Time is 
subjective, but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject 
[DR, 71] 
It is the passive synthesis of the imagination that 
supports the active synthesis of memory and understanding. 
Thus, 
[t]he constitution of repetition already implies three instances: 
the in-itself which causes it to disappear as it appears, leaving it 
unthinkable; the for-itself of the passive synthesis; and, 
grounded upon the latter, the reflected representation of a 'for- 
us' in the active syntheses [DR, 71] 
The profounder significance of the passive synthesis 
does not merely lie in its contractive character but in that it 
creates a kind of retroactive movement; by contracting the 
distinct instances it also separates them again in the active 
synthesis. In this retroactive movement imagination has 
enveloped the external instances "in its own temporal space" upon 
which it will reconstitute them as distinct. The double 
movement of contraction and retrospection (or contemplation) 
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is not a composite movement, but rather contraction is identical 
with retrospection and envelopment 102 
In the repetition of the series of AB, my expectation for B 
to appear after A corresponds to the passive synthesis of the 
present as 'habit'. This contraction performed by the 
imagination is neither conscious or active nor exclusively 
human. "Rather, it is the property of passively acquiring an 
unconscious relation to the future"103 and by constituting the 
lived present as the contraction of the past towards the future, it 
gives time its direction. The arrow of time, which coincides with 
the sense of a flowing time, is born out of this first passive 
synthesis. 
What is important to note about repetition in the passive 
synthesis is that what is repeated are intensities and relations 
between intensities - contractions as signs -a constant 
variability that occurs with an individual and which defies 
representation, identity and concepts. As such, repetition in the 
passive synthesis does not determine the outcome of its motion 
- that is, it is not itself a determination - but rather it gives the 
conditions for the emergence of things, which get their 
determination in action. Consequently, the sign cannot be 
repeated by knowledge, which rather than capturing it makes it 
disappear, but only by letting it work through us. That is why for 
Deleuze, habits are not acquired by action but emerge out of 
contemplation. By invoking the passive synthesis of time, 
Deleuze reverses our common conception of its constitution: the 
102 Deleuze will express this in various ways: "It is simultaneously through 
contraction that we are habits, but through contemplation that we contract. " 
And further down: "We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in 
contemplating - that is to say, in contracting that from which we come" [DR 
74]. 
103 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical 
Introduction And Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003) p. 87. 
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past, the present and the future are not themselves dimensions 
of time: 
[r]ather, synthesis constitutes time as a living present, and the 
past and the future as dimensions of this present. This 
synthesis is nonetheless intra-temporal, which means that this 
present passes [DR, 76] 
Although the first passive synthesis determines the living 
present by giving it its direction from the past to the future, it 
cannot provide us with the full account of its constitution. The 
living present bears also a quality of passing, not when it has 
passed and is no longer present but at the very 'moment' that it 
is; a being in passing or the fugitive present. This is the passive 
synthesis of the past or memory, which grounds the active 
synthesis of memory as remembering, although this latter is 
founded upon the passive synthesis of habit. 
The first synthesis, that of habit, is truly the foundation of time; 
but we must distinguish the foundation from the ground. The 
foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is 
established upon this soil, how it occupies and possesses it, 
whereas the ground comes rather from the sky, it goes from the 
summit to the foundations, and measures the possessor and the 
soil against one another according to a title of ownership [DIS, 
79] 
The foundation and the ground do not stand in 
opposition, nor is the one the empirical and the other the 
transcendental principle. Instead Deleuze, following Bergson, 
evokes a ground of the pure past, one that has never been 
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present but is always presupposed in every present, and which 
gives it its reason. Consequently, this mode of (pre-)existence of 
a pure past also defies the notion of a first time, or an absolute 
beginning. The first time is already a repetition and "the 
beginning always begins in-between, intermezzo" [TP, 329]. 
The passive synthesis of memory as the ground 
introduces depth as a dimension of repetition, which organises 
experience not only horizontally, but also vertically. For 
Deleuze, one does not really advance in experience but only by 
real leaps, which create for us a different level of the lived. The 
introduction of depth in a discussion about time appears to be a 
strange choice; is Deleuze spatializing time by evoking layers of 
experience? Moreover, how can one read his discussion of 
depth in Difference and Repetition considering the fact that just 
one year later, in The Logic of Sense, he renounced depth in 
favour of surfaces and series, and in A Thousand Plateaus he put 
forth the rhizomatic model of the plane of immanence? 
Although it is not our aim to analyze the Deleuzian shift of 
position, there is a way to interpret depth without considering it 
as a spatialization of time (anymore than one spatializes when 
one talks or describes or thinks about time), and we believe that 
there is also a reason for that. 
Deleuze talks about depth in the last chapter of DR 
where the temporal synthesis explicates itself in space, as the 
"asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible". 
Depth itself, [... ] is not an extension but a pure implex. No doubt 
every depth is also a possible length and size, but this possibility 
is realised only in so far as an observer changes place and 
gathers into an abstract concept that which is length for itself 
and that which is length for others: in fact, it is always on the 
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basis of a new depth that the old one becomes length or is 
explicated in length. [... ] Extensity as a whole comes from the 
depths. Depth as the (ultimate and original) heterogeneous 
dimension is the matrix of all extensity, including its third 
dimension considered to be homogeneous with the other two 
[DR, 229] 
One might validly argue that Deleuze's discussion of 
depth does not concern time, but the emergence of extensity 
and consequently; rather than spatializing the former it 
temporalizes the latter. This is true but there seems to be 
something more about this point. Depth is not extension and 
explication, but intension and implication. It does not merely 
explicate itself in extensity but rather by being the condition of 
extensity it also envelops and renders possible the latter's 
dimensions. 
But what else is the intension of depth, upon which its 
vertiginous power lies - the attraction of depth by a lower 
depth - than the affirmation of repetition? Every repetition is an 
affirmation of the Unequal it repeats, not simply because it 
repeats it, but because it increases its power (i. e. the energy) in 
repeating. That is why every repetition is different - not because 
it repeats the different, but because it revitalises and empowers 
its difference. Repetition does not increase the energy by 
attaining depth but rather it is the other way around; depth is 
nothing more than the increased energy entailed in every 
repetition. 
It now becomes apparent why it is not enough for 
Deleuze simply to state difference as the being of the world, but 
that he also needs repetition, the other pole of immanence, to 
affirm this difference. Repetition as contraction is the mode in 
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which external instances become enveloped in our temporal 
space and then reorganised in their distinctness; that is, events 
re-emerge through us. Repetition, however, is not merely 
reproduction of difference, nor fusion of external and internal 
difference but rather it is itself and every time the affirmation of 
its own difference. 
Nevertheless, to invoke depth in relation to rhythm 
appears to be either incomprehensible or meaningless. 
However, when Deleuze says that every rhythm is a poly- 
rhythm, he does not merely evoke variation but also an increase 
of the intensive quantity, which is variability as such. The 
vertical relation of levels of experience as degrees of contraction 
and relaxation, translates into resonances and dissonances, 
harmonic relations and shocks. Deleuze cites Bachelard as 
following: "the link between truly active moments (rhythm) is always 
effected on a different plane from the one upon which the action is 
carried out"? 0'He continues to add: "Action occurs in a milieu, 
whereas rhythm is located between two milieus, or between 
two intermilieus, on the fence, between night and day, at dusk, 
twilight or Zwielicht, Haecceity" [TP, 313-314]. Rhythm is never 
effected on the plane of action, because it is not an actual 
property or quality of the things; rhythm is not an object of 
perception. As an enveloped resonance and an enveloping 
force, it deterritorializes milieus and territories, unsettles 
properties and qualities from within; it is the purely expressed 
without ever becoming a content of expression. 
104 Gaston Bachelard, la Dialectique de la duree, (Paris: Bovin, 1936), pp. 128- 
129; emphasis mine. 
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V. Cracked consistency 
Difference and repetition are the co-existent instances of 
rhythm. Although the two moments are not merely combined 
or added to one another, it is yet not clear exactly how they do 
hold together. The problem of consistency concerns the manner 
in which the components of an assemblage, whether it be a 
work of art or a living being, hold together. But it also concerns 
"the manner, in which different assemblages hold together, 
with components of passage and relay" [TP, 327]. Already this 
point alerts us to a common denominator: what holds an 
aggregate together is also what allows for its communication with 
others; what holds its unity also opens it up to the multiplicity. 
Agamben described rhythm as appearing to introduce in 
the incessant flow of time a split or a stop, which "coming from 
the future sinks into the past" [MWC, 99]. Rhythm is a whole, 
but a fractured whole. This fracture, or suspension, does not 
divide the whole in parts but on the contrary, the instance of 
suspension is necessarily implicated in the whole as the 
condition of its rhythm. In fact suspension is an explosive or 
ecstatic instance, but on condition that it becomes enveloped in 
the whole. We cannot live the suspension as such transforming 
it into an empirical content; the outside of time cannot bring 
itself into temporality without transforming itself into its 
petrified image. And yet, it is living and can only be lived in the 
change that has made possible; it allows for the unfolding of a 
different rhythm of the whole. 
However, the idea of the fracture initially appears to 
contradict the Deleuzian passive syntheses or Bergson's 
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continuity of duration. Deleuze's passive syntheses correspond 
to Bergson's two forms of contraction memory; the passive 
synthesis of the present corresponds to the contraction of 
qualities, the contraction of a multiplicity of instances in a 
greater instance of perception, a contraction which necessarily 
renders every act of perception also a memory. But this 
contraction is possible only because of a prior contraction of 
levels of the past (the second passive synthesis), which allows 
for the whole of the past to be preserved in itself - pure 
memory. 105 
However, pure memory is not a static or given being but 
also continuous becoming or duration. How can duration be not 
only a qualitative change produced by the succession of 
instants, not merely an aspect of the conservation and 
conversion of energy, but a true becoming? More precisely, how 
can it pass from its inactive, virtual status to become also actual 
and acting? l06 Memory would take us to greater and more 
fascinating depths, yet all the more unrealised, all the more 
removed from the demands of action and life. But if memory 
retains a practical and (not merely a speculative) interest for us, 
then we must grant the possibility of it recovering its depths in 
a sharpened edge which will cut through action. 
A third order of time and repetition is needed for that: 
the time of the future as the eternal return. The eternal return 
signifies the caesura of time, and constitutes a fractured 'I' rather 
105 As Mullarkey rightly points out Bergson's theory of memory is "a 
tripartite theory with a concept of 'pure memory' alongside those of habit- 
and representational-memory". J. Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 51. Representational- 
memory corresponds to Deleuze's active synthesis of memory. 
106 Thus in Creative Evolution: "Like the universe as a whole, like each 
conscious being taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing that 
endures. Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its present and abides 
there, actual and acting" [CE, 15]. 
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than guaranteeing a coherent Cartesian Cogito. Following 
Deleuze's critique, Descartes' logical formula 'I think therefore I 
am' attempts to draw directly the undetermined ('I am') from a 
determination ('I think'). Descartes was able to arrive at this 
conclusion only by expelling time, "by reducing the Cogito to 
an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous 
creation carried out by God" [DR, 86]. Once Descartes had split 
'I', he could only grant its unity in the unity of God. The 
Kantian critique addressed this insufficiency or gaplO7 and he 
introduced a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the 
form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the 
determination). It is the form of self-reflectivity or the affection 
of a passive self. For Deleuze, 
it amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the 
form of an empirical difference between two determinations, 
but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the 
Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in 
the form of an external difference which separates, but in the 
form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori 
relation between thought and being [DR, 86]; (emphasis mine) 
The crucial difference between Kant and Deleuze, 
however, is that the former entrusted synthetic power solely to 
an active identity, while the passive self remained only 
receptive. On the contrary, the Deleuzian passive syntheses 
recognise the passive self of reception a simultaneous 
contractive-contemplative power. The profounder significance 
of this difference is the role and position the two philosophers 
107 Related to what elsewhere will appear as the need of reason, or what in 
chapter 1 we called the quest for its justification. 
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attribute to 'the given' respectively. Thus, although Kant 
secures the given against. any doubts that may assail it, 
attributing to it an a priori character independent of concepts 
and sensations, Deleuze "takes a foundation shot through with 
sensations and concepts, an individual's particular 
sensation"; 08 in Deleuze everything takes place in the plane of 
immanence, yet not everything is empirical even if it is within 
experience. This allows Deleuze not only to look for the 
conditions of the given but also to test the conditions against the 
conditioned in a process of co-modification. That is, the given 
for Deleuze aspires to be both a priori and immanently tested 
and renegotiated, open to becoming. But then, the challenge 
and criticism that Deleuze risks to face and needs to overcome, 
is that of falling prey to a vicious circularity 109 
Rather than filling the fracture with a new form of 
identity like Kant, Deleuze will instead expose it, following the 
Nietzschean doctrine of the eternal return. The thought of the 
108 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, supra, p. 100. 
109 We have already encountered the problem of circularity at least twice: 
first, in Chapter 1 our discussion of the Baroque, which having collapsed the 
possibility of transcendence and with it the possibility of configuring 
meaning in the world, it also liquefied the distinction between good and evil. 
In order to come to terms with this liquidation, the baroque has invented the 
figure of the intriguer. The problem of circularity has also appeared in the 
case of the modern work of art and the doctrine of self-referentiality: the 
fractured opened in the work of art was quickly capitulated by the museum. 
In this case, circularity was resolved in a more conservative way, by 
replacing the death of God (truth) to the mere guarantee of the museum. 
Having become conscious of this evolution, Conceptual art structures itself 
as an institutional questioning and critique. Nevertheless, despite the 
different attitudes, what becomes apparent in both cases is that the problem 
of circularity far from just being a problem of Deleuze, is the problem of 
immanence itself, the problem of having lost an external point of reference 
from which we could illuminate the world or the self and would guarantee 
its unity. Moreover, it appears that it is modernity, which has structured 
itself solely in the plane of immanence (death of God, destruction of 
authority, no external point of critique); circularity then is the problem of 
modernity and Deleuze having recognised such a thing attempts to 
reconsider the conditions of possibility for the re-organisation of experience 
in this new distribution. 
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eternal return is perhaps the simplest and the most monstrous 
(inhuman) thought. 110 Everything that happens and can happen 
has already happened before and must also happen again. This 
moment is the gateway to a double eternity, the eternal 
repetition of the past and that of the future. Zarathustra's 
eternal return is not the circular time of the Ancients, but rather 
the straight line of a double infinity. 
In the ancient conception of time things revolve, and this 
circularity of time is exemplified in the "cyclical transformation 
of qualitative elements into one another" or in the "circular 
movement of incorruptible celestial bodies" (the physical and 
the astronomical eternal return) [DR, 242]. In both cases 
however, the eternal return remains according to Deleuze a 
"law of nature", or a "generality"; that is, in both cases the 
eternal return can only be an empirical doctrine, which only 
affects the order of qualities and extensities, the order of a bare 
repetition. The crucial point remains that its conception 
presupposes the identity of that which returns. If for Nietzsche 
the eternal return is also a cosmological and physical doctrine, it 
rejects the idea of a principal or terminal state of equilibrium. 111 
It therefore reverses the Ancients' recognition of the eternal 
return of Being (of the Same) and transforms it into a thought of 
endless becoming. As Deleuze puts it: "returning is the being of 
that which becomes". 112 
110 If we want to be more precise we would have to assert that eternal return 
cannot be thought but only in its simulacra. It is instead what forces every 
thought, an intrinsic violence that thought attempts to recuperate, or 
probably, thought is bom as its recuperation. 
nl Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale, ed. W. Kaufmann (New York. Vintage Books, 1968) p. 377. 
112 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1983) p. 48. 
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Moreover, the Nietzschean doctrine appears to maintain 
a most intricate relation to the scientific principle of the 
conservation of energy. It is true that Nietzsche wrote that: "The 
law of the conservation of energy inevitably demands eternal 
recurrence". 113 But this statement attempts to appropriate the 
scientific position rather than be appropriated by it. The idea 
that energy is a total quantity conserved in all its 
transformations is founded upon the guarantee of its initial 
identity. What this conception totally misses is that energy is 
constant activity (becoming), and by considering it as a quantity 
science transforms it into being and distorts its essential 
character 114 For Nietzsche instead there is indeed something 
that is conserved for ever - "escape is impossible! "115 - but this is 
not like a totality (a Unity). What is conserved is not the timeless 
but the for all times. 
"Timelessness" to be rejected. At any precise moment of a force, 
the absolute conditionality of a new distribution of all its forces 
is given; it cannot stand still. "Change" belongs to the essence, 
therefore also temporality. 116 
What distinguishes 'timelessness' from 'for all times' is 
not so much that the former is a-temporal while the latter is 
temporal, but rather the risk entailed in the latter conception. 
Timelessness affords no risk for it is itself the guarantee of 
unity; but that which returns for all times earns its return, 
113 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, supra, p. 547. 
114 "That 'force' and 'rest' and 'remaining the same', contradict one another. 
The measure of force (as magnitude) as fixed, but its essence in flux". Ibid., p. 
547. 
I's Ibid., p. 545. 
116 Ibid., p. 547. 
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selected in action, only on condition that it has let itself to death, 
that it has risked its own extinguishing. 
This is why Nietzsche alerts us at several points and in 
different ways (most expressively with Zarathustra's crisis and 
convalescence) that the thought of the eternal return is not the 
thought of lightness or fleetingness, which would allow us not 
to value things too seriously. And yet, it is the thought that 
makes us lighter or free. But then it is not a thought but only at a 
first instance, when as an ethical thought it urges us, whatever 
we will, to will it in such a way that we can also will its eternal 
return. 117 It calls the will to eliminate everything that is negative 
and reactive, everything that restrains the will to its power. 
But in its profounder and true meaning, the eternal 
return is a cruel, esoteric doctrine of death, destruction and 
annihilation. Not anymore the destruction of the small man or 
of reactive forces but primarily the destruction of the self and 
the reactive forces that we are. 118 It is not anymore memory but 
forgetfulness, expulsion, and primarily self-forgetfulness 119 Not 
everything returns in the eternal return; the order of extensities 
and qualities, the order of the same and the similar, of identity 
and the equal, do not return but perish, once and for all. This is 
the condition for the return of intensities, of the truly active 
forces. 
117 Thus Deleuze argues that "as an ethical thought the eternal return is the 
formulation of the practical synthesis". See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, supra, p. 68. 
118 For Nietzsche a body is made by active (the superior and dominant) and 
reactive (the inferior and dominated) forces. Great activity is unconscious 
and consciousness only expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the 
active forces that dominate them; as such it is essentially reactive. For a more 
extended analysis on that see Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, supra, 
pp. 39-42. 
119 In this second instance the eternal return expresses the new sense of the 
"disjunctive synthesis". Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester, 
ed. Constantin V. Boundas (London, New York: Continuum, 1990) p. 300. 
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But what brings Zarathustra back to life? What makes the 
compulsion of repetition, the striving to death, also a 
convalescence, a coming back? What urges again? Only a belief 
of the future, as a pure and empty form of time, freed from any 
events that would make up its content. The "straight line of 
time" that "abjures all empirical content" is neither the cyclical 
time of the Ancients nor the linear time of the Moderns but 
exposes the illusion of both conceptions as well as the illusion of 
their supposed opposition. For both conceptions extract time 
from empirical observation, the former from that of qualities the 
latter from that of extensities; they both subordinate time to 
movement. 
Yet, the Kantian or Nietzschean straight line of time is 
not a spatialization of time but overturns its relation to 
movement, by creating the possibility for the temporal series 120 
It undoes the foundation of habit (the arrow of time) and the 
ground of memory (the curve of time) in favour of the straight 
line of universal ungrounding. It is only on the condition of the 
eternal return that depth is no longer and deploys itself on the 
surface but may become light: "My abyss speaks, I have tuned my 
ultimate depth inside out into the light" 121 It is at this moment that 
everything is equal and everything is the Same, that one has 
become equal but only to the Unequal itself and one returns 
transformed. 
The eternal return does not produce an external change 
of things, making them lighter or more intensive. It is not 
120 For a more extended analysis of Kant's creation of a specifically modern 
topology of time, which "enfolds the intensive character of our becoming in 
time" see Keith Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: 
Bergson and the Time of Life, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 
197-204. 
In Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. 
W. Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1978) p. 216. 
165 
merely an external selection of the 'fittest', or of the more active 
forces that ensures their return. For such a conception would 
entail that what lives today is definitely better than what lived 
fifty or hundred or thousand years ago, that history, humanity 
and all nature necessarily evolve and that progress is granted 
somewhere outside of us and our will122 But in this case, 
evolution, or change, would be given rather than creative and 
created. 
For both Nietzsche and Deleuze the doctrine of the 
eternal return is an affirmation of the will to power, the one 
cannot be read or exist without the other. Deleuze precisely 
expresses this connection when he states that: "the will to power 
does not at all mean 'to want power' but, on the contrary: 
whatever you will, carry it to the 'nth' power" [DR, 8]. It is the 
will that wants itself to return and which thus also risks its own 
annihilation. Thus, as Agamben argues, "[w]hat Nietzsche tried 
to do in the concept of the eternal return is precisely to conceive 
122 Darwin had famously argued that evolution takes place by selection of the 
fittest, conceived in terms of the immanent capacity for reproducibility. His 
account is immanent although it also grants a radical externality to selection. 
H. Caygill criticises Deleuze that he presents us with a humanised account of 
selection, which lacks the radical externality of the Darwinian concept. By 
implicating choice and value in selection, and making it the ethical 
requirement that 'while existing we must select joyful passions' he ends up 
with a sentimentalised nature and a brutalised ethics and politics. In our 
view, however, something else is at stake: first, Deleuze seeks to create the 
conditions for the translation of an ontological question into an ethical (for he 
recognises that it is not just a matter of applying the rules). And second, 
which maybe only follows from the first, Deleuze is driven by a different 
question than Darwin: namely, not what are the criteria of selection (external 
or internal) but rather granting the externality of selection (it selects) how do 
we have a chance, how can it be made ours? See Howard Caygill, "The 
Topology of Selection: the Limits of Deleuze's Biophilosophy" in Deleuze and 
Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, Keith Ansell Pearson (ed. ) (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997) pp. 149-162. 
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the final identity of the two potentiae [potentia activa and potentia 
passiva], the will to power as a pure passion affecting itself. 123 
Moreover, as a doctrine of selection, the eternal return is 
also the power of transformation. Of course, this does not make 
the eternal return a matter of our conscious selection and 
change is not a product of our actions. If the eternal return brings 
a change in the product or in the object, this is only secondarily. 
First, it has transformed us, not as the agents of the action but 
primarily as a will. It has not changed the object of our will, it 
has not made us will something different, but it has made us 
will differently, it has made us will to the nth power. But what 
makes the will to power is not just the intensification of the will 
(Will more! Will intensively! ) but rather the will's envelopment of 
its caesura, the will's envelopment of the necessity that contradicts it. 
("One day I want to see as beautiful what is necessary"). One should 
not just fill the caesura, one should arrive to will it that is also to 
let oneself to it. For there is neither will without passion and 
passivity, nor passion without an energetic will. The power of 
transformation is not the transformation of our caesura but the 
transformation of our envelopment of the caesura (us, as this 
envelopment). 
One might say that there is external necessity (God), or 
one might say that there is only chance (immanent necessity). 
But at the end of the day these are both questions of knowledge. 
What matters instead is that we arrive to make of chance, our 
necessity; this alone constitutes creation. 
123 Giorgio Agamben, "The Eternal Return and the Paradox of Passion" in 
Nietzsche in Italy, Thomas Harrison (ed. ) (Saratoga, Calif.: Anma Libri, 1988) 
p. 17. 
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Rhythm is a temporal whole but only on condition that it 
is cracked. It is this crack, the suspension or the caesura of time 
that prevents rhythm from becoming a temporal synthesis, One, 
once and for all. Instead rhythm is a singularity unfolding itself 
in a multiplicity of ways (poly-rhythm), alternating its masks, 
yet transmitting all the way through that power - the power of 
its caesura, which unceasingly dissolves and recreates it anew. 
The ecstasis of rhythm is the risk and the death it undergoes so 
that it can return, be selected again, in a new life. Being 
ambiguous itself, rhythm dissolves life in an ecstatic death and 
envelops dying in the course of its life. 
VI. On the mode of existence of the work of art 
Where is the work of art? Is it the material entity, the 
canvas with its colours and spatial forms that stands in front of 
my eyes? Just a painting? Or, is it an idea intended by its creator 
and communicated by the representation of it? An idea, which 
would place the work in the mind of the artist or of the 
spectator that entertains it? Benjamin endowed the work of art 
with an aura, which he defined as "the unique phenomenon of a 
distance, however close it may be" 124 Similarly, Agamben 
identified the idiosyncratic mode of existence of the work of art 
with its strange capacity "to give and withdraw itself at once". 
Could we say that these formulations only repeat the bourgeois 
124 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction", in Illuminations, edited and with an Introduction by Hannah 
Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Press, 1992) p. 216. 
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cult of art which has invented the aesthetic attitude? Following 
our discussion in the earlier parts of this chapter, it would be a 
reduction and a mistake to consider the idea of beauty as merely 
a product or construction of modernity. What is modern is the 
separation of beauty from truth, which has subsequently 
collapsed it to an identification of the spatial properties of the 
work. In our view, both Benjamin's and Agamben's 
formulations address a more intricate issue, namely that of the 
ambiguous mode of being of the work of art. Though in what 
does its ambiguity consist? 
The modern conception of the work of art has conceived 
it as a double entity, form and content. But once separated how 
could the two components ever come together again; how could 
the work reclaim a unity? It is the unity of the work of art that is 
at stake in modernity, not the fact of a material unity but the 
event of consistency. The problem of consistency concerns the 
way that the work arrives to 'stand on its own', it signifies its 
moment of completion. Completion, however, does not refer to 
the finished work (Rimbaud is complete even if unfinished), 
rather completion and consistency both address the same 
question, namely "what makes this work art? " 
A common response to this question was usually 
provided by a formalizing, centralized, arborescent model, 
which might be expressed in two fashions. Both of them 
however, would remain subordinate to the order of 
resemblance. Thus in a first instance, and similarly to the 
Platonic model of mimesis, art imitates or resembles an external 
world of nature and things. As a representation, the work of art 
is measured against the reality, the external model it represents, 
and it is judged according to its degree of faithfulness. In 
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another view, the work's consistency is granted to the intentions 
of the artist: whether as an expression of the artist's genius (the 
idealist version), or of the unconscious (the materialist version), 
art is once more the copy (even if exemplary) of an original. In 
all instances, it remains referential to something, which is other 
than it, external to it and probably superior to it. As opposed to 
the aforementioned views it is proposed here that the work of 
art far exceeds the prior intentions of the artist and her -or our - 
lived experience. 
But then do we succumb to the modernist doctrine of 
art's self-referentiality? As Agamben had clearly shown, the 
problem of art in modernity is not its status as a copy, which 
subordinates it to an original (i. e. a religious or moral Idea, a 
truth content) but rather the contrary, the problem is its 
autonomy from any external Idea. But the process in which art 
has gradually emptied itself of any content aspiring to attain the 
pure form has resulted in a reversal movement, it has 
annihilated art's own idea and has rendered it fully dependent 
on the aesthetic institution. Agamben's exposition of the fate of 
modern art draws an absolute parallel between the recognition 
of art's self-referentiality and its self-annihilation. 
Art's quest for autonomy, exemplified in the separation 
of beauty from truth, has signified the demand for inventing its 
own internal and self-sufficient criteria. But it has resulted 
instead to an even greater heteronomy, which has subordinated 
art to the authority of the institution and its power to validate. 
Consequently, it now becomes clear that the problem of 
whether art refers to something other than itself or not, does not 
address the status of art vis-a-vis reality (superior, inferior, or 
equal) nor does it so much concern the possibility of a non- 
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representational art; it is instead a problem addressing the 
criteria of judgment. Thus for example, abstract art does not 
really tell us that art can go beyond representation; rather, it 
posits a challenge to our perception and experience of art, by 
requiring that we invent new ways to view art, beyond external 
references. 
But when art frees itself from external reference it ends 
up in circularity: it posits itself as a question to itself. The 
impossibility of such a circular structure is revealed and 
confirmed by the all-empowered role of the museum. Self- 
referentiality, which entailed the radical aspiration for an art 
which bears its own reason, and which creates its own criteria 
for judgment, has trivially ended up to surrendering art to the 
institution and the demands of the art market. Thus, the modem 
work of art founded on the fracture between form and content, 
creator and spectator, rather than sustaining itself in vertigo, 
appears to have entrusted the guarantee of its unity to the 
museum. 125 Could there be another way, internal and 
immanent, that the work of art might gain consistency? 
Benjamin had insightfully diagnosed in mechanical 
reproduction the increasing substitution of art's intrinsic value 
for an exhibition value. But what is the exhibition value of the 
work of art? Is it the value attributed to it by the museum, the 
collectors and the art market? And could it be said that art's 
monetary value is the immanent expression of its power, in the 
same way that truth was the transcendent? 
125 One might say that the museum, the art market and the whole institution 
are not merely external and arbitrary authorities in relation to the work of 
art. Art's monetary value is the immanent expression of art's power (truth is 
the transcendent). However, in our view this is an artificial construction: 
monetary value cannot be attributed to the artwork's power but totally to the 
market's power to appropriate the artwork (which the more it is emptied the 
more it is available to such appropriation). 
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Thierry De Duve has argued that the "most primary 
convention, the most elementary of all modernist artistic practice, 
[is] that works of art are shown in order to be judged as such" 126 The 
need that the work is exhibited is not merely a convention, but 
rather it is the condition of modem art, and De Duve also states 
that, "even if it is informed and crossed through and through by 
discursive practices, the field of plastic arts, [... ] is not 
discursive but ostensive, even for that art which calls itself 
Conceptual" (emphasis mine). 127 The condition 'to be shown' is 
not merely the material necessity of appearance, but rather it is 
a movement by which the work of art opens itself to the viewer. 
Moreover, once they've passed the test (of exhibition) works 
bear, implicitly at least, the label: 'this is art'. That is, the process 
of exhibition in the museum context which names the work as 
art, is an irreversible process, a historical fact. 128 
Clement Greenberg identified the "essence of 
Modernism" as lying "in the use of the characteristic methods of 
a discipline itself - not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it 
more firmly in its area of competence" 129Yet the question is 
whether after all Duchamp is also a modernist: doesn't the 
readymade precisely test art's own conditions? An initial 
response to this question would be that the readymade tests 
art's conditions but it does not do so with art's proper means, 
like a painter does, in the sense of technique or violation of 
aesthetic criteria; it does not do so in the retinal sense. 
126 Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp, An October Book (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996) p. 379. 
127 Thierry de Duve, "Echoes of the Readymade: Critique of Pure 
Modernism", trans. Rosalind Krauss, in October, Vol. 70, Fall 1994, p. 97. 
128 Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp, supra, p. 380. 
129 Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting", in The New Art, ed. Gregory 
Battock (New York: Dutton, 1973) p. 66. 
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But, in De Duve's and our view, the readymade has 
pushed to something more than that. Rather than questioning 
the condition, it really makes it a fact. Once exhibited, a work is 
art. So the name 'art' becomes a status rather than a quality. 130 It 
is a given, rather than the product of the spectator's judgment or 
creation. Instead, as Duchamp wrote, now, "the role of the 
spectator is to determine the weight of the work on the aesthetic 
scale". 131 But this evolution does not simply assume the 
spectator as the bearer of the qualitative judgment, attributing to 
him a relatively passive role. De Duve concludes: 
[t]he fact that the readymades have passed the test successfully 
does not absolve us from having to judge them again. [... ] To call 
them art [... ] is to make our judgment as to their quality bear on 
the very fact of deciding whether, in their case, status equals 
quality. Whether, in other words, we simply read the label 
pinned on them, or whether we write it 132 
The transformation of aesthetic judgment into a 
qualitative judgment does not simply alter the kind of judgment 
we are making, or the question that we need to answer. In order 
to make the qualitative judgment one does not simply decide 
for oneself, nor express a subjective opinion. Instead, Duchamp 
has radically transformed the question we need to ask, namely: 
how could I see this as art? Consequently, it is not merely a 
matter of testing the object but mostly of testing us: how could I 
become such that I would see the fountain in the urine? Would I 
130 Thierry de Duve, "Echoes of the Readymade: Critique of Pure 
Modernism", supra, p. 123. 
131 Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (eds. ), Salt seller: The Essential 
Writings of Marcel Duchamp (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975) p. 140. 
132 Thierry de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, supra, p. 425. 
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pass the test? Passing the test is not merely a matter of external 
conformity, but a matter of inventing one's own reason, as a 
will to power. Duchamp's readymade, which transforms 
aesthetic judgment into qualitative judgment, marks also the 
transformation of freedom (Kant) in affirmation (Nietzsche). 
What he attempts to do is to turn the given fact of passivity 
('this is art') into the conditions of activity ('I can see it as art, 
because I willed it'). If Duchamp radically transforms (or 
illuminates) Kant, this is not because he moulds him into 
Nietzsche but because he reveals that the possibility of 
judgment necessarily implicates my own becoming. 
We can now say that the work of art is an intensity (in- 
itself), which also appears in enveloping itself. A rhythm. That 
is why it is primarily a whole, rather than the addition of form 
and content. It is this rhythm as a whole which becomes 
consequently distributed into form and content. Form and 
content constitute modalities, in which the same Unequal whole 
redistributes itself, rather than dividing itself. As such, both form 
and content implicate and unfold the rhythm of the whole but 
in different degrees of contraction and relaxation. 
In the discussion of art in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze 
and Guattari draw the distinction between 'actualization' and 
'embodiment'. The work of art stands as a monument to the 
event; and "the monument does not actualize the virtual event 
but incorporates or embodies it; it gives it a body, a life, a 
universe" [MP, 177]. But if everything is rhythm, which simply 
redistributes itself, how can this distinction still be possible? 
Actualization and embodiment are two different rhythms, that 
is, different modes of enveloping the caesura. Thus actualization 
tends to fill up the caesura by rendering intensity outside itself, 
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such as the external instances of matter or explication. 
Embodiment on the other hand, envelops the caesura, and 
'conceals and reveals' it like Benjamin's origin. Yet, this is not so 
much a dialectical movement but, following our analysis, rather 
an inhuman tendency (yet mostly implicated in the human) to 
risk oneself; yet, one risks only because one wills to live. 
Consequently, the work of art does not express 
something but in its being it gives the conditions for 
participation; we become in tune. Becoming in tune, that is the 
primary becoming, the condition of all becomings. For Levinas 
in rhythm "there is no longer oneself, but rather a sort of 
passage from oneself to anonymity". 133 In this passage, we 
recreate the multiplicity of rhythms haunting us from within; 
we are taken by rhythm, compulsively. It is not a matter of 
representing the thing, by actualising its rhythm in memory or 
imagination, but rather it is really a matter of letting us being 
infused. The difference between representation (imitation) and 
the becoming of rhythm, is that we do not create it, but it becomes 
through us. 
But then, if rhythm is what becomes through us, then it is 
really our becoming - we become Giacometti's fragility, and we 
become Modigliani's blind girls. We do not imagine how a blind 
person feels, but we let ourselves to her look at us and thus we 
become a blindness that opens to the light. When I look at a 
painting, it is a will that is aroused and which activates the life 
of the painting; a will, which reflected on the surface, that is 
taken by the 'object' it wills, returns on us and fills us with a new 
life. Rhythm: theft and gift. This is how a painting returns our 
gaze in a pleasure without fulfilment; not because of the lack of 
133 Emmanuel Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow", in The Levinas Reader, Sean 
Hand (ed. ) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p. 133. 
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a desired object, but rather because we cannot cease wanting it 
again. Pleasure without fulfilment is the moment of ecstasis, the 
moment which wills, 1M and by willing it risks and forgets itself, 
so that it returns in a new life (power of metamorphosis). 
In the last chapter, we will elaborate this last instance of 
becoming, where things or the work of art become or live 
through us. They do not live in us, as if we contained or have 
stored them but rather we recreate them in our becoming. Such 
a conception would be possible and plausible only if we 
managed to show that it is the body itself which is a becoming, 
a rhythm which creates itself rather than something given. 
But first, let us follow some of Bill Viola's video works as 
a questioning and stimulation to our thinking of art's desire to 
touch the body and art's will to live. 
134 Will (or desire for Deleuze and Guattari) is primary or a priori. It is 
therefore without an object and non-empirical. This is a significant point of 
their divergence from other French post-structuralist thinkers who posit 
'lack' as primary and desire as being driven by this lack. This is exemplified 
in their conception of 'the body without organs'. "The BwO is the field of 
immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire 
defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, 
whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it" [TP, 154]. 
This also leads to a different account of passion or self-affection. Thus, for 
Levinas would see the 'passion' of rhythm in a 'radical passivity' of passing 
to anonymity; on the contrary, we would argue that for Deleuze and Guattari 
one is affected because one wills, because one (the body) opens oneself 
(itself) to the future. 
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Chapter 4 
Materializing time: Bill Viola's video works 
I. Introduction 
What is the status of the image? Although traditionally 
the consideration of the image has been the providence of art 
and art history, in recent years it has also preoccupied cultural 
theory. The question recurs in different guises and points to the 
image's own ambiguity. Thus, on one hand, the discussion of 
the image takes place as a critique the ocularcentrism of western 
culture, in terms of a "denigration of vision" due to its tendency 
to reify the world and establish subject/object relationships 135 
In this context, the image is conceived not just in opposition to 
135 There is an extensive bibliography addressing these issues from different 
perspectives (philosophical, sociological, psychoanalytic, art historical), 
which would be pointless to cite here. From a cultural theory perspective, 
Martin Jay's study is characteristic in the field. He gives an illuminating 
account of the fate and critique of vision in 20th century French theory and 
art. Martin Jay: Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 201h Century French 
Thought (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1993). 
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the thing itself, but primarily as our mode of relating to the 
world - i. e. through the perceptual modality of vision - which 
tends to separate us from the world. Vision has been 
considered to be the most immaterial of the senses and the one 
which mainly sustains the emergence of the subject. The origins 
of this conception are not to be found in twentieth-century 
philosophy (e. g. Sartre) and psychoanalysis (e. g. Lacan), but in 
the birth of Renaissance perspective and it is intricately 
connected with the contemporaneous rise of the subject/object, 
mind/body dichotomies. 
However, in a different context or from a different 
perspective, the image is privileged in comparison to language, 
because of its greater attachment to materiality as opposed to 
the conceptuality of language. Thus the image is closer to the 
concrete and material (although it remains a representation of 
reality), and therefore it keeps us embedded in the concrete and 
the material. This is also the reason for the 'visual turn' in 
theory, which comes as a response to the 'linguistic turn' of 
structuralism and post-structuralism. In other words, the image 
is on one hand charged for reifying and disenchanting the 
world by dematerializing it and rendering it pictorial, while on 
the other it is praised for its material qualities. Television 
images of war render reality of pain and agony into spectacular 
pictures, but the image of a painting can overflow in us with 
sensations and feelings. Where does the difference lie? Is it in 
the skill of reproduction of the artist rather than of the news 
cameraman? 
However, the interest in the image attains a crucial 
significance once it is recognised that contemporary culture 
becomes permeated by images to such an extent that visual 
representations do not only substitute language and 
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conceptuality but also reality and life. These conditions appear 
to alter not only the paradigm of perception but also of 
experience, and to affect the established presupposition of the 
real. 
Bergson found in the ambivalent status of the image the 
sufficient correlate for his universe. His plane of immanence is 
not formed by things as material givens, nor of our 
representations as our ideal constructions, but of images in the 
broader sense; not simply pictorial, but sensuous/material, 
rather than abstract signs (visual, olfactory, auditory, haptic). As 
we have elaborated in the first chapter, the Bergsonian 
conception of the 'image' posits it in-between the thing-in-itself 
and our representation of it, between pure reality (or 
materiality) and pure ideality (immateriality), and between the 
objectification of the thing/content and the formality of a pure 
concept 136 In Bergson the image is not a spatial, fixed entity but 
a spatio-temporal process. 
In this chapter, we will explore this ambiguity of the 
image in the case of video. We will begin our discussion by 
considering how video shifts the temporal paradigm that had 
structured cinema and therefore creates different conditions and 
possibilities for experience. We will then discuss some of Bill 
Viola's video works aspiring to show how time and intensity is 
not determined by the technology but is enveloped and 
enveloping in its fragments. 
136 These distinctions only take place in principle (de jure) rather than in 
reality (de facto). According to Bergson experience always gives us 
composites. Although states of things are mixtures one could discern the 
pure tendencies in them, which differ in kind. 
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II. Time and video technology 
In the Cinema books, Deleuze saw in cinema the 
conjunction of art and technology in the creation of the correlate 
to the universal flux of images. It seems that it is the technology 
of video and electronic media that translate literally Bergson's 
account of the image. However, although both cinema and 
video reproduce a moving image on the screen they are based 
on substantially different principles. Although their difference 
may not always be directly perceptible, it provides not only a 
different conceptual basis but also different possibilities in the 
implementation of time; most importantly it structures different 
spatio-temporal coordinates of experience. 137 
Cinema has emerged from the technology of 
photography, as it is an analogical medium operating on the 
basis of light and still images. Running the film footage in a 
certain speed rate (standardised to 24fps) the still images 
produce to the viewer the perceptual effect of continuous 
movement. And although movement cannot be reconstituted 
from the addition of static points (as was the constant 
Bergsonian critique), what allows cinema to create the 
impression of movement is the delay of human perception - the 
fact that it is always a bit off-phase or a bit slower than reality. 
More specifically, studies in neurophysiology have 
distinguished three time scales arising through the phase- 
locking of neuronal activity into synchronous emergent 
137 For a phenomenological approach of the difference between cinematic and 
electronic technologies, in their concrete 'materiality' and particular 
existential significance see Vivian Sobchack, "The Scene of the Screen: 
Envisioning Cinematic and Electronic 'Presence'", in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 
and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer (eds. ), Materialities of Communication, trans. by 
William Whobrey (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994) pp. 
83-106. 
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neuronal ensembles. At the lowest level, non-perceptible 
microphysical registrations self-organise and form a durational 
whole that we immediately sense as 'now'. This duration of the 
'now' has been identified as lasting 0.3 seconds and it is not 
given as an information unit but as a 'horizon of integration 138 
This means that what happens in an interval shorter than this is 
not registered as such, but in contraction and implicated in a 
longer event. Cinema does not reproduce real movement but 
creates for us the impression of movement based on the 
durational rather than instantaneous character of perception. 
The impression of movement is the result of the memory 
retained in the formation of perception, and that is why cinema's 
temporal paradigm is sequentiality, where time is created in the 
fragments between frames or shots. 
Conversely, video is a much more malleable technology 
in the incorporation of movement. It is not based on the 
inscription of light on a photosensitive surface which becomes 
reproduced, but on the simultaneous transmission of the 
electronic signal through a network, even though images then 
also unfold serially. For video, the primary value is the 
electronic signal which materializes time and movement. In 
cinema, the image is projected as a whole, analogically as it is 
imprinted on the film reel, and movement is superimposed, 
while in video there is no image stored, but each time it is 
created in the movement of the electrons; movement informs 
the video image, which is rendered more fluid and malleable, 
open to greater manipulation. In video, contrary to cinema, it is 
stasis which is an illusion. 
138Francisco Varela, "The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time 
Consciousness", in Jean Petitot, Francisco'J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and 
Jean-Michel Roy (eds. ) Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1999) pp. 272-273. 
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But what is the meaning or significance of this difference 
in the temporal structure of the two media, since it only 
concerns a micro level of perception outside the rate of normal 
or conscious perception and therefore goes unnoticed? In 1976, 
in an insightful and controversial essay, Rosalind Krauss 
defined video as "the aesthetics of narcissism". By identifying 
narcissism as "the condition of the entire genre" she founded 
video art on a psychological rather than material factor 139 
Although she uses particular examples in her discussion (such 
as Vito Acconci's video tapes Centers (1971) and Air Time (1973)) 
her argument is not simply addressed to the specific works' 
content or to the condition of the artist, but to the structure of 
the genre and therefore it includes the medium. She bases her 
idea on video's fundamental capacity to record and transmit at 
the same time - producing instant feedback. 
The body is therefore as it were centered between two machines 
that are the opening and closing of a parenthesis. The first of these 
is the camera; the second is the monitor, which re-projects the 
performer's image with the immediacy of the mirror. 140 
Video's simultaneity creates a self-encapsulation in a 
present lived and mirrored by the synchronous feedback, which 
disengages from the spatio-temporal context, from the world, 
and from past and future. Krauss rightly notes that video's 
auto-reflection is not the same as the reflexive movement in 
which "consciousness doubling back upon itself [... ] perform[s] 
and portray[s] a separation between forms of art and their 
contents, between the procedures of thought and their objects. " 
139 Rosalind Krauss, "Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism", in October (spring 
1976) 1: 51-64 at 51. 
140 Ibid., p. 52. 
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The difference is total. Reflection, when it is a case of mirroring, 
is a move toward an external symmetry; while reflexiveness is a 
strategy to achieve a radical asymmetry from within. 141 
Although we do not intend to reproduce Krauss' whole 
argument here, and would rather not psychologize a 
technology, there is a significant insight in the basis of her 
argument, which must be investigated here. The technological 
insertion into the spatio-temporal whole of experience and the 
flow of life, segments and extracts a part of it. This is equally the 
case in photography, cinema or video and that is why all these 
technologies operate on the basis of the spatialization of time. In 
this extraction and disembededness, time becomes objectified, 
because (as we have already noted) duration cannot be divided 
without changing in kind. However, video's electronic signal is 
a much shorter duration than the one captured in the 
photographic frame; video then does not create a greater 
affective intimacy with the real or the present, nor does it bring 
us closer, but it only analyzes it. That is why video's distinctive 
temporal principle is simultaneity, or the present, even if its 
images are also unfolding. 
Although the signal forms itself into the image, this is a 
process contained in the closed circuit of the medium and 
therefore cannot be compared to a living process of becoming, 
which is bounded yet open. 142 However, art does not simply 
rely on the capacities of the medium but rather attempts to 
141 Ibid., p. 57. 
142 Thus in our view Lazzarato totally misses this detail which makes 
photography, cinema, video and digital media, in principle technologies that 
spatialize time, rather than "crystallizing time" as he argues. The 'crystals of 
time' are not properties of the technological apparatus. Maurizio Lazzarato, 
"Machines to Crystallise Time: Bergson", trans. by Matthew Hyland, in 
Theory, Culture and Society, forthcoming issue. 
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render them expressive. In the following part, we will consider 
aspects of Bill Viola's work in order to see how he attempts to 
open the simultaneity of the video image into time and 
intensity. 
III. The Reflecting Pool: eccentric temporalities of an instant 
We will begin our discussion on Viola's work and the 
complex implementation of time in his images with a video 
made during 1977 and 1979 - the Reflecting Pool. Its initial format 
was that of a video rather than a video installation (like much of 
his later work), although it has subsequently been exhibited in 
different ways as a video projection143 Our choice to introduce 
time through this particular work is because it illuminates 
several aspects of Viola's creative process and his interest in the 
possibilities of the technology, but also remains a beautiful piece 
with an immediate impact. 
Viola characterises his works of the early 1970s primarily 
as experimentations with the medium of video itself - its 
technical capacities and expressive possibilities. It is in this 
sense that he views the Red Tape, from 1975, as "a sort of bridge. 
Before that, the tapes were didactic, the content was the 
medium, like structural film in a way. [... ] [T]he act of making a 
tape became a process of discovering and demonstrating 
143 For example in the Video Acts show hosted at ICA in 2003 it was simply 
projected on the upper part of a wall, above the stairs. This kind of staging of 
the work emphasised the feeling of suspension, entailed in the work. 
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something about video. "144 Thus, for example, in the Passage 
Series from 1973, he experimented upon the different - despite 
appearances - perceptual effects produced by a zoom and a 
dolly. First, he walked down a hall holding the camera in a way 
that the image looked like it was created using a zoom lens and 
then he zoomed in a way that appeared like walking along the 
hall, blurring the difference between the two types of shooting 
and making them appear interchangeable. Then, however, he 
placed the camera against the wall, noisily scraping it all the 
way down and back again. In this way, he emphasised and 
rendered perceivable the implication of embodied experience in 
space, which in the case of the zoom was bound to remain only 
a pictorial space (in the conceptual strand of the Renaissance 
perspective) while in the dolly it incorporated its physical 
reality of movement. 
If the early tapes constitute a kind of 'structural video' (to 
paraphrase) this is because "the camera was given its primary 
role as a monitoring instrument, that is, as an 'object'; but ever 
since about 1976, [... ] Viola employs the camera not only as an 
'object', but - with preference - as a 'subject': that is, as the 
'inner eye"'145 In other words, during the early stages the gaze 
is turned upon the camera, which is a separate, external object; 
man and the apparatus form a closed circuit. Gradually, 
however, through use, struggle, mistakes and accidents, 146 or 
144 Raymond Bellour, "An Interview with Bill Viola", in October (1985) Vol. 
34, pp. 91-119 at 93. 
145 Rolf Lauter, "The Passing: Remembering the present, or pain and beauty 
of being", in the exhibition catalogue Bill Viola: Unseen Images/ Nie Gesehene 
Bilder! Images Jamais Vues, edited by Marie Luise Syring (Düsseldorf, 
Stockholm, Madrid, Lausanne and London: R. Meyer, 1992) p. 65. 
146 Viola describes how he made a 1973 tape called Information when, while 
trying to make a copy between two machines he accidentally "plugged the 
output into the input of the same machine, pushed the record button, and 
suddenly there was this strange feedback, a signal that was no signal at all. " Although merely a product of mistake, he considered it to be the best tape he 
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else through repetition, it becomes incorporated to the body as a 
kind of extended limb itself or a new integrated system, which 
then allows for the eye (both the natural and the technological) 
to open and free itself to the outside. 
The Reflecting Pool was made in the period 1977-1979, 
together with a series of tapes which form part of the same 
cycle 147 It initiates us in his work in many ways: thematically, 
since it introduces basic themes and ideas which recur in a 
similar or disguised way in much of his later work; technically, 
in terms of the ways he manipulates time and image in the 
course of the realisation of the work - in the recording, editing 
and matting of images process; and more importantly, 
rhythmically, that is in the complex orchestration of distinct 
temporalities in the viewing experience of the work. Although 
we may distinguish these as different levels of the work, in the 
course of this chapter we will attempt to show how they are 
inextricably linked. 
First, we will describe this video in terms of what takes 
place on the narrative level of the image, or else what we 
actually perceive. A static camera frames a pool in the 
foreground surrounded by a forest visible in the background. 
On the soundtrack an airplane's hum gradually subsides giving 
way to the sound of rushing water, seemingly the water in the 
pool. A man emerges from the forest and walks up to the edge 
of the pool; he stands still for a few seconds, we see his 
reflection in the water, then he suddenly jumps over the pool 
had made at that time. See Raymond Bellour, "An interview with Bill Viola", 
supra, p. 94. Maybe accidents of this sort are not only accidental; not that they 
are in any way fatal or predetermined. They also constitute a kind of passive 
interest produced by repetition, a surplus or remainder of the generated 
energy. 
147 The Reflecting Pool cycle is a videotape collection consisting of the 
homonymous video as well as Moonblood (1977-1979), Silent Life (1979), 
Ancient of Days (1979-1981) and Vegetable Memory (1978-1980). 
186 
and is frozen in midair. In the pool the light darkens, but the 
water is animated by the movement of concentric circles. In the 
meantime, the figure suspended upon the water in the foetal 
position gradually begins to dissolve into the landscape. There 
is more movement in the water, this time in backward motion 
and the reflection of non-existent people. The water turns black 
and the reflection becomes light. In the last sequence, the man 
emerges from the water, naked, his back to us, climbs onto the 
edge of the pool and disappears into the forest in a 
discontinuous movement. 
Although on the level of its reception the work appears 
as a single, continuous piece with special effects superimposed, 
on its production level it is more complicated. The piece was 
made by combining three series of recordings: first, a series of 
recordings of the things happening within the pool (reflections, 
throwing of small objects forming circles in the water, play of 
light/darkness); then another recording of the man coming out 
of the forest, jumping into the water, coming out and leaving 
the pool again; and finally, a recording of the scene while 
completely empty, with no action taking place at all. The key 
element, which allowed for the reconstruction of the separate 
recordings in a single piece, was the stationary camera; as he 
explains "[kleeping the camera in the same place automatically 
means that any objects that have not moved between different 
recordings can be registered (aligned) again, broken up and put 
together, and reconstructed to make a whole image. "148 The 
recordings were edited together using slow dissolves, in order 
to create an impression of continuity merging the different 
activities, a freezing frame (when jumping in midair) and the 
148Raymond Bellour, "An Interview with Bill Viola", supra, p. 96. Viola gives 
a detailed analysis of the technical process he followed in the making of the 
piece in pp. 96-97. 
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external key to bring the three temporal levels in a single image. 
As a result, since there is no change in viewpoint or movement 
of the camera, the spatial dimension of the image remains static; 
change occurs on the temporal level as the "frame is broken up 
into three distinct levels of time -real time, still, and time lapse. " 
The video begins with a recording of action in real time - 
a man walking out of the forest. Since this is the only movement 
taking place within the frame that is within our field of vision, 
our gaze is mainly concentrated upon it; we begin with a 
general view of the whole scene, and then the eye focuses upon 
the action. The camera by remaining static during the whole 
piece gives up any activity on its part. Instead of leading our 
gaze, it only frames for us a field of vision and withdraws to an 
inactive position. It is simply switched on (which is nevertheless 
enough to transform it from inert object to receptive surface) 
recording action and non-action and the passage of time and its 
traces upon the scenery. The static view transforms the video 
piece into a kind of painting or an instantaneous image where 
the camera plays the role of the frame, with the sole difference 
that this is a spatio-temporal frame. 
The static spatial view becomes animated by the 
movement occurring within the frame. Or rather, isn't it the eye 
itself, which becomes activated by movement? 149 Movement 
attracts the eye, it makes it move, alternate its intensity and 
focal point from the general view of the landscape to the man 
coming out of the forest. The sequence appears as description of 
the action, recording its duration; nevertheless, there is already 
a disturbance provoked by the sound of an airplane's engine in 
149 The more spatial an image the easier it becomes appropriated in 
recognition of the same, and the eye tends to withdraw from it to a more 
passive position. It is movement, or time, or difference, what activates the 
eye. 
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the air - an auditive image introduced in the field of perception. 
This sound gradually fades away and the sound of water 
emerges in the foreground. The introduction of the auditive 
image does not simply extend our perception of the scene, but 
introduces movement to the pool (even if this is not yet a visual 
movement but only acoustic). We become aware of two 
(simultaneously. and heterogeneously) unfolding durations, not 
just of a human action and of water's flow, but different 
durations of the image (rather than within the image as its 
content). Man's stillness at the pool's edge, becomes interrupted 
by a mutation on the soundtrack with the sound of an airplane. 
This disruption between stillness and movement produces a 
decalage of tension in the image of the whole - an evasion of its 
concentration or a dissonance. Nevertheless, we are still in the 
realm of human time; the sequence is shot in real time, which 
corresponds to the time measured by the action of the body. 150 
Real time becomes suspended when the man performs 
the leap and the frame freezes in the air. The piece is about the 
moment of suspension, which constitutes a difference in time. 
The leap removes him violently from the flow of time (which 
now stands still for him) and space (where his body no longer 
produces a reflection). The leap, which freezes him in the air, 
creates an ek-static/ecstatic sense, by bringing a centrifugal force 
in the image or a tendency to an outside. The consequence of 
this created tension is a dismantling of the temporal order and 
coherence of the image. The image of the body in the air begins 
150 The expression 'time measured by the action of the body' does not 
restrictively mean the amount of time the body takes to perform an action. 
The body does not only perform an action but it is already itself an action; 
following Bergson "the body is actual and acting". The active body however 
is not the whole body; there is also the affective body, which envelops and is 
enveloping in a different temporality. The technical principle of video's real 
time is the thirty frames per second, a division based on the measurement of 
the active body. 
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to dissolve very slowly (in about four minutes), creating a 
caesura in the image, a haemorrhage. Although the suspension 
begins to 'melt' into the image and from intensive to become 
spatial again, it also initiates the unfolding of heterogeneous 
durations. 
The water in the pool continues its movement forming 
extending concentric circles but without the viewer ever seeing 
the objects that caused them; similarly reflections of non- 
existent people appear on its surface. In a backward movement 
the circles intend to their centre, as if swallowed by a force 
coming from the depth. Shades of light and darkness in the 
water reflect the passage of time. These variations in the image 
are created by the use of time-lapse videography, which 
condenses time. The apparent stillness of the landscape is in fact 
the result of a highly compressed time, which intends 
movement in space and only manifests itself in the spectral 
variations of light. 
At the end of the video piece, the man comes out of the 
pool in a real time sequence. Just before disappearing in the 
forest, Viola performs a last dissolve of his movement, a final 
suspensive impression, as an allusive comment on the piece. 
Critics refer to the symbolic meaning of the work as an 
allegory of human "baptism", spiritual purification, death and 
rebirth. 151 But it is also about an instant of suspension, or a 
tension created outside of time which then freezes or dies 
within it by initiating some internal change; it is about 
151 Caterina Maderna-Lauter, "The Reflecting Pool", in Bill Viola: European 
Insights, Reflections on the Work of Bill Viola, Rolf Lauter (ed. ) 
(Munich/London/New York: Prestel, p. 157. Viola has also identified as key 
element in the piece the frozen action and described it as "as a 
transformation that's all based on the original decision to give up; I think it 
relates to death in some way, or letting things that you know, just releasing 
everything. " In Raymond Bellour, "An interview with Bill Viola", supra, p. 97. 
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contraction and relaxation. Of course, the materialization of this 
rhythmical web was allowed by the specificity of video 
technology and computer editing, which gave him a holistic 
rather than linear sense of composition. 152 On one hand, this 
technology "freed him from the constraints of working in real 
time" and allowed him "to challenge the conventional nature of 
the video present - an immediacy predicated on the continuous 
quality of the electronic signal, yet rendered spurious by the 
paradox of instant feedback. "153 Moreover, on a conceptual 
level, the holistic sense of composition consists in the use of the 
static camera, which serves the logic of simultaneity rather than 
sequentiality. However, the static camera does not create an 
objective time, in which events (the body, human actions, 
natural cycles) take place, but gives rise to an image which 
moulds itself in variability. By interweaving different durations 
of sound, of light or of the water's movement, it achieves not 
simply to combine several movements in the image but to 
render the image polyrhythmic, and to envelop complexity in 
simplicity and create temporalities in simultaneity. 
IV. The liquid image of Hatsu-Yume (The First Dream) 
Hatsu-Yume is a single-channel video work produced in 
1981. It was all filmed in Japan while Viola was artist-in- 
152 Bill Viola: "Will There Be Condominiums in Data Space? ", in Reasons for 
Knocking at an Empty House: Writings 1973-1994, Robert Violette in 
collaboration with the author (eds. ) (London: Thames & Hudson, 2002) p. 
101. 
1s J. Hoberman, "The Reflecting Pool: Bill Viola and the Visionary 
Company", in Bill Viola: Installations and Videotapes (The Museum of Modern Art New York, 1987) p. 65. 
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residence at the Sony Corporation. The video, composed in 
parts and lasting for 56 minutes, comprises of images of the 
secluded rural landscape of the mountains and the sea, but also 
of the life of the city. The imagery, which oscillates between 
representation and abstraction (or maybe it abstracts 
representation) can be 'read' on different levels. On the 
narrative or conceptual level of the image, the work may be 
viewed as a meditation on Japanese culture as well as a 'poetic' 
insight on the relation and clash between nature and 
civilisation. 1M On a material/ aesthetic level, the work manifests 
a unique sensibility in its treatment of light and time. The whole 
piece experiments with the material fluidity of light and the 
malleability of time, and affects the viewer in a profound way in 
the experience of the work. In this part, we will look at the 
images of Hatsu-Yume and the temporal orders they are 
unfolding, prior to the representational content they unfold; as 
we will show, the 'story' of the work is primarily experienced in 
the temporal form of the images rather than narrated in their 
content. 
The video begins with abrupt images filmed in time- 
lapse of the sun rising over the sea and setting (in a backward 
movement) behind the mountains as it dissolves in red and blue 
hues, followed by fragmented close-ups of sea waves in very 
slow motion and stills, the sound of wind and the deep sound 
of waves, and a long, time-lapse shot of clouds passing over the 
mountains. This is an image of nature as comprised of primal 
elements, such as light, water, air and the earth. These appear 
like images of the origins of formation, although we are not 
presented with them by way of description; it is not so much 
154 For such a reading see: Katja Bloomberg: "Hatsu-Yume (First Dream)" in 
Bill Viola: European Insights: Reflections on the work of Bill Viola, Rolf Lauter 
(ed), (Munich, London and New York: Prestel, 1999) pp. 178-180. 
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Viola who narrates how the world came to being, but rather 
time-images which dramatise this process. But does this mean 
that they imitate life's or nature's processes? 
All images are filmed with the stationary camera, which 
does not engage the viewer as a participant in the scene but 
maintains the distance of the observer. The distance is primarily 
expressed in an absence of an emotive impact (e. g. shock, awe, 
fear, vertigo). The viewer - like the camera - remains an 
observer of the scene rather than a participant. 
However, we do not stand in front of a description, and 
the camera's eye is not that of the human observer. The crucial 
factor here is time and the way it is implemented; for a 
description (which is ultimately human) would have been shot 
in real-time, that is, in the time a human being would actually 
have perceived it. Instead, we are confronted with the temporal 
orchestration of time-lapse and slow-motion videography, 
freeze frames and cuts, which represent temporal velocities and 
rates, which although they may not be those of the things in- 
themselves, neither are they those of conscious perception. 
More specifically, time-lapse as a video technique 
consists in the high acceleration and condensation of time, 
which means for example that the duration of an act, which 
would actually be unfolded in several hours can be contracted 
in the duration of a minute. Time-lapse corresponds to a 
velocity more rapid than the human, and thus we could say that 
it condenses the human past and future in the creation of an 
inhuman enduring present, that is not the present actually 
perceived by the senses. Time lapse creates a temporality more 
intensive than the time of human perception (which is more 
extensive and slower) and it can be viewed, not as the 
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equivalent but, as the technological metaphor for the time of 
light; or rather, as the time of dream. 
Dreams happen as intensities, faster and more 
instantaneously than the extensive order of human 
consciousness (in the strict sense), and as such they do not so 
much constitute something other than the human but rather they 
create an internal otherness to the conscious self. In other words, 
dreams prove that human experience simultaneously unfolds in 
different intensive layers, which literally means in different 
speeds or wave-lengths, which are constitutive of the modalities 
of experience. 
Returning to the eye of the camera, could we say that it 
represents a point of view? Following our earlier discussion, it 
cannot be identified with an empirical point of view which 
would occupy the plane of actual experience; these images 
cannot be reduced to fragmented views of the world because 
they are not the images extracted by the human body in 
perception. If these, however, are images unfolding in dreams, 
we cannot exactly talk about a point of view, unless this is a 
disembodied one. However, the disembodied eye of dreams 
structures neither a reificatory vision nor merely a pictorial one, 
deprived from sensuousness; dreams abound of intense 
sensations. Rather, it constitutes an a-centered vision since the 
subject itself (a consciousness, which coincides with itself and 
centres perception) is split. In dreams, I both act and see myself 
acting, I become an object to myself, but yet not entirely, 
because I continue to experience, sense and feel through the 
image of myself. This ruptured subjectivity, which is opened up 
and revealed in the dream process while it remains implicit and 
disruptive in action, substitutes the centre for a schism. 
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Nevertheless, these images do not simply recount a 
dream, rather they are dream-images resonant to the early 
ontological processes. However, since the latter take place 
before the appearance of the human, they cannot in anyway be 
described, represented or dramatised by us without becoming 
mere anthropomorphic accounts. This impossibility is not due 
to the fact that such processes were never actually experienced, 
but rather because the fact that they have preceded human 
consciousness is not merely indicative of a temporal order but 
one constitutive of an otherness. But although we do not have a 
direct knowledge of things in-themselves, it is maybe through 
dreams that energetic processes, which pertain both nature and 
humans becomes communicable. Dreams are translations of a 
single life in different languages, dreams as passages which 
create intensive analogies. The resonance of dreams is not a 
matter of transcendent premonitions but rather the material 
passage and 'translation' of inhuman energies through the 
human. 
In the following part of the piece we are presented with 
images of organic life -a bamboo forest. The sequence begins 
with an abrupt composition of still (or time-lapse? ) images 
before the camera, placing itself among the trunks and 
recording in real-time. It is in this last instance that the camera 
occupies a point of view for the first time. The point of view as a 
static, bounded and empirical view only emerges from a more 
dynamic, unbounded view - one which cannot properly be 
ascribed to a body and is therefore not empirical. The actuality 
of visual perception is only subsequently given by a virtual, 
destabilised vision. 
However, even when the camera assumes the point of 
view within the forest, it does not simply provide us with a 
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spatial view of the surrounding space. In fact, what the camera 
is really looking at is not the space of the forest but the 
entwinement of light with the trees and leaves - luminous 
cathode rays, which appear almost material and tactile through 
their contrast with the tree shades. It is this sensuous (rather 
than only optical) play of light, which gives movement, vivacity 
and tension in the static image; optical tension, between light 
and darkness, and also bodily tension between what is given 
visually and what is implied haptically. The materiality of light 
is also stressed by the alternation of deep focus and depth-of- 
field where the focus of the camera lens in extreme close-up 
moves from the foreground to the background. In the first case, 
the light sensually implies the material surface of the trunk, 
evoking the concentration of the hand, while in the latter it 
spreads itself in space and floods the body. 
The camera pans horizontally among the bamboo trees, 
and becomes suspended in a still image which gradually fades 
out. Simultaneously though, a new image of a valley fades in 
and the camera performs a full movement of rotation, 
describing the surrounding space of the mountains. In this 
innovative camera movement, Viola does not so much alter the 
point of view, but rather he changes level of experience; from 
the immersed experience of light among trees, where the sense 
of vision and touch are inextricably mingled, to a coming on the 
surface of sense perception, the body of action where vision 
assumes its clarity and distinction from the other senses. This 
performative leap is made possible by a pause of the still image, 
which lets the first image dissolve and at the same time initiates 
the formation of a new image; the latter is both discontinuous 
and integrated in the movement of the whole. 
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The next part consists in a medium shot of a rock; the 
camera remains still as if shot in real-time and only later we 
become aware of the time-lapse videography, as the clouds slide 
across the sky 155 We listen to the deep sound of wind and we 
see people appearing from behind the rock in slow-motion and 
then disappearing in dissolves. 156 We experience a strange 
assymetry in the scene, caused by the unnatural correspondence 
between the size of the human bodies and that of the rock, and 
we gradually become aware of the zoom quality of the image. 
Although in terms of its representational content the sequence 
appears quite straightforward, Viola disturbs our perception by 
employing particular temporal (time-lapse and slow motion) 
and spatial (zoom) video techniques. Our perception of the 
image becomes estranged from actual experience not so much 
because of the techniques themselves but from their 
synchronous, rather than sequential, implementation (it is 
within the same shot that parts are zoomed, others are filmed in 
slow-motion or time-lapse, which means the shot is in fact a 
collage of different shots). The image is a collage (rather than a 
condensation) of layers in a single surface and the result lends it 
an oneiric or aerial quality of alienated perception. Moreover, 
the experienced assymetry stresses the relativity of perception. 
This relativity does not mean that perception is something 
purely subjective with no necessary correspondence to the 
objective world but rather that it is a translation of the world or 
things-in-themselves to the human order or level of experience. 
155 In time lapse videography there is a significant amount of time between 
each exposure. As a result the action will be speeded up considerably so that 
an action, which in reality takes place during several hours may unfold in 
few seconds. 
156 What we commonly call slow motion corresponds to the frame rate. The 
real time rate is 24fps or 30fps (depending on the type of the camera); filming 
in a higher speed will slow down the action and running the camera in a 
lower than the normal frame rate will speed the action up. 
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We do not perceive in general but always in relation to us, the 
human body - and its plane - acting as a point of reference. The 
disproportion of the image originates from fusing together, not 
so much the points but, the planes of reference. 
The effect of alienated perception becomes further 
explored in more complicated ways in the last sequences of the 
piece. Viola films in real-time a fish-market and he then moves 
on to give us slow-motion images of the sea and a night fishing 
boat. The real-time shot is the image of actual perception, the 
description of what happens. However, by effectively slowing 
down time and zooming to give close-up images of waves and a 
boat, Viola passes from a perception-image to luminous 
affective images evocative of how it feels. Together with the 
image Viola slows down sound and extends its duration. The 
mechanical sound of the boat becomes transformed into a deep 
roaring sound, one of a profounder, more primordial and 
indiscernible duration of life. In this way he creates the passage 
(or the dream) of a mechanical object to a deep and vibrant 
matter. Organic, inorganic and elemental nature appear to be 
only temporal aspects of a single duration, which renders solid 
matter and light fluid, diffusive and passing. 
Fluidity becomes accentuated in the following images of 
the city's night landscape of cars and neon lights. Viola 
introduces the city not in a descriptive shot of buildings, cars or 
people, but in vertiginous movement and fluorescent lights. The 
camera is performing wavy movements and slow speed blur, 
which slows down and blurs the action of the image? 57 In this 
157 The slow speed blur is a special case of off-speed filming which produces 
a blurring effect, achieved by running the camera slower than usual (most 
often at either 12fps or 6fps). The effect is blurring but the action runs at 
normal speed, and although it looks very much like it is slowed down, it is 
not. "The reason that it is acceptable to shoot at such a slow speed is that, due to the persistence of vision, the frames perceptually overlap slightly and 
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way, it abstracts the initial representational image by melting 
down its content; what remains in this process is only 
movement and refractive light. The flowing camera attaches the 
viewer (through his gaze) in its dizzying swirl. There are two 
unfolding durations in these images produced by, on one hand, 
the off-speed filming, and on the other, the wavy movements of 
the camera itself. The sequence is not about the movement, 
speed or energy of the city but rather about how the city is 
experienced by a dizzied man who is slower than the city, one 
who does not fully adhere to its rhythm and yet is taken by it. 
Maybe, this is the contemporary fläneur in conditions of high 
speed; the stimulation of the city is both overwhelming and too 
fast to be retained, it comes and is already gone and it leaves the 
wavy movement and the flashing of fluorescent lights. 
While light becomes liquidated, water is treated as a 
modality of light. Through the use of extreme close-up, the drop 
of water on a car's window dissolves into colourful refractions 
of light embodied in abstract images of purple, green and 
yellow. Images of waves become indistinguishable from images 
of fire. We have come a full conceptual circle; from images of 
light and water, to the city's neon lights and its movement as a 
sea. The correspondence between the two is not a matter of 
resemblance nor a poetic metaphor, but rather the repetition of 
a resonance. Civilisation and culture do not stand in opposition 
from nature but rather they translate, they create passages to a 
different level of 'contraction and relaxation, one in which it is 
not anymore the image, but rather the rhythmic and affective 
mask the unsharpness. With very rapidly moving objects, the blur is 
apparent, but this generally reinforces the feeling of speed and energy". A 
highly blurred image, although it may not stand up itself as a still 
photograph, may be very effective as a moving video image. Blain Brown: 
Cinematography: Theory and Practice: image making for cinematographers, 
directors, and videographers, (Boston: Focal Press, 2002). 
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flow of its movement that becomes generated; not in order to 
substitute or equate it, but rather to remind us how our 
existence is inescapably bounded to it. 
Hatsu-Yume begins and ends with images of light and 
water, and the whole video explores their relation on 
symbolic/conceptual and aesthetic/ material levels. Light and 
water are not two different elements but two modalities of the 
energy of life. The same applies to the modalities of experience: 
for Viola, actual perception, dreams or bodily sensations are 
only more contracted or more relaxed temporal structures in the 
elastic thread of existence. 
In both the Reflecting Pool and Hatsu-Yume Viola uses 
video as a technology which modulates time. As opposed to 
cinema which creates time in the fragments of static frames, the 
video image is continuous transformation. Viola attempts to 
'break' this continuity (which is nevertheless the spatial 
continuity of technology) to invent fragments, by the 
incorporation of different time-speeds in the image. By 
stretching or condensing time, he attempts to reveal the image 
and our perception as a temporal aspect (or plane or point of 
view), which does not so much makes it relevant but rather 
renders the animate and the inanimate, perception and dream, 
primal nature and cityscapes as planes of intensive analogies. 
However, in our view, it is the Reflecting Pool which achieves to 
fragment video's continuity and presence and to create an 
intensive effect. In this work Viola 'breaks' the present of the 
image with contemporaneous durations, disturbs the natural 
perception with an artificiality of suspension, which also keeps 
the tension of the technological estrangement; nevertheless, he 
arrives to envelop all these in a single duration of a man's leap 
into the pool and he creates a temporal asymmetry and rhythm. 
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V. A shifting surface of The Passions 
In his latest series of work (begun in 2000 and entitled 
The Passions), Viola engages with new cinema and video 
technologies in the exploration of his fundamental artistic 
concerns with time and the body. It includes, amongst others, 
works such as The Quintet of the Astonished (2000), Anima (2000), 
Six Heads (2000), Silent Mountain (2001). The title of the series 
explicitly recuperates a theme, which had inspired much of the 
devotional painting of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 
namely the representation of extreme emotional states. 
This originary similarity is consequently recuperated in 
the staging of the actors, their poses and expressions, as well as 
in the chromatic spectre of the images, which create a 
visual/ aesthetic allusion to the work of old masters. Viola's 
work both pays a tribute to those early paintings and 
irrevocably differentiates itself. One might validly say that any 
similarities are only apparent and phenomenal; rather than 
imitating the early works, they precisely stress the impossibility 
of creating again that kind of art. This is not an observation 
about the authenticity of these works, neither is the difference 
between the two cases simply to be reduced to the different 
media involved (painting/video), nor to the religious or secular 
investment of the passions. Instead, the difference drawn is that 
between the history of art in the centuries lapsed, in the time 
that took art from representational painting to conceptual art; 
all subsequent differences spring from and explicate this 
profounder difference born in time. It is not our intention here 
to undertake a comparative analysis between Viola's videos and 
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the original works that inspired them. Nevertheless, we will try 
to show that these works require us to also view conceptually, 
while at the same time they also attempt to create a supple sense 
of the present moment. 
The novelty of the Passions series when compared to his 
earlier videos and installations, is largely related to the 
particular means of production and the deployment of the latest 
cinema and video technologies which extend the range of 
possibilities for the manipulation of time. The technical 
principle is the same for all the works: shot on 35mm film at 
very high-speed they are then transferred to digital video and 
thus drastically slowed down so that the minutest shifts in facial 
expressions and bodily movements may become visible. The 
images are not anymore formed by the projection of light on a 
surface such as was the case in his earlier installations, but they 
are displayed on flat LCD screens, which deliver a high- 
resolution image without scan lines. The new plasma screen 
allows Viola not only to give us images of vivid clarity but also 
to allude to the form of the painting, by presenting the videos as 
moving pictures in frames. From the creation of total 
environments in the form of the video-sound installation, Viola 
returns to a classical two-dimensional form of display, yet with 
the significant difference of an image unfolding diachronically, 
that is in or through time, rather than synchronically, and 
instantaneously in the space/ time conjunction. 
In this section, we will attempt to show that 71te Passions 
series is a complex body of work in the sense that it 
simultaneously unfolds and entwines different layers of 
experience and interpretation. This diversity, however, is not 
identical to the relativity of points of view; it is not so much a 
horizontal difference of points of view but rather a vertical 
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difference of levels of experience, a multiplicity sustaining the 
unity of the work. The Passions constitute Viola's explicit attempt 
to create the affection-image. Such an aspiration is not new, on 
the contrary, it has been underlying all his earlier work even if 
only implicitly; here, however, it also becomes the theme. But as 
we will argue, the attempt to explicate affection and to represent 
pure passion creates a decisive ambiguity in the work. 
All videos in The Passions consist in frontal close-up 
(Anima, Four Hands) or medium shots (the Quintets series) with a 
static camera. The latter, however, are treated as and function as 
the former, with the sole difference that what is in close-up view 
now is a group of people, rather than a face or bodily part. This 
is achieved by the compression of depth on a flat surface and 
the particular usage of light, which, much like in medieval 
religious painting, illuminates the action in the foreground 
while obscuring all background. 
Deleuze in the Cinema books identifies the close-up as the 
affection-image by arguing that "the affection-image is the 
close-up and the close-up is the face". The identification of the 
close-up to the face as affection-images is instructive for the 
former's function. He writes in relation to the face that: 
When a part of the body has had to sacrifice most of its motoricity 
in order to become the support for organs of reception, the 
principal feature of these will now only be tendencies to 
movement or micro-movements which are capable of entering into 
intensive series, for a single organ or from one organ to the other. 
The moving body has lost its movement of extension, and movement 
has become movement of expression. It is this combination of a 
reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements, 
which constitutes the affect [emphasis mine] [Cl, 87]. 
203 
The close-up, like the face, has lost its mobility, not 
because the camera remains static but because it is deprived 
from the capacity to describe an action. Movement is not absent 
from the close-up nor is it merely cut out of the frame; rather 
closeness condenses it implicitly, as if what is lost in extension is 
gained in intension. The inhibition of explicating movement in 
the action turns it back upon itself, radiating as expression. The 
close-up then is not defined extensively as measuring a distance 
(between the camera and the object shot) but intensively, for its 
virtual capacity to enfold movement in expression. It is in this 
sense that, according to Deleuze, a particular treatment of light 
and depth may render the medium- or full-shot to also function 
as close-ups, that is, to double themselves as affection rather 
than only perception-images. 158 
In the Quintet of the Astonished a group of five people, 
standing close together, are seen undergoing the experience of 
an intense emotion, which like a thread traverses each one of 
them while simultaneously holding them together. Although 
"the five individuals experience the rising emotional energy 
independently, with no acknowledgment or direct interaction 
with their companions, other than occasional physical contact 
due to their close proximity"159 - and as such they are 
undergoing the emotional experience individually - as viewers, 
we are bound to look at them as a whole. The specificity of the 
close-up function of the camera consists in a double operation of 
condensation and abstraction, by which the individual 
experiences are not simply turned into a collective one, but even 
more, the individuals themselves are becoming parts of the 
158 CI, 107. 
159 From the description of the Quintet Series, in the exhibition catalogue Bill 
Viola: The Passions, John Walsh (ed. ) (London and Los Angeles in association 
with The National Gallery and The J. Paul Getty Museum, 2003). 
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unfolding whole of emotion. In other words, this is not a piece 
about five people in astonishment but rather about 
astonishment itself; not so much as a feeling but as a rhythmical 
compound. Accordingly, what is delivered in close-up view is the 
aggregate itself as an emergent choreography of movement, 
which envelops the individual constituent parts. 160 
Deleuze ascribes to the close-up "the power to tear away 
the image from its spatio-temporal co-ordinates in order to call 
forth the pure affect as the expressed" [C1,96]. The 
fragmentation operated by the close-up has nothing to do with a 
partial object as it neither creates a continuity nor marks an 
essential discontinuity in the sequence of images; instead, it 
creates different levels of their experience 161 He writes: 
As Balazs has already accurately demonstrated, the close-up does 
not tear away its object from a set of which it would form part, of 
which it would be a part but on the contrary it abstracts from all 
spatio-temporal co-ordinates, that is to say it raises it to the state of 
Entity. The close-up is not an enlargement and, if it implies a 
change of dimension, this is an absolute change: a mutation of 
movement which ceases to be translation in order to become 
expression [Cl, 95-96]. 
160 It is interesting that, although the actors were not necessarily feeling the 
same emotions - ranging from joy, sorrow, anger, fear - nor expressing them 
in the same way, what hold them together was the traversing thread of 
intensity, or in Viola's formulation'the arc of intensity', which gave the piece 
"an emotional and physical shape". In other words, what rendered form to 
the aggregate was not a common emotional quality, nor any intentional form 
of communication or interactivity between the actors but only a power of 
intensity, which initially was enveloped in their expression but consequently 
they became enveloped in it. See also the description of an actor, in ibid., p. 
36. 
161 According to Deleuze, both psychoanalysis and linguistics miss the point 
when they view the close-up as presenting "a partial object, detached from a 
set of which it would form part" and consequently discover in this 
fragmentation a structure of the unconscious (castration) or a constitutive 
procedure of language (synecdoche) [Cl, 951. 
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The abstraction "from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates" 
signifies primarily the extraction of the image from the 
empirical order of linear time and spatial perception. The close- 
up, by tearing the image from the narrative sequence of which it 
forms part, does not simply disrupt the action but rather, by 
cutting its link, it also performs a leap on the level of experience. 
The abstraction of the object does not turn it into a general 
concept, but on the contrary, it de-signifies it. Signification is tied 
up with action since it does not so much concern the thing itself 
but our interest in it (for action); as a result the object's 
detachment from action equally dissolves its signification, 
suspending it in its a-signifying material excess. Such a thing, in 
its overflowing materiality, resists its appropriation by 
conscious perception, not because we do not recognise it but 
because we do not know how to use it; and since it can no 
longer function as a means to the end of action, it becomes an 
end in itself to which we can only relate in the mode of 
affection. 
Moreover, the abstraction of the thing from its spatio- 
temporal co-ordinates does not render it a-temporal nor general. 
In the case of the close-up, abstraction does not consist in 
tearing away from the empirical conditions; it does not mutilate 
the object from its sensuous particular context in order to 
assimilate it to the generality of the concept. It does not cut off 
from extension if only to condense it in the minute, activating in 
matter its intensive depth or else, its virtual capacity for 
affection. 
Viola's work also focuses on the minute details of facial 
and bodily expressions not only in the spatial mode of the close- 
up but also in the temporal mode of extreme slowness. 
Slowness (and slow motion) is favoured and recurs in Viola's 
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works 162 It is mostly in his installations that slowness becomes 
the exemplary rhythm of the affection-image. Slow motion here 
is achieved as the perceptual effect of running at a normal speed 
what was shot at a very high speed. For the viewer, the 
difference between slow-motion and this kind of temporal 
conversion consists in the degree of clarity and visual detail of 
the image, for the two ways of temporal extension correspond 
to different technical/ conceptual principles; in the first case 
(that of the slow-motion) the instant is stretched in order to 
occupy a longer duration, while in the second, it is unlocked in 
tiny, constitutive temporal units. In both cases time is treated as 
a co-ordinate of space (whether as a material or an 
informational unit) rather than as its radical difference; 
nevertheless, we could say that in the latter case we have a more 
detailed description of the constitution and experience of time. 
Viola shot the Quintet of the Astonished on high-speed film 
(384 fps) which he then played back at normal speed (24 fps 
now channelled through video's 30 fps). The result is a radically 
slowed down movement and a highly resolute expression, 
exposing us to the minute details of its occurrence, which pass 
imperceptibly not as a result of our lack of attention but rather 
because they stand outside the temporal threshold of normal 
perception. As we have said earlier, the basic cinematographic 
principle of running the film at 24 fps corresponds to the 
requirements of the active body and the conscious perception of 
movement. Movement however, happens constantly and 
continuously far beyond this limit, and this excessive aspect of 
162 In Viola's video installations slowness is extensively used in the creation 
of the affection-image. The reason why we have not discussed any of his 
video installations, which create environments of vision and sound, is that it 
shifts the role of the body in the experience of the work and would require a 
more extensive discussion. Instead we wanted to stay with the paradigm of 
vision. 
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its constitution we (subconsciously) contract it in our 
(conscious) perception. Shooting at 384 fps, the camera's eye 
perceives roughly 16 times faster than humans do; this inhuman 
perception when translated into the human perception (video's 
30 fps) analyses what we contract. In other words it brings to 
conscious visual perception what was formerly only 
unconsciously experienced by a passive or affective body, 
which means that it renders to actual perception what remained 
virtual in it. But what are the affective consequences of such a 
move? Mark Hansen in his book New Philosophy for New Media 
writes: 
[w]hen the viewer takes in this intensely oversaturated 
temporal object, the guiding mechanism of cinematic 
temporality - the perceptual coincidence between the flux of 
the film and that of consciousness - gives way to a kind of 
affective contagion through which consciousness, by being put 
face-to-face with what it cannot properly perceive and yet 
what constitutes the very condition out of which the 
perceivable emerges, undergoes a profound self-affection. In 
this incredibly intense experience, consciousness is made to 
live through (affectively, not perceptually) the very process 
through which it continually emerges, from moment to 
moment, as a selection from a nonlived strictly 
contemporaneous with it 163 
Hansen believes that in this video piece we are made to 
perceive the (normally unperceived) process from which 
perception emerges, and that through this encounter with its 
affective double, consciousness "undergoes a profound self- 
affection". The latter assumption however, is highly 
163 Mark B. N. Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004) p. 265. 
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problematic since it equates conscious perception - and thus 
knowledge - of the affective substratum of perception with the 
experience of affection itself; and this is because he has made an 
earlier reduction in assuming that we come to face the affective 
process itself, while we only face its perceivable aspect (rather 
than the affective). For as we have already argued earlier, 
Viola's technique in The Passions consists in analysing what our 
normal perception contracts. However, it remains a question 
whether expression is only a contracted movement, that is 
whether it is the explication of time in space that is, movement, 
yet with the sole difference that it happens faster and cannot be 
consciously perceived. Hansen equates the two when he 
concludes that: 
Viola's work can thus be said to enlarge the now by putting 
perception into the service of affection, or in other words, by 
opening perception to the very principle of its own self- 
perpetuation, to its own radical imperceptible - affectivity. In 
this way, Viola's work anticipates a new configuration of human 
experience and machinic recording that can help us tap into the 
potential that "machine time" holds extending the scope of the 
perceptual now and thus, in a way that pushes the Bergsonist 
vocation toward its most radical potential, for expanding our 
grasp over the material worlds" [emphases mine]. 
Hansen's 'enlarged now' is only quantitatively enlarged 
not qualitatively deepened. When he explains that "by 
oversaturating the now with information, [new media] enlarges 
it, and by enlarging it, catalyzes the self-affection of 
consciousness that is constitutive of time-consciousness"; 65 he 
neglects the difference in kind between perception (actual) and 
164 Ibid., p. 267. 
165 Ibid. 
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affection (virtual), which can only be bridged in a leap of 
intuition rather than in a continuous quantitative expansion. 166 
Moreover, in our view, his interpretation over-intellectualises 
Viola's work and misses the ambiguity enveloped in the image. 
The series is called The Passions, but in its realisation it 
ends up becoming something different. For by depicting pure 
passion, and thus to thematize pure emotion as an autonomous 
entity, Viola abstracts it, in exactly the same way that the close- 
up abstracts its object. In films however, the close-up constitutes 
one instance of the shot among others (medium and long shots, 
tracking shots and long takes etc. ) and it realises its function as 
affection-image, not only in and by itself but mainly in the 
dynamic of its relation to perception and action-images. It is only 
when implicated in a spatio-temporal order, that the close-up can 
abstract from it; for otherwise, any 'abstract' order by-itself very 
soon becomes consolidated to just another order 167 Emotions are 
no longer implicated in actions but are treated as pure instances, 
no longer impending upon their causes and conditions. The first 
consequence of this move is that the viewer cannot share the 
emotion because he is not given the conditions of its emergence 
in order to participate experientially, but he is only shown it; in 
166 In other words, Hansen repeats the same obliteration of heterogeneity that 
Bergson had accused of associationism. The latter believed that the principles 
of similarity and contagion are enough to take us from perception to 
memory; similarly for Hansen we can get from perception to affection simply 
by expanding our perception. Bergson, however, absolutely insisted on the 
discontinuity of the passage from perception to memory despite the 
continuity of the reverse process, namely from memory to perception. 
167 The claim put forth does not assume the close-up in juxtaposition to the 
long or medium shot stressing the necessity for a dialectical relation. Rather, 
what is suggested here is that the affection-image is not constituted by the 
close-up but in a difference created in its implication to different types of 
shots. According to Deleuze the shot is only a relatively closed set since it is 
always linked to other shots as ensembles and to the film as a Whole. This 
fundamental openness of every shot implicates it into movement in general 
and thus guarantees its movement of expression. This means that the 
affection-image cannot be viewed as a property of the close-up, considered as 
spatial configuration, but only as its expression. 
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this latter case the intensity of emotion becomes explicated in 
the body's image. The passions then are rendered visual and the 
viewer is led to envisage them as images rather than sharing 
their experience emotionally. 
Thus for example, Silent Mountain is a study of "the onset 
and aftermath of an explosive emotional outburst as it courses 
through the human body". The gradual intensification of 
emotion is rendered visible through the body's tropisms: the 
expanded veins on the neck, intensified wrinkles, hollows. Body 
and face are taken to their edges, deforming themselves through 
expansions and cuts -a face/body which is no more human, 
than animal, than desert. The 'thread of intensity' permeating 
the actors is also like a force, which has assumed the whole 
body, but in a movement of paramorphosis (or of 
metamorphosis? ). And where has it sprung from? Where did it 
reside before? What is it that strives to come out in a cry? 
But violence is betrayed by slowness. Slowness relaxes 
the violent impetus into a visible movement. The explosive 
outburst and the force it releases are contradicted by the aerial 
movement of the hair. Is this after all, the lightness of passion? 
Various questions (without answers necessarily) may arise from 
these images: is passion a cathartic lightness? Is it only human 
or is it of the world? What accounts for the different intensive 
weight it assumes in the two orders? 
On another level, as we have already mentioned, The 
Passions instantiate the appropriation and repetition of 
devotional Medieval and Renaissance painting by the new 
media technologies. Considering the profound auratic quality of 
those paintings, it is really a question of how this aura could 
ever be reproduced or what it becomes in the age of new media. 
The high-speed camera delivers images, which do not only 
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describe every little detail of facial expression, but also present a 
striking clarity and vividness of colour. One might say that 
technology restores to a vibrant perception the luminosity of 
things normal perception has lost. What differentiates these 
works from the early paintings (besides the formers' unfolding 
in a movement the instant that the latter contract) is an 
imperceptible sense of 'flatness' of the image. 
Now, this kind of flatness is not like the 'condensation of 
depth on the surface'; the latter refers to the image as 
representation even if this is only the way the representation is 
given, while the former attaches itself to the image as 
presentation, as object itself. The dense shine of oils, a certain 
coarseness of the layers of paint, a mysterious 'weight' colours 
carry on their surface - such invisible sensations residing on 'oil 
on canvas' render light and matter adjacent to the coloured 
surface. On the plasma screen of digital technology, colours 
assume a sleek quality, almost artificial, or flat -a luminosity 
without matter. 
In the essay entitled "A Small History of Photography" 
Walter Benjamin finds in early photography a particular aura, 
"an atmospheric medium, that lent fullness and security to the 
gaze even as it penetrated that medium". These early pictures 
did not just capture the image of reality but they somehow 
sipped its whole atmosphere. He writes: 
[t]he expressive coherence due to the length of time the subject had to 
remain still", says Orlik of early photography, "is the main reason why 
these photographs, apart from their simplicity, resemble well drawn or 
painted pictures and produce a more vivid and lasting impression on 
the beholder than more recent photographs. " The procedure itself 
caused the subject to focus his life in the moment rather than hurrying 
on past it; during the considerable period of the exposure, the subject 
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as it were grew into the picture, in the sharpest contrast with 
appearances in a snap-shot. [... ] Everything about these early pictures 
was built to last'68 [emphasis mine]. 
For Benjamin, it is as if the long exposure time allows 
duration to soak through the image. The lasting impression has 
nothing to do with the intentionality of the photographed 
subject; rather it is a modest and dense way that he 
delivers 
himself. The interval of long exposure entwines the quantitative 
(duration of exposure) to the qualitative - to focus his life, with 
the result that the developed image contracts in the instant an 
infinite duration. 
In such an interpretation of technology's treatment of 
time, Benjamin's 'aurä, as "a strange weave of space and time" 
which renders "the unique appearance or semblance of 
distance, no matter how close the object may be"; 69 unveils 
itself beyond the romantic and mystical idea. It attains an 
almost technological reality, one, however, enveloped in the 
metaphysics of technology in its relation to time. 
Extending Benjamin's argument in Viola's video works, 
the high-speed camera has minimized the interval of exposure, 
and it has thus achieved perfectly detailed and polished images, 
yet with the price of having eliminated their aura. By shortening 
the interval of exposure in an impossible aspiration of almost 
capturing time, the camera has only achieved to perfectly 
capture time's inscription in space and emotions' disguise on 
the body, and has therefore translated tension to extension. 
Viola's works ironically represent the desire "to bring things 
closer to us", to capture and analyze them from all their facets 
168 Walter Benjamin, "A Small History of Photography" in One-Way Street and 
Other Writings, (London: Verso, 2000) p. 245. 
169 Ibid., p. 250. 
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and points of view. More specifically the question haunting his 
exploration is where do emotions reside? In which space/ time? 
In which instant do they begin and when do they end? When 
does time coincide with space? 
Despite the advanced technology, the camera fails in its 
aspiration to become contemporaneous with time and to capture 
the decisive moment. Emotion unfolds its slippery surface. The 
luminous, more-than-life, airy images testify to that minute 
ungraspability of emotions. Passion does not belong to time, not 
because it is eternal, but because it remains infinitely fugitive, 
even if it has to metamorphose itself in water or air in order to 
slip through our fingers. 
Aura - that "strange weave of space and time" - is not a 
romantic notion but a historical one. 'Historical' does not 
describe a phenomenon which appears at a certain moment and 
totally disappears at another, but rather that tendency which 
runs through historical time in disguises, assuming different 
forms of expression. The aura of Medieval painting was 
entwined with a 'immaterial density' of the painting's surface. 
This is not about the materials of the surface but rather about an 
immaterial, which is bound to this surface; on these surfaces is 
accumulated an infinite time, not only of the artist but also of 
the viewers who have surrendered their passionate, dreamy, 
distracted eyes. 170 This infinite time captured in the poses of the 
painted figures becomes lost in the rhythms of modernity and 
under the conditions of art's mechanical reproduction; yet, 
170 This idea of the viewer's implication and durational inscription on the 
work originates from Benjamin who, regarding the relation of photography 
and art in the photographic reproduction of works of art, writes: "They 
[great works] can no longer be regarded as the work of individuals; they 
have become a collective creation, a corpus so vast it can be assimilated only 
through miniaturization. In the final analysis, mechanical reproduction is a 
technique of diminution that helps men to achieve a control over works of 
art without whose aid they could no longer be used. " Ibid., p. 253. 
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Baudelaire will recreate it in the image of the fugitive. In 
Benjamin's early photographs the aura becomes a sense of 
endurance or a lasting impression with an air of permanence 1n 
Viola's work offers us a lyrical description of emotions and 
expressions in order to beautifully testify its failure to grasp the 
shifting being of passions. 
But the same technological principle finds a singular 
expression in The Greeting which restages a renaissance painting 
with the theme of Visitation. It results in enveloping in a slow 
aerial motion a luminous orange colour which cloths fecundity, 
the folds of a dress like flying in the air, her bending, the 
whispered sound of a secret, and the strict geometrical 
perspective. Thus the piece creates a continuous unfolding 
tension between the voluptuous and the sharp and at the very 
back it reserves two figures, which go almost unnoticed (but 
then you do notice) - the intriguers. 
171 "Everything about these early pictures was built to last; not only the incomparable groups in which people come together - and whose disappearance was surely one of the most telling symptoms of what was happening in society in the second half of the century - but the very creases in people's clothes have an air of permanence. " Ibid., p. 245. 
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Chapter 5 
The Creative Body: 
perception and affection 
in a plane of immanence 
I. Introduction 
In the third chapter of the thesis we argued that the work 
of art is in-itself and appears only latently; it is a rhythm that 
awaits the viewer to activate it. As such, the work of art can 
only in principle be distinguished from its experience, because it 
is only in it that it can live. But what does it mean that art lives 
in the experience? Does this recognition reduce art to a 
subjective and empirical content of experience despite all our 
efforts to counter this assumption, especially with the notion of 
rhythm? The aim of this chapter will be to show that art lives in 
the body and at the same time it generates the life of the body; 
aesthetic experience is a bodily becoming. This means that the 
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question is no longer what art can do but what might a body 
create? Affects. 
But what is an affect? Deleuze and Guattari wrote that 
"affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them" [WIP, 164]. In this 
formulation they aspired to grant affects a non-psychological 
existence, which distinguishes them from feelings of pleasure or 
displeasure. Rather pleasure and displeasure are explications of 
affects - actual qualifications of experience - and as such, belong 
to a subject. Instead, affects neither belong to a subject, nor are 
contents of experience; affects are becomings, and if "they could 
be said to exist in the absence of man", this is because "man 
himself is a compound of percepts and affects" [MP, 164]. Thus 
affects for Deleuze and Guattari are a-subjective and necessarily 
embodied. 
In this chapter, we aspire to show that the body is an 
affect. However, affect is a-subjective, in the sense that it 
happens prior to conscious and unconscious (in the Freudian 
sense) volition. This means two interrelated things, namely, that 
it already takes place at the neuronal level of the body before 
the emergence of consciousness, and moreover, that it turns 
bodily functions, perceptions and consciousness into neuronal 
processes. Whether one considers biological functions or 
consciousness, the principles of operation remain the same, they 
repeat different levels of 'contraction and relaxation', or else, 
different levels of intensification and complexity. In other 
words, it is not only that affect refers to a bodily substratum but 
rather that consciousness itself is an affect. Our argument is 
concerned with showing that affect is the rhythm of the body 
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which is constantly repeated at different levels or modalities of 
experience. 
We will elaborate our argument by presenting the 
neurobiological account of the body. More specifically, we will 
follow Gerald Edelman 's and Jean-Pierre Changeux's 
evolutionary theories, according to which the body itself invents 
and co-ordinates its movements without following the 
instructions of a transcendentally given consciousness; instead, 
consciousness emerges immanently. Thus, we will show that 
the body is not given as properties, qualities, determined 
movements or capacities, but that at all levels it creates itself in 
experience. It is a variability, which unceasingly becomes 
determined (and re-determined) in action through selection. 
We will begin our discussion by presenting the principal 
aspects of the organization and connection of the brain and the 
body and by showing that they are a single thing which 
occupies double (or rather multiple) temporalities. Moreover, 
we will distinguish between the two main systems of the brain - 
the thalamocortical system of perceptions and actions, and the 
limbic system of vital behaviours. Then we will turn to the 
problem of perception or perceptual recognition, and will 
elaborate the neurobiological account according to which 
recognition is not the identification with a 'correct' content 
(what entraps us in a problem of infinite regress) but rather 
takes place in terms of selection and re-entry. This account 
radically reverses our conception of the body which reveals 
itself as a continuous becoming -a process by which it creates 
both the environment and itself. However, the body has a 
practical relation to the world rather than an aesthetic one, and 
so in the following part we will attempt to show how the 
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effectivity of its actions is tested, recognised and retained 
through the affirmation of pleasure. We will conclude our 
chapter by recapitulating affect as the rhythm of the body - its 
singular mode to will and to risk itself. 
II. The body and the brain: aspects of organization 
In both animals and humans, the brain constitutes the 
central mechanism for the organization of sensory-motor 
behaviour and the anatomical condition for the emergence of 
consciousness. Neurobiology considers the development of the 
mind as embedded and emerging during the evolutionary 
process of the species rather than as transcendentally given. But 
what is the brain s central role in relation to the rest of the body? 
First, we will introduce some aspects of the anatomical, 
organizational and functional relation of the brain to the body. 
The results of modern investigations suggest that there is 
nothing special about the material constitution of the brain 
compared to the rest of the body; it is made up of chemical 
elements which form parts of intricate molecules and make up 
complex structures in the cells of living tissues. One of the most 
specialized of these cells is the nerve cell or neuron, which is the 
vector of electrical and chemical energy through the body. 
The comparison of the human to the animal brain reveals 
a common general plan in the structure of the brain, which has 
been preserved in the course of evolution. Furthermore, in 
mammals there is a similar evolution and expansion of the 
neocortex (or cerebral cortex or simply cortex), the frontal part 
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of the brain which is central to higher brain functions such as 
speech, thought, complex movement patterns etc. However, the 
most determinate result of the growth of the cortical surface in 
the human brain has been a consequent quantitative evolution in 
the total number of neurons, which in turn increased and 
rendered more complex the operations performed by the cortex. 
The body is connected to the brain through the nervous 
system. As opposed to the old theory of a continuous axonal 
network unifying the action of the nervous system, the 
discontinuity of the nerve net is now acknowledged. Nerve cells 
receive connections from other nerve cells at sites called 
synapses. Synapses are the loci of conjunction of an axon 
terminal (presynaptic neuron) and a postsynaptic membrane, 
"clearly separated by a cleft a few nanometers (thousandths of a 
micron) wide". 172Electrical energy passed down the axon of the 
presynaptic neuron releases a chemical (neurotransmitter) that 
in turn induces electrical activity in the postsynaptic neuron. 
What is interesting about the synapse as a mode of nerve 
connection is that the discontinuity it introduces to the nerve net 
does not so much individualize the neuronal elements and 
fragmentize the action of the nervous system 173 Instead, we 
would argue, it inserts an interval or discrepancy in the process 
172 J. -P. Changeux, Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) p. 52. 
173 That was the fear of Golgi, a supporter of the nerve-net theory, which had 
taken over from holistic, even spiritualistic ideologies. At his Nobel prize 
lecture of 1906 he justified his insistence on the theory as follows: "I have 
never had reason, up to now, to give up the concept which I have always 
stressed, that nerve cells, instead of working individually act together. [... ] 
However opposed it may seem to the popular tendency to individualize the 
elements, I cannot abandon the idea of a unitary function of the nervous 
system. " Cited in, ibid., p. 26. However, as it will become clear in the course 
of this chapter the failure of Golds theory does not renounce the view of the body as an interconnected whole, but rather it makes the mode of connection 
more energetically complex and less mechanical. 
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of neuronal communication; its function expresses indeterminacy 
even on the neuronal level. 
The brain is connected to the whole of the body and the 
outside world. More specifically, it is connected to the world in 
two ways, namely through the periphery of the sensory 
apparatus and through the motor apparatus (musculoskeletal 
system). The sense organs are made up by specialized neurons 
(sensory transducers) which provide input to the brain and the 
cortex. On the other hand, the cortex sends its output by means 
of neurons, which connect to muscles and glands. Nerve fibers 
(axons) from all sensory modalities are sent to the cortex after 
relay to the thalamus. The cortex and the thalamus form the 
thalamocortical system, which is principally responsible for the 
perception of external stimuli and the execution of movement. 
The thalamocortical system in the brain corresponds to the 
active body - the body of perceptions and actions. Bergson had 
suggested that perception is interested because it is always 
directed to action; in this sense perception is also equated to 
action. Indeed the neuroanatomy of the brain confirms the 
Bergsonian insight, the sensory organs are connected 
principally to the back half of the thalamocortical system, and 
the front half is mainly devoted to action and planning. 
In order, however, to illuminate the role of this system 
and its relation to the rest of the body, we need to talk about the 
principle of mapping. Maps are the projections of the sense 
organs to distinct cortical areas after relay in the thalamus; they 
relate the receptor sheets of the body to corresponding points of 
the cortical surface. We could simply say that maps are the 
localization of sensory-motor functions in the brain. Changeux 
describes each area as, 
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'represent[ing]' a physical parameter to which the sense organ is 
sensitive. A first level of representation of the world in the cortex 
thus consists of territories distributed like continents, each 
corresponding to a major category of physical signal, reaching 
the organism through impulses in the sensory nerves [emphases 
mine]. 174 
The whole sensory-motor surface of the body is mapped 
in the brain. Brain maps, however, scan neither a simple spatial 
surface, which is represented on the cortical surface, nor a ready 
made sensory-motor function (vision, hearing, touch). Rather 
they also analyze the sensory modality to its constitutive 
parameters. Thus for example vision is 'represented' in primary 
and secondary (association) areas, each one representing a 
different parameter (colour, shape, orientation, direction etc. ), 
which is then incorporated in our single image of the world. In 
other words, every sensory modality is not only represented in 
the brain but also analyzed in sub-modalities, or according to 
Changeux, parameters of sensitivity. Consequently, not only 
every image we consciously perceive has subconsciously been 
analyzed but also we only recognize those aspects of an image 
which are represented in our brain maps. Nevertheless, it is not 
at all clear (and yet very crucial) what is represented in the 
maps, how this representation is possible, or even, whether 
something is represented in the first place or at all? We will 
suspend the discussion of these questions until later. 
This great anatomical segregation however, is recovered 
by an impressive anatomical integration. All these areas 
constantly interact and are reciprocally connected with fast 
reentrant circuits, "a process of signaling back and forth along 
174 Ibid., p. 115. 
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reciprocal connections". 175 Reentrant connections constitute a 
highly dynamic and rapid way of neuronal communication; 
within a temporal range of milliseconds to seconds it allows the 
assemblage and integration of signals coming from different 
maps in a single perception. All sensory and motor maps 
constantly and simultaneously send and receive signals among 
themselves, which allows for the continuous coordination of 
bodily activity to the environment. 
Connected to the sensori-motor body, the thalamocortical 
system 'represents' the body's tendency to the outside in its 
interaction with its environment. There is also a different 
organization of the nervous system, (another brain/body 
connection) which is oriented to the inside, to the body itself. 
This is the brainstem together with the limbic (hedonic) system 
and it is situated within the deeper layers of the brain. At its 
core is the hypothalamus, which is connected with a group of 
structures arranged in a ring-like formation. 
This system is concerned with appetites, and sexual and 
consummatory behaviour, which originated from the more 
basic metabolic processes of the organism - its internal economy. 
Metabolic processes aim at the maintenance of the internal 
equilibrium of the organism - its homeostasis. In their simplest 
forms they are connected with respiratory and digestive 
processes, body temperature etc. As such, appetites (the term 
used by modern neurobiologists to denote what Freud termed 
'libido') are more complex forms of this 'vital' type of activation 
connected with metabolic processes taking place in the body. As 
Luria notes however: 
175 G. Edelman and G. Tononi, Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination 
(London: Penguin Books, 2000) p. 44. 
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[t]heir difference lies in the unequal complexity of their level of 
organization and the fact that whereas the first, the more 
elementary, processes evoke only primitive, automatic responses 
connected with oxygen deficiency or the liberation of reserve 
substances from their reserve depots in starvation, the second 
are organized into complex behavioral systems, as a result of 
whose action the appropriate needs are satisfied and the 
necessary balance of the 'internal economy of the organism' is 
restored 176 [emphasis mine] 
Despite the difference in complexity of these processes all 
pleasure and displeasure is the outcome of this internal 
economy, the maintenance or loss of the organism's internal 
equilibrium (homeostasis), regulated by the limbic system, 
which is also extensively connected to many different body 
organs. As opposed to the thalamocortical system, the circuits in 
this limbic-brain stem system are often arranged in loops, which 
respond relatively slowly (from seconds to months) and do not 
consist of detailed maps. This type of temporal organization 
was selected to better fit the aim of this system, the maintenance 
of a balanced internal state of the organism? 77 
Consequently, the brain and the body are made up of the 
same materials and therefore there is nothing substantially 
different between the two. The centrality of the brain 
corresponds principally to its connection with the entire body - 
both the body of perceptions and actions, and the body of 
metabolic processes and appetites. The whole body intends to 
176 A. R. Luria, The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology, trans. by 
Basil Haigh (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 53. 
177 The circuits forming this system "have been selected during evolution to 
match the body, not to match large numbers of unanticipated signals from 
the outside world. These systems evolved early to take care of bodily functions; they are systems of the interior. " C. M. Edelman, Bright Air, 
Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 117. 
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the brain and renders the cortical surface the site of intense 
energy concentration. 
Signals received by the sensory organs are processed to 
the brain through the nervous system. However, this is not a 
linear development but rather a discontinuous neuronal 
transmission, and this discontinuity introduces a fundamental 
indeterminacy in the body. This does not mean that the body 
operates on pure contingency and chance, for if that was the 
case it could never have evolved to such a specialized structure. 
Indeterminacy in neuronal firing is two-fold: on the one hand, it 
is never certain which, or how many, neurons will fire (as there 
are always some that remain silent) while on the other, it 
remains undetermined to which neurons the energy released in 
firing will be transmitted, or, in other words, what kind of 
synaptic connections will be made. Therefore, indeterminacy - 
which is neither pure chance nor conscious choice, but is bound 
up with neuronal activity - is the sign of the body's radical 
openness. 
Moreover, what is the 'signal' that is transmitted, and 
doesn't it risk becoming distorted if there is not a single and 
determined path to the brain? It is important to note that energy 
transmitted in neuronal firing differs significantly from 
information processing. Thus for example in the case of a 
computer information becomes processed by being codified into 
digits 0 and 1 and then decodified. Information occurs as the 
content of the process of communication while the activity of 
processing remains external and indifferent to this content 178 
Conversely, in the case of neuronal activity, the activity and its 
178 That is why the hardware and the software are clearly distinguished and 
we can run "a given program on two digital computers of radically different 
construction or hardware design and successfully obtaining identical 
results. " Ibid., p. 220. 
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message coincide. Neuronal firing does not transmit anything 
other than its firing. However, doesn t the fact that in synapses 
electrical energy becomes transformed into chemical and then 
electrical again testify to a content of transmission? Isn't it a 
quantity of energy that is transmitted? This is only partly true, 
and as it will become clearer later, we cannot dissociate energy 
transmission from the process in which it is enveloping without 
committing the fallacy of spatialization. This is also why in the 
case of the brain - as opposed to a computer - program and 
machine "exhibit from the first stages of development a very 
intricate interplay. It's difficult, perhaps impossible to define a 
program independently of the cerebral machine's 
connectivity" 179 
Moreover, there is one more critical difference between 
information and energy transmission. In the first case the 
content is already determined in advance, unambiguously. 
While in the second case, what is transmitted is something 
positive, but not determined. It is inherently ambiguous and 
only becomes determined in action, that is, in the process of 
transmission. 180 
The discontinuity of the nerve net also entails neuronal 
silence or the possibility that certain neurons may not fire. 
However, it compensates for this potential loss by producing a 
more significant profit for the body. Synapses, by connecting 
every signal transmitted to several receivers, open up a 
multiplicity of simultaneous pathways and result in the 
179 J: P. Changeux and A. Connes, Conversations on Mind, Matter, and 
Mathematics, ed. and trans. M. B. DeBevoise, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 168. 
180 Edelman repeatedly refers to the ambiguity of the signal in order to show 
how the operations of the human brain significantly differ from those of a 
Turing machine. He criticizes all attempts (of physics and cognitive science) 
to understand mind without biology. G. M. Edelman, "Mind Without 
Biology: A Critical Postscript" in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, supra, pp. 211-252. 
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increasing complexity of the system. In the same way that 
energy is not transmitted like content, neither does it increase 
by extending itself to the brain. On the contrary, it increases by 
distributing itself to a multiplicity of different neuronal circuits; 
it infiltrates the body by spreading and contagion. This kind of 
organization results in the signal arriving at the brain analyzed 
and maybe partly lost, but in the process it has enriched the 
whole system by informing several pathways. The delay of 
travelling from the periphery to the centre does not so much 
enrich the signal, or increase its energy, but the system itself, 
which becomes affected in several ways. The intention of the 
signal to the maps is like a multiplied echo, a repeated firing 
which also results in its analysis; at the sensory organs, signals 
are more extended and fused, while they become more intended 
and analyzed in the brain. 
Consequently, what differentiates a neuronal signal at 
the sensory organs from the one arriving at the brain is the 
distance travelled. When the nervous system of an organism 
differentiates and develops a centre and a periphery, what in 
fact has happened is the introduction of a spatio-temporal 
distance between the movement received and the response; in 
relation to its first reception by the body, the signal arrives 
belatedly at the brain. This interval introduces a temporal 
discrepancy between the periphery of the body and the centre - 
the sensory organs where the stimulus is received and the 
cortex where it is analyzed. The brain responds with delay to 
what has already happened to the body, it responds to what is 
already past. Consequently, the centre and the periphery of the 
nervous system are essentially one thing but inhabit a double 
temporality. 
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Moreover, we have already described two kinds of 
cortical organization and brain/body connection: the 
thalamocortical system and the limbic-brain stem. The former 
consists in fast re-entrant circuits 'representing' the body of 
perceptions and actions, while the latter is arranged in long 
slow loops regulating its biological functions. At first it appears 
that the one is a system of the exterior and the other of the 
interior. However, this is not entirely accurate because if the 
organism needs to maintain its homeostasis and even develops 
a mechanism for this purpose, this is because it is primarily the 
environment that threatens its equilibrium. Moreover, we know 
that the two systems did not appear at the same time in 
evolution, but that the limbic system is phylogenetically older. 
However, the two cortical systems are distinguished not only 
topologically but mainly temporally; they operate according to 
different temporal principles of organization. 
The limbic-brain stem system is the more primal and 
extended system as changes in this system are slower, and its 
mode of operation appears to be more repetitive. This system 
evolved to regulate the organism's vital functions as responses 
to the environment's changes. It is not oriented though to the 
organism's interior but rather it creates an interior. The 
thalamocortical system on the other hand, the system of 
perception and action, was developed later and intensifies the 
relation with the environment. It takes the relationship of the 
organism to the environment further by creating a mode of 
acting upon the world. The evolution from the first to the second 
expresses the passage in the relation of the organism to the 
environment, from co-existence to interaction. 
The development of distinct organs of perception is a 
movement of specialization, which brings the organism closer to 
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the present by giving it more tools for grasping present stimuli. 
The sensory organs of perception embody the capacity to 
analyze the signals received. They bring us closer to the present, 
for what was formerly only implicitly 'perceived' in contraction 
is now analyzed in expansion. Perceptions then extend us to the 
present and its analytic details. In perceptions we have limited 
the scope of temporal contraction but have been compensated 
with an expanded present upon which we can act more 
effectively. This is then also the difference between intensity 
(that is memory for Bergson) and intensification that is 
perception: the former consists in a temporal contraction while 
the latter in temporal analysis in expansion. 
Nevertheless, the evolutionary tendency, which led to 
the development of specific organs for perception, cannot be 
conceived of as merely a mechanical process of division of being 
and the world. It does not consist simply in the analysis of an 
existent function but rather in an explosive effort which 
actualized an implicit active tendency as capacity. The creation 
of distinct organs for perception is a movement of actualization of 
virtual tendencies. 181 
Although sensory and motor organs are dissociated and 
represented in distinct brain areas, they remain connected in the 
brain and the motor system acts on the basis of 'information' 
derived from all the senses. The principal role of the sensory 
organs as our 'terminals' to the world, then is not so much to 
give us information about it, but to guide our action. They 
constitute our grasp of the world or our capacity for action. 
181 Bergson distinguished between division of labour, which is only based on 
analysis and creative evolution, which consists in the actualization of the 
virtual: "[w]herever there is division of labour, there is association and also 
convergence of effort. Now, the evolution we are speaking of is never 
achieved by means of association, but by dissociation; it never tends toward 
convergence, but toward divergence of efforts" [CE, 1171. 
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II . 
Perceptions aim for the world, even if they take a detour. That is 
why perceptions are not aspects of receptivity but, as Bergson 
had argued, possible actions. Perception does not bring us closer 
to the present nor does it enrich the present but rather it extends 
us over the present. Or, isn t it rather that it creates the present 
as the extension of being? This movement of specialization that 
is perception would remain analytical and extensive were it not 
for a significant consequence, on which lies its true inventive 
character: according to Bergson, the dissociation of the sensory 
and the motor organs introduces an interval of indetermination. 
Perception is only possible action rather than real (but this does 
not annul its actual character; see our chapter I, section IV. b). 
[I]n the measure that the reaction becomes more uncertain, and 
allows more room for suspense, does the distance increase at 
which the animal is sensible of the action for that which interests 
it. [... ] [W]hatever be the inner nature of perception, we can 
affirm that its amplitude gives the exact measure of the 
indetermination of the act which is to follow. So that we can 
formulate this law: perception is master of space in the exact measure 
in which action is master of time [MM, 321. 
This temporal distance from the sensory organs to the 
brain constitutes the 'amplitude of perception % in Bergson's 
terms, which conditions the indetermination of the act. By 
presenting the neurobiological account of perception we will 
argue that the body creates its process of perception. This argument 
implies two things, namely (i) that the body does not follow 
prior instructions (i. e. by consciousness) but itself invents its 
actions, and (ii) that perception opens to a creative process that 
is affect. 
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III. Perception: the model of selection 
The problem of perception does not concern perception 
per se, that is how the body receives stimuli from the 
environment, but rather perceptual categorization, that is how it 
is able to recognize them in order to provide a relevant 
response. 182 For the brain sciences, this problem does not simply 
concern how an action is organized by unifying its composite 
parts, but rather how a response relevant to the environment is 
made possible from the part of the body. Thus for example, if I 
want to grasp a glass, it is not enough to organize the 
movement of my arm (extending towards the glass) and hand 
(opening in the shape of a semi-circle), but these movements 
need to fit the particular glass whose distance and shape may 
vary. Since the environment is constantly changing, how can the 
body co-ordinate its movements to these variations, or rather 
how can it become synchronized to conditions of continuous 
novelty? 
In other words, the problem of perception is a problem 
of recognition. Edelman's theory adapts Darwin's model of 
'population thinking' in order to understand how recognition is 
possible in conditions of novelty. By inventing 'population 
thinking' Darwin performed a significant reversal in the 
traditional mode of thought: until then the idea of nature and 
182 Perceptual categorization is the 'first' level at which the problem is posed 
- although the terms first and last have only relative significance since the 
problem is repeatedly and endlessly posed. Thus, for both Edelman and 
Changeux's perceptual categorization, primary and higher order 
consciousness constitute different levels (modalities) of experience, which 
are rendered possible in the course of evolution by increasingly more complex 
mechanisms and processes, but which are all based on the same principles. 
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species was fundamentally informed, in a Platonic way, by a 
model of pre-existent species perfection. Nature had been 
assumed to consist of classes defined by properties from the top 
down, fixed as self-sufficient totalities; individual variation was 
only a 'noise', the fallibility of earthly existence. Darwin's 
subversive move consisted in considering individual variance as 
real, rather than as simply noise, and as the basis of change. 
Evolution became possible through the process of natural 
selection of those individuals who could better adapt to the 
environment, leading to their higher rate of reproduction. 
Consequently, evolution did not aim to preserve the identity of 
the species, although it did work for its benefit 183 
Edelman considers neurobiology to be a science of 
recognition and his theory suggests that we regard brains as 
'selective recognition systems', what 
relieves us of the horror of the homunculus. Because diversity 
exists beforehand in a selective system, and because specificity 
arises as a result of selection ex post facto, we are no longer faced 
with an endless regress of information processors in the head 184 
There is no direct transfer of information occurring nor a 
central mechanism which reads or decodifies it; instead, 
recognition is selective. 
Following his 'theory of neuronal group selection' 
(TNGS), there are three tenets one should explain in order to 
183 "Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from 
their parents - and a cause for each must exist - it is the steady 
accumulation, through natural selection, of such differences, when beneficial 
to the individual, that gives rise to all the more important modifications of 
structure, by which the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are 
enabled to struggle with each other, and the best adapted to survive. " 
Charles Darwin, The Origin of the Species, edited with an introduction and 
notes by Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 139. 184 G. M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, supra, pp. 79-80. 
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give the image of how perceptual categorization became 
possible, and the first is the question of morphology, which is 
concerned with how the anatomy of the brain is first set up 
during development. It implies that perceptual categorization 
became possible because the body and the brain developed in 
certain ways which therefore bound this capacity to its material 
conditions. 
It is the common view that the morphology of the body 
and the brain are, to a large extent, given genetically by the 
species and the inheritance of a genetic code. However, this is 
only partly true and closer inspection reveals great 
diversification in the morphology of individual brains within 
the same species. Diversification takes place during 
development and concerns the local connectivity of neurons. 
Dendritic and axonal connections within defined anatomical 
structures are never identical on the individual level but are 
subject to enormous variation and overlapping connectivity. 
Synaptic connections then become determined at their finest 
levels and ramifications developmentally, through a process of 
somatic selection, which involves populations of neurons 
engaged in topobiological competition 185 A population of 
variant neuronal groups (or local circuits) is formed 
epigenetically and is known as a primary repertoire. The 
morphology of the body and the brain, and the material 
conditions for the development of capacities are not given as the 
'hardware' of the individual animal belonging to a species, but 
rather they undergo many variations and only relatively 
become stabilized in the process of development. Moreover, 
185 It is not our point here to enter in a description of the process of formation 
of the primary repertoire but rather we are interested in its principles. For 
more detailed account see also: G. M. Edelman, The Remembered Present: A 
Biological Theory of Consciousness (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 
1989) pp. 44-46. J: P. Changeux, Neuronal Man, supra, pp. 180-186. 
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[t]he genetic code does not provide a specific wiring diagram for 
this repertoire. Rather, it imposes a set of constraints on the 
selectional process. Even with such constraints, genetically 
identical individuals are unlikely to have identical wiring, for 
selection is epigenetic. 116 
Contrary to what is commonly believed regarding the 
determination provided by genetic information, the genetic 
code neither initially nor ultimately determines the selectional 
process but rather it only informs somatic development 
negatively, by imposing a set of constraints. Does the genetic 
code then give us the framework of individual development? 
Are its constraints absolute limits of the animal's 
neuroanatomical formation? However, if we assume as 
determinately given the content of any kind of limit, we cannot 
avoid evoking some kind of transcendent (beyond the reality of 
the body), pre-existent authority. This is a difficult and crucial 
question to answer, namely what is given by heredity? 
Although we will not fully engage with this issue, some of its 
principal aspects will be addressed indirectly in the following 
section of this chapter. Here, however, we need to stress the 
remarkable non-linearity between the simplicity of the DNA 
content and the enormous complexity of the brain 187 Thus 
genetic constraints, such as phenotypic aspects of an organism 
that have been selected during evolution, rather than being 
absolute determined limits, they function as an envelope to the 
organism's activity. They constitute a form of resistance to its 
development rather than positively determining its course; it is 
the organism instead who invents the latter. 
186G. M. Edelman, Bright Air Brilliant Fire, supra, p. 83. 
187 J. P. Changeux, ibid., p. 185. 
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Although they are dynamic formations, anatomical 
connections of primary neural repertoires as the material 
condition are not enough in themselves to account for 
perceptual categorization. Selection also takes place at another 
level - that of experience. Experiential selection does not involve 
an alteration of the anatomical pattern, its impact is more plastic 
and concerns the strengthening or weakening of synaptic 
connections by specific biochemical processes. This mechanism, 
which underlies memory and a number of other functions, 
effectively 'carves out' a variety of functioning circuits (with 
strengthened synapses) from the anatomical network by 
selection. 188 These variant functional circuits form the secondary 
repertoire, which affirms the role of experience and repetition in 
the development or atrophy of capacities, by stabilizing certain 
synaptic connections and leaving others latent, and therefore 
creating functional circuits, whose role is to facilitate the 
performance of an action. Thus, the body learns an action and 
performs it automatically when "certain preexisting connections 
are selected by activity or 'experience' without inducing any 
synthesis of new molecular species or structures"? 89 
But there is a further important consequence of this 
process of synaptic selection. It is observed that the same 
afferent message may stabilize different arrangements of 
connections which nevertheless result in the same input-output 
relationship. 190 The same cause may produce the same result 
while having followed very different paths of execution. 
Moreover, since the mechanisms leading to the formation of 
primary and secondary repertoires are interconnected, the 
consequence of such variability is that behaviour and 
188 G. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, supra, p. 85. 
189 j. -P. Changeux, Neuronal Man, supra, p. 229. 
190 Ibid., p. 229. 
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experience affect and may even alter an existing neuroanatomy 
- in which new neural processes form additional synapses - not 
only in the early stages of formation but also in a developed 
brain. 191 
The secondary repertoire is more dynamic than the 
primary repertoire. It is more 'flexible' because it does not 
effectuate somatic/material changes but only 
dynamic/intensive. For the same reason it is also less localized 
and more of a process nature. However, this is only a relative 
difference of degree; what is more crucial in our view is that 
levels of both morphology and experience are based on the 
same principles and express the same tendency: the primacy of 
becoming over being. They constitute the individual animal not 
as something which varies, but rather as a variability, which 
does not cease to be determined in selection. In this sense, the 
course of an action is a process of determination. Repetition 
strengthens synaptic connections and creates functional circuits; 
repetition affirms not only the past retrospectively but by 
strengthening the synapses it also 'wills' that something returns 
in the future. Nevertheless, determination is never absolute and 
every repetition remains an open event of selection. 
A perception or an action, however, is a unified event 
rather than merely a series or an addition of selective events. 
These latter terminate and become analyzed into different brain 
maps, though when I see a round, yellow glass on my right side, 
I see it in a single, coherent perceptual scene instead of adding 
the analyzed sub-modalities of my perception. This is the 
'binding problem', which has been a major area of dispute 
191 Edelman gives the example of the development of bird song and frog 
metamorphosis, where the formation of new parts of the nervous system 
involving simultaneous primary and secondary repertoire formation occurs during behaviour in the world. Bright Air Brilliant Fire, supra, p. 85. 
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among neuroscientists. It questions how the integration of 
selection events is possible. 
Edelman 's response is that integration is possible due to 
the principle of reentry, which accounts for the dynamic 
interaction between maps. Although every map receives signals 
from the world or other maps (principle of segregation) 
independently, "within a certain time period, reentrant signaling 
strongly connects certain active combinations of neuronal 
groups in one map to different combinations in the other map. 
This occurs through the strengthening and the weakening of 
synapses within groups in each map and also at their 
connections with reentrant fibers. In this way, the functions and 
activities in one map are connected and correlated with those in 
another map". 192 Reentry describes the activity of neural firings 
which go from one map to the other, through parallel, reciprocal 
threads connecting them, and then return (reenter) in a constant 
dynamic interchange. 
Reentry is the dynamic principle sustaining all neuronal 
activity193 It allows for the communication between neuronal 
groups, local maps (topographically connected) and global 
maps, not by the transmission of some kind of 'information in a 
feedback loop fashion, but through the strengthening or 
weakening of synapses, or in other words through intensification 
of circuits. The main difference between the two is that 
"feedback occurs along a single fixed loop made of reciprocal 
192 G. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, supra, p. 87. 
193 The unit of selection for the brain is not the individual nerve cell but 
"rather a closely connected collection of cells called a neuronal group". As 
opposed to the individual neuron which can be either excitatory or 
inhibitory the neuronal group is a mixture of both kinds of neurons and is 
characterized by a 'strong cooperative property' binding together the activity 
of the neurons in group. Ibid., p. 86. This point also confirms that 
transmission and selection at synapses does not merely concern a quantity of 
energy. The same principle which binds together neuronal activity is also 
repeated at the levels of memory and consciousness. 
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connections using previous instructionally derived information 
for control and correction, such as an error signal. In contrast, 
reentry occurs in selectional systems across multiple parallel 
paths where information is not prespecified. "194 Information is 
always determined in advance, it is a content and constitutes a 
closed system. This does not mean that it cannot be altered in 
the feedback loop but that it changes by external addition. The 
feedback loop does not occur as a temporal process of duration 
but as successive instants (spatialised time). On the contrary, 
Edelman explains reentry in terms of temporal coordination or 
synchronization of firing neurons in functionally segregated 
areas of the brain. Exploring its function in a computer 
simulation of the visual system, he discovered that: 
[t]he activity of neurons responding to different attributes of the 
same object was synchronous at the time scale of tens of 
milliseconds. [... ] However, the activity of neurons responding 
to different objects was asynchronous. Thus, the objects were 
differentiated from each other at this time scale. Despite these 
fine temporal differences, all these neurons were active together 
at the longer time scale (hundreds of milliseconds) required for 
'behavioural' output 195 
The neurological function of reentry requires as its 
anatomical precondition the presence of reciprocal connections 
within and between areas. This connectivity is not limited to a 
single pair of maps or to a moment of time, but is continuous 
and it involves the interaction of multiple maps, both sensori 
and motor. Moreover, due to a higher order structure of the 
194 G. M. Edelman and G. Tonopi, Consciousness: How Matter Becomes 
Imagination, supra, p. 85. 
195 Ibid., p. 118. 
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nervous system called global mapping, multiple reentrant maps 
are able to interact with nonmapped parts of the brain. Thus: 
[a] global mapping allows the selectional events occurring in its 
local maps to be connected to the animal's motor behaviour, to 
new sensory samplings of the world, and to further successive 
reentry events. Such a global mapping ensures the creation of a 
dynamic loop that continually matches an animal's gestures and 
posture to the independent sampling of several kinds of sensory 
signals. 196 
Reentry and the activity between maps (local or global), 
are intricately related. For what is implied in both cases is the 
possibility of different neuronal groups not simply to interact 
but to connect their activity in such a way that would form a 
whole. What is most important and critical about reentry is that 
the effects of constant interactions constantly reenter. In other 
words, reentry accounts not just for the action but also for its 
repetition, that is, the possibility of being retained or of being 
remembered. Is then reentry a principle of memory at the 
neuronal level? 
Following Edelman 's earlier description, the co- 
ordination of neuronal groups consists in achieving relative 
synchronous firing. Discernment between objects corresponds to 
the differentiation of neuronal firing on a very short time scale, 
while coherence is given by their synchronicity over a longer 
time scale. But then the principle of reentry only describes the 
process of the exchange of energy between neuronal groups, areas 
etc., which by strengthening their synaptic connections intensify 
their interactions with each other (rather than with non-related 
groups of neurons) and thus tend to form a unified, or 
1% G. M. Edelman, Bright Air Brilliant Fire, supra, p. 89. 
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synchronized, whole. Rather than a mysterious principle which 
renders memory a capacity immanent to neurons, reentry as a 
materialist principle of energy reverses the order: it renders 
memory a matter of distribution of energy, a modality of neuronal 
groups' synchronization. 
Moreover, according to Edelman's description: 
the conjunction or integration of the appropriate attributes of an 
object to yield a correct output was not achieved in any one 
particular simulated cortical area or by just one particular group 
of neurons. [... ][I]ntegration was achieved not in any place but 
by a coherent process. 19' 
Integration then is not only caused by a process which 
leads to synchronization, but rather it is itself a process. 
Integration is a temporal event and a process, and as such it can 
neither be substantiated into properties of certain neuronal 
groups, nor localized in particular brain areas and maps. 
This is probably a most fundamental characteristic of the 
brain and its functions: rather than being a special 'substance', 
what is 'special' about it is merely its innumerable set of 
connections, which render the formation of a great number of 
neural circuits possible and unpredictable. Topology is also 
characteristic of the brain's impressive specialization (i. e. areas, 
maps etc. ), but this is an intensive topology which renders local 
maps more cooperative in action. Nevertheless all brain areas 
(as well as the brain and the body) are connected to a greater or 
lesser degree of intensification, through longer or shorter 
197 Ibid., p. 118. 
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circuits, which means that any change in one particular area 
affects the whole, although in more or less direct ways 198 
Consequently, let us extract some conclusions from our 
discussion of perception. The course of experience consists in 
stabilizing and eliminating a labile variability of synapses. 
According to Changeux: "[e]pigenetic selection acts on 
preformed synaptic substrates. To learn is to stabilize 
preestablished synaptic combinations, and to eliminate the 
surplus". 199 However, selection of neuronal groups and synaptic 
pathways does not consist in a merely passive elimination, nor 
does it simply realize pre-existent possibilities. It is a real 
process of actualization, which 'carves out' routes from a more 
or less undifferentiated field; in a single stroke, it differentiates 
and invents them. Learning an activity and performing it 
` automatically' benefits action because it shortcuts the process 
of its execution to the stages which are necessary, while at the 
same time it also renders it economic for the organism to 
perform, since a circuit which is already 'carved out' requires 
much less effort. On the contrary, selecting a labile synapse, one 
198 The fact that the body and the brain are organized as wholes and that 
together they (in-)form a single whole is also made apparent in cases of 
bodily impairments and cerebral lesions. Thus for example, the loss of a 
bodily limb does not only result to the individual's reorganization of its 
behavior, but much earlier than that such a reorganization has taken place at 
the neuronal level in terms of the distribution of neurons. This is the process 
of remapping, by which one area of the brain takes over the function of an 
adjacent area due to a lack of input to the latter (because of the limb loss). 
This is what happens in the pathological cases of the 'phantom limb'. In such 
cases, a limb that one may have lost for a long time may still be remembered 
by the brain and felt as if it was a real limb. Various cases of 'phantom limbs' 
are presented in V. S. Ramachandran & S. Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: 
Human Nature and the Architecture of the Mind, (London: Fourth Estate, 1998). 
Moreover, Luria asserts the same for mental conditions, where a local brain 
lesion does not lead to its direct 'loss', but having abolished "the conditions 
necessary for the normal working of the particular functional system [... ] [it] 
leads to reorganization of the working of the intact parts of the brain, so that 
the disturbed function can be performed in new ways" A. R. Luria, supra, pp. 
103-104. 
199 J: P. Changeux, Neuronal Man, supra, p. 249. 
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which is not yet stabilized, or an 'unusual' neuronal circuit, 
demands greater effort and time on the part of the individual. 
Thus, action (and perception as action) is bound up with 
a double consequence: on one hand, it eliminates a multiplicity 
of virtual potentialities and therefore restricts our world. But on 
the other hand, it renders us more effective upon the world by 
canalizing and concentrating our expenditure of energy, and 
this is how, it extends us upon the world. Moreover, selection is an 
event rather than merely passive elimination, since it also opens 
up new possibilities for the interaction of new populations and 
the creation of unusual connections. 
The body does not act following an initial, internal plan, 
but in its interactions with the environment it is constantly faced 
with new problems, for which it needs to find vital solutions. In 
the same way that the body is only given as variability, external 
reality itself is a continuous becoming or an unceasing 
movement of matter and energy. As such, it is positively, but 
without determination. However, the encounter between the 
active body and its environment makes the indeterminate status 
of reality into a problem; the problem is the form of the encounter. 
In order to act, the individual animal does not have to 
understand reality as it is, but rather it needs to respond to it 
successfully. The solution to the problem - or the determination 
of reality - comes by selection in action; from a multiplicity of 
possibilities the body selects and actualizes only some. This 
means that the individual and its environment are always in a 
practical relation, and in order to keep it vital (i. e. active) what is 
required is not identification of a true content but the invention 
of an effective action 200 
200 Bergson very insightfully argued against "the mistake of those who 
maintain that perception springs from what is properly called the sensory 
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In the selection and determination of neuronal circuits, 
the body invents the way it receives, analyzes and responds to 
the world. The same input may give the same output but by 
following very different paths of execution, and this is how the 
body creates itself by creating its perceptions and actions: not so 
much by producing a different outcome from its action but by 
creating its singular pathway of action, by inventing the 
process. Thus Bergson was correct to consider perception and 
action as being 'actual' and as taking place in the world rather 
than in us; input and output are external to us. Instead, what is 
ours is the invention of the process, during which the body 
determines and actualizes an undetermined given. Moreover, 
the development of distinct sensory organs, the creation by 
extension, and analysis of modalities and sub-modalities of 
perception are ways in which the body analyzes and creates its 
environment rather than analytic parameters of the environment 
itself. 201 The body creates its actions but how does it recognize 
that it was an effective action? Unless the body is somehow 
capable of retaining and repeating its actions, it would be 
endlessly inventive and only marginally effective. Inventiveness 
per se would not be viable. What measures the power of 
inventiveness? 
vibration, and not from a sort of question addressed to motor activity" 
(emphasis mine) [MM, 46]. He therefore emphasized the practical interest of 
perception. That is why the activity rather than receptivity of perception was 
one of his basic principles. 
In This view is also assumed by leading theorists of the school of autopoiesis: 
"The environment is not a structure imposed on living beings from the 
outside but is in fact a creation of those beings. The environment is not an 
autonomous process but a reflection of the biology of the species. " R. C. 
Lewontin cited in F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind: 
Cognitive Science and Human Experience, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1995) p. 198. 
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IV. Pleasure, value and the test of reality 
The body's recognition of the action performed as the 
appropriate one, the possibility to retain and categorize it as it is 
required for learning, requires value criteria. Edelman suggests 
that: 
[C]ategorization always occurs in reference to internal criteria of 
value and that this reference defines its appropriateness. Such 
value criteria do not determine specific categorizations but they 
constrain the domains in which they occur. According to the 
theory, the bases for value systems in the animals of a given 
species are already set by evolutionary selection. They are 
exhibited in those regions of the brain concerned with regulating 
bodily functions: heartbeat, breathing, sexual responses, feeding 
responses, endocrine functions, autonomic responses. 
Categorization manifests itself in behavior that appropriately 
fulfills the evolutionary selected requirements of such life- 
supporting physiological systems702 (emphases mine) 
According to Edelman the bases of value criteria are set 
by evolutionary selection, though they do not determine 
categorization but rather provide its constraints. As was the 
case with the formation of the primary repertoire, the 
entwinement of the genetic code and somatic selection, value is 
given as constraint rather than as specific determination, which 
means that it is constantly 'renegotiated' by selection in 
experience. 
Neural value systems are connected to the hypothalamus 
(whose maps regulate vital behaviours) and the limbic system, 
especially in the more complex case of emotions (i. e. 
202 G. Edelman, Bright Air Brilliant Fire, supra, pp. 90-91. 
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pleasure). 203 They are implicated in the completion of the action, 
as by releasing some chemical substances (neuromodulators) 
they are responsible for the strengthening of synapses in a 
retrograde manner204 and affect neural plasticity, yielding 
adaptive responses. 205 Consequently, the appropriate act 
retrospectively strengthens ('retains') the synapses that were 
involved in its operation and thus facilitates its repetition. The 
implication of value systems does not involve the performance 
of the action but operates as an act of approval206 By releasing 
chemical energy they "make final decisions about the balance of 
energy" (emphasis mine). 207 In the neurobiological account, the 
act of approval becomes a matter of energy distribution and 
regulation, which repeats once more, the principle of the 
energetic equilibrium, which in the case of the living organism 
becomes translated as a homeostatic tendency. Pleasure, 
whether conscious or subconscious, is related to the 
maintenance of an internal equilibrium. 
Freud had also provided an economic account of 
pleasure and mental processes, in addition to the 
2m As we mentioned earlier in this chapter (section II), emotions are 
regulated by the hypothalamus and the limbic system. Although they take 
place as much more complex processes, they are based on the same 
principles as basic vital behaviours. Thus, pleasure cannot be identified with 
a specific 'pleasure centre' and it is recognised to be a complex process not 
yet totally understood. However, it is also clearly connected with certain 
chemical substances. But this observation is not really new, it is as old as the 
use of drugs. See J: P. Changeux, supra, pp. 107-111. 
204 Ibid., p. 229. 
205 G. M. Edelman and G. Tononi, Cosnciousness, supra, pp. 87-90. 
2D6 Similarly, another kind of neurotransmitters function as motivation 
substances. As Changeux rightly observes: "the sensations of thirst or hunger 
or sexual desire do not immediately lead to drinking, eating, or copulating. 
Instead, a state of motivation is created that incites one to drink, eat, or make 
love; it disappears after these desires have been fulfilled" (emphasis mine). 
This is the role played by dopamine synapses which can be regarded as 
'pleasure' or 'hedonic' synapses, which "participate in the development of 
motivational states that enable us to 'go into action". J. P. Changeux, supra, 
pp. 108-109. 
207 Ibid., p. 108. 
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'topographical' and 'dynamic' ones. He linked pleasure and 
unpleasure to the quantity of excitation present in the mind but 
not in any way 'bound', arguing that "the factor that determines 
the feeling is probably the amount of increase or diminution in 
the quantity of excitation in a given period of time" 208 Unpleasure 
was related to an increase in the quantity of excitation, while 
pleasure to a decrease. Yet Freud further complicated his 
economic account in two instances: first, he connected the 
pleasure principle with the principle of constancy (rather than 
merely with the quantity of excitation) according to which "the 
mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation 
present in it as low as possible or rather to keep it constant" 209 
But he also went further; in his discussion of traumatic 
neuroses, he asserted that "the chief weight in their causation 
seems to rest upon the factor of surprise, of fright", which is not 
at all the same as anxiety and fear210 What distinguishes fright 
is the element of unexpectedness of the event from the part of the 
individual, a state of relaxation which renders the effect of the 
traumatic event much more intense. In all these cases, Freud's 
sophisticated and energetic account considers psychic energy 
not merely as a quantitative economy, but rather as an intensive 
one. Measuring the modification of the quantity of energy in 
relation to a given period of time implies that what matters is 
not the quantity but the intensity of the modification. 
Moreover, by stressing the element of fright, Freud 
rendered the intensity of the excitation (as opposed to its 
quantity) as equally dependent on the particular attitude of the 
21111 S. Freud: "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. XVIII (1920-1922), 
translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey 
in collaboration with Anna Freud, (London: Vintage, 2001) p. 8. 
209 Ibid., p. 9. 
210 Ibid., p. 12 
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organism and its degree of relaxation. The intensity of excitation 
can only be approached in terms of a differential emerging in- 
between the organism's internal disposition and the external 
event, rather than in terms of a quantity, which would account 
for energy as substance. Energy as the intensive is always an in- 
between and never a substance. It is only us who turn it into a 
substance for our measurements. By pointing to the intricacy of 
the relation between the quantity of energy and the body's 
attitude, Freud did not simply render the intensity of pleasure 
relative and subjective, but rather he invented intensity as 
inextricably and irreducibly happening in embodiment, as singularly 
taking place in action. Furthermore, by inserting the dimension of 
"a given period of time" Freud performed a most decisive, 
Bergsonian move of reversal: he substituted for the spatial 
relation between subject and the event, the temporal relation of 
two internal psychic states - as quantities of excitation. In this 
single stroke he invents affect as the movement, which envelops 
an external relation in internal differentiation. 
Although Freud did not extend his argument in the 
direction of time, there is an important consequence following 
his movement of reversal. It implies that although we are 
immediately related to the world, we cannot have a pure 
objective knowledge of the world as it is in-itself. The reason is 
precisely that we are immediately implicated in the world. We 
only come to know the world (perceptually or cognitively) 
through experience; that is, through the impact all things have 
on us and our affective response. In other words, although we 
cannot identify the 'true' content of things we cannot doubt 
their real existence; we feel because there is a world. And 
moreover, we feel the world, which means that to feel is to 
implicate the world. 
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In our discussion of perception we argued that 
perception has no theoretical interest in the world (it does not 
aim to know the thing in-itself) but it always has a practical 
interest in that it is a problem posed by the environment to our 
action. In the same way that perception is a question to our 
motor activity, affective states (i. e. pleasure, pain etc. ) are 
internal acts of approval. The appropriateness of our action is 
always tested in the world. However, what is tested is not the 
correctness of our action in the way it fits into the form of the 
world. The world has no given form, it is a becoming. What is 
tested in reality is how an action on the world benefits the body, 
satisfying its needs and desires. 
Consequently, the results of our action are not only 
external but also internal. The release of neuromodulators 
making final decisions about our internal equilibrium (the vital 
state of the organism) and retrospectively strengthening the 
synapses thus facilitating repetition of the same action, proves 
this: that every action is caused by an outside and that it is 
oriented and expires to an outside, which provides for the body 
the platform on which to test its powers. But it is only the body 
that can affirm the test according to how the action and the 
world had infused its vital powers. Our actions, once performed 
would be forever lost, remaining external from the body, unless 
the body, could appropriate its action, making it its own, by 
recapitulating in pleasure the expenditure of energy. 
However, what is recapitulated is not merely the deed 
but rather the whole process of the action as it encounters and 
responds to the world; what is recapitulated is the expended 
energy. Consequently, pleasure is the way the body envelops 
the effects of an action and affirms it as its own. Pleasure or pain 
or any affective state, is the way in which an action is 
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irreducibly self-referential. Nevertheless, self-referentiality 
cannot be the aim of the action without annihilating both the 
power of action and of pleasure: the necessity of action which 
tends to an outside is the necessity of energy expenditure, and 
therefore self-referentiality can only pass through the world. It is 
only in this way that every action aims at the world but it finds 
its reason in life, and remains subordinate to what every single 
time is 'considered' by the body as vital, yet its affirmation 
renders it life, and makes it vital. 
Truth is not external, it is not internal, it is embodied. 
V. Affect: the rhythm of the body 
The body is not one thing but the co-existence of a 
multiplicity of temporalities, of different degrees of contraction 
and relaxation. This is a vertical co-existence organized 
according to different degrees of intensification and complexity. 
However, all levels of organization (i. e. the thalamocortical and 
the limbic systems, perception and consciousness, vital 
functions and emotions) are interconnected, whether in more or 
less intense circuits, but nevertheless in such a way that 
everything that happens at any point of the centre or its 
periphery resonates to the whole. All levels of organization are 
informed by the same dual tendency, which is constantly 
repeated, and at all levels it becomes split again in two 
movements -a centrifugal tendency to action, extension and 
externalization and a centripetal movement of reintegration and 
envelopment. 
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We described perception as the process, during which 
physical signals from the outside world are received by the 
sensory organs and translated into neuronal signals, which are 
then transmitted to the brain. Brain maps re-integrate the 
analyzed signal by co-ordinating their neuronal activity and 
firing in differential synchronization. Perception then happens in 
a process, which is the time needed for the neuronal signal to 
arrive to the brain. But also perception is a process, a differential 
synchronization rather than merely the release of a certain 
amount of energy. 211 The same goes with affection (pleasure, 
displeasure etc. ). But both perception and affection are 
processes and rhythms, only from the point of view of a body 
enveloping them. 212 This is then the persistent ambiguity that 
has constantly recurred in our account, namely why is the body 
a rhythm rather than energy since everything that we have 
described corresponds to patterns of energy distribution? 
For both Bergson and the neurosciences perception is 
oriented to action and its exigencies (i. e. utility). However, if 
perception was merely oriented to utility it would never invent 
different pathways, for different ways of perception. Once it 
had created them, and tested their utility and effectiveness, it 
would always follow the same path. Even if it created anew, it 
211 Our argument that perception is a process rather than merely energy 
release and that there is a significant difference between the two is also 
supported by the comparison of epilepsy and consciousness. Conscious 
experience is characterized by the occurrence of effective, long-lasting 
distributed connections among groups of neurons, and as such it is rendered 
possible by the discharge of neurons at high rates. Strikingly enough 
however, epileptic seizures also engage the brain in neuronal hyperactivity 
but are invariably associated with the loss of consciousness. There is a 
hypersynchronous discharge of neurons and neural states alternate every 
third of a second between unison firing and unison silence, as opposed to 
"the continuous switching among the billions of different patterns of firing 
observed in normal waking". G. M. Edelman and G. Tononi, Consciousness, 
supra, p. 71. 
212 Thus we have tried to emphasize the impossibility to expel the point of view. 
This is not the empirical point of view of a relative horizon, on the contrary it 
is a point of view which opens up all horizons. 
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would be only in order to shortcut the process. In other words, 
the invention of new circuits, the elongation and 
complexification of the process of perception are totally 
uneconomic events for the organism and do not serve utility. If 
utility was the law of life, creative evolution would never have 
taken place. Utility then, is indeed a law that should not be 
forgotten, but it is not the driving force. What is it then that 
urges the body to the luxury of this process? 
Neuroscience claims that the same input can produce 
similar outputs having followed very different processes. This is 
both true and not true. On one hand it confirms that life is a 
multiplicity of ways of living or that there are many pathways 
leading to the same end - invent your own, and even if it 
doesn't work, invent another one. But is that all? Does the 
process make any difference, apart from being just... a different 
process? Does it produce difference or is it only ornamental? 
Based on the example of perception and its 
neuroscientific description, we can discern only this difference: 
the process of perception or else, the amplitude of perception, 
consists in neuronal transmission in such a way that it opens up 
to a (potential) multiplicity of connections. In this way, 
depending on the openness of the body, that is the time it allows 
for the transmission - but probably a certain effort as well, 
although a non-psychological effort but maybe an effort of life 
or a will - it invents new and unpredictable circuits, 
connections, ways of perceiving. But it would be mere 
anthropomorphism to think that the body is concerned with 
inventiveness. So, we arrive to conclude only one consequence 
of the process of perception and of the inventiveness it entails: 
the production and distribution of neuronal energy in the body. 
Or rather, the production by distribution; the contagion of life. 
z 
ý' 
t 
251 
Consequently the process that is perception in no way 
has an aesthetic value, such as inventiveness. It has a vital value 
in the empowering of life and the generation of energy in the 
body, which becomes expended in action but is then enveloped 
in affection. Consequently, the affection of an action has 
enveloped the action as the amount of expended energy. With 
pleasure and affection actions do not expire in the world but 
recur to the body, which by expending energy it is also 
generating its life. This is then what renders the reality of the 
process indeed a reality rather than merely a succession of states, 
because it is not merely time lapsed but vital energy expended 
(or failed to). That is also why every process becomes 
irreducibly singular, as it is bound up with its spatio-temporal 
happening, and its reality is this spatio-temporal happening. 
But the body would have no passion were it only for this 
creative vital force unceasingly urging it to create more, to 
expend more and to expand. The body is not machinic, but is 
truly creative, and that is why it is not without its darkness; the 
singular passion that does not possess or own or create, but 
rather is possessed by it. This darkness is nothing else but the 
constant repetition of something that nevertheless does not 
appear, except as a constraint and takes up various guises: in 
one case, it is the number of cortical neurons which cannot 
increase after birth; 213 in another, it is the constraints of the 
genetic code; in a third, the internal criteria of value which are 
selected evolutionary but only as constraints; and finally the 
paradox of life itself as a tendency to regression. Is then the 
creativity of the body, its generation and transmission of vital 
W They are given at that moment and in the event of lesions the lost neurons 
cannot be replaced. Moreover, development of the brain and the nervous 
system is not the only tendency but it is also countered by regressive 
phenomena. Redundancy and regression is the natural tendency of the body. 
See: J: P. Changeux, supra, p. 202 and pp. 216-219. 
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energy an expression of its constant battle against its own 
natural condition, its mortality? Is the adventure of the living 
body that of a constant effort to overcome itself? 
In an imaginative essay, Roger Caillois suggested that the 
instinct of self-preservation and distinction is a luxury on the 
part of the organism, and alongside it, a dark process of 
"depersonalization by assimilation to space" is taking place -a 
tendency to exteriority and matter. He calls this "a sort of 
instinct of renunciation that orients [the creature] toward a mode 
of reduced existence, which in the end would no longer know 
either consciousness or feeling - the inertia of the elan vital". 214 
However, the penetrating insight of this essay, its 
beautiful darkness, does not consist in the revelation of such an 
instinct but rather in something that the author never explicitly 
tells us, a haunting idea that risks itself as unsaid. Caillois's 
argument is driven by the problem of distinction (or its 
opposite, assimilation) as posed in the relation between the 
organism and its surroundings and clearly observed in certain 
animals' and insects' habit to develop a bodily organ or to make 
the whole body itself similar to their environment in order to 
imitate it. Isn't it this the whole problem of creation as real 
becoming? Not how one creates something similar, by imitating 
externally, but rather how one creates something similar only by 
herself becoming it affectively. In the course of his discussion 
Caillois will attribute this tendency to "the instinct of 
renunciation", a regressive tendency of the elan vital to become 
matter. This is his thesis, but isn't it rather something that he 
doesn't say that reverses his argument? 
214 R. Caillois, "Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia", translated by John 
Shepley, in October: The First Decade, 1976-1986, eds. Annette Michelson, 
Rosalind Krauss, Douglas Crimp and Joan Copjec (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts/London: The MIT Press, 1988) p. 74. 
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When the animal imitates its surroundings it does not 
die, quite the opposite. Although, as he rightly points out, 
mimicry is a much greater phenomenon that cannot be reduced 
to a defensive or offensive mechanism, in the end it has to 
benefit the life of the animal in some way, and that is also why it 
has been evolutionary selected and survived. Consequently, we 
need to draw a different conclusion from the essay, namely that 
it is an instinct of renunciation that somehow informs or urges 
the activity of mimicry. In other words, it is always a death that 
conditions the abyss of true creation. It is only then that creation 
at the moment of the most intimate resemblance ceases to be 
something similar, and becomes instead the affirmation of an 
imperceptible and decisive distinction. 
But how are the two tendencies related in a single body? 
The living installs itself, in a single stroke, as this ambiguous 
singularity: the clinch of life as a force of expansion, to its own 
caesura. The body is not constituted as a polarity of two 
antithetical tendencies, nor as a dialectic which overcomes itself 
in synthesis. The body is a rhythm developing in perceptions, 
enveloped in affections and enveloping its affect, the singular 
clinch. It constantly risks and loses itself in action, regains its 
energies and recreates itself in affection, and in every moment it 
is re-living its own passion, that by which it is possessed and 
which it will not possess but it has a chance - this life - to 
become. 
Kafka wrote: "[t]here is goal, but no way; what we call 
the way is only wavering". 215 The body is a bounded surface, it 
has a limit, and the fact that it is not determined in advance but 
only in experience indicates precisely that finitude is not given 
215 Franz Kafka, "Reflections on Sin, Pain, Hope and the True Way", in The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces, trans. Willa Muir and Edwin Muir (London: Secker and Warburg, 1946) p. 145. 
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as a content of experience but rather as its form. Indeed finitude 
as boundedness is already inscribed in the principles of energy: 
neuronal signals do not extend themselves, they transmit 
themselves in firing. It is transmission that opens up infinite 
ways for the body to create its pathways, that is, its modes of 
affection and action in the world, different degrees in which it 
can generate and expend its vital powers. The process of life is 
not a procession to death, not really a gradual process of dying, 
but rather it is the process in which the living creature by 
inventing its pathways strives to make the mere form of its 
existence, its own creation and will; to create the singular reality 
of its passion. 
255 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis has addressed the problem of art in modernity 
identified as the separation of form and content, which opened 
up an incommunicable gap between art and the viewer, art and 
society, and between art and life. Art's incommunicability is or 
had previously been expressed in the doctrine of autonomy, 
which reified art into the perception of beauty, fetishized it in 
the form of the museum-object and ultimately commodified it 
following the demands of a continuously expanding art market. 
Consequently, the standard modernist demand for art's 
autonomy has resulted in a greater heteronomy where art has 
become subsumed to the institution and its power for 
validation. 
Nevertheless, the secularization of art, (as the separation 
of beauty from transcendent truth) is an irreversible process; it 
is contained in the general movement of secularisation, and it is 
this separation of the physical from the metaphysical that has 
founded the modern era. This separation has inherited a series 
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of dualisms and, once established, could only account for the 
mode of communication between the split terms, as the activity 
of a subject and the passivity of an object. This is not only a 
problem of power relations and established hierarchies, but is 
also one of validation and authority of the active term itself. 
Nietzsche's 'death of God' and Freud's discovery of the 
'unconscious', have shaken, if not collapsed, the ground of 
criteria for judgment, morality or truth and the guarantee of an 
autonomous, active self. 
The haunting problem of modernity is how could one 
account for an immanent absolute? This question does not 
simply address the necessity to re-enchant the world from its 
state of objecthood, but is intricately related to the possibility of 
inventing immanent criteria for judgment, and reasons for 
action other than mechanistic, external causality. Art and 
aesthetic experience constitute an exemplary field for the 
consideration of this problem, only because the judgment of 
beauty is one that does not follow objective rules. And yet it 
resists being merely an arbitrary, contingent and subjective 
judgment; it aspires to reclaim a ground - this time, that of 
subjective universality (Kant). In this thesis we have attempted to 
show that this is a kind of groundless ground, perhaps the 
groundless basis of a rhythm of the body, of affect and of the 
felt. 
Following Bergson and Deleuze we have aspired to give 
an immanent account of 'what is art? '; or rather, we have 
envisaged the plane of immanence as modernity's given and, 
following their theories, we have tried to think of the possibility 
of difference, or of the absolute, under these conditions. Bergson 
conceived in duration the idea of internal difference (as 
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opposed to ontological difference) and Deleuze created the 
plane of immanence as difference and repetition; we called it 
rhythm. Since difference is not simply added to repetition but is 
enveloped and enveloping in it, we defined rhythm as the mode 
of enveloping the caesura (difference). 
In the plane of immanence things (both animate and 
inanimate) are intensities or rhythms. Intensities differ in 
degrees or in the way they envelop the caesura. Thus the 
inanimate, or matter, is that which infinitely relaxed is covered 
by the caesura, it has externalised it. The animate, however, is 
enveloping it; it does not fill it up, or suppress it, but on the 
contrary, it lets itself open to it, exposes and risks itself, and 
recovers. However, this is not an exposure to risk but an 
exposure to the risk of the will; for if the will is energetic rather 
than active this is because it entails self-forgetfulness. One does 
not simply let oneself go; one wills and is taken by the object of 
the will, to which one nevertheless strives to become equal. 216 
Compulsive rhythm, mechanic repetition, the seduction of 
matter... 'Make me an object! ' But mechanism betrays itself from 
within, and every repetition brings back the unequal and the 
power of the caesura or the condition of change. 
Works of art are intensities, indivisibles and wholes 
rather than assemblages of form and content or anything else 
(i. e. movement, in the case of cinema). Instead, form and matter 
are modalities in which we analyze the work of art. However, 
intensity is powerless in-itself; its power becomes activated at 
the encounter. Rhythm is the event of an encounter, where life 
happens - transmissibility. After art has been secularized, the 
work of art is powerless without the viewer; it is at the 
216 Thus to will is to challenge and render redundant the classical categories of object and subject. 
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encounter with the viewer where art is given a chance to live. 
But this is only because the encounter gives the viewer the 
chance to live. 
Beauty is judged immanently, that is without pre-existent 
criteria. Instead, it embodies the invention of new criteria. But 
do we 'judge' a rhythm? This is a judgment performed by the 
body itself, prior to us, ad hoc. There is no difference between 
the perception of an artwork or 'beauty', and the perception of 
an object, because in all cases it is the body that both receives 
and recognises external stimuli. This means that the body is not 
only passive in following the instructions of an active mind, but 
at all levels and modalities it is itself body and mind, activity 
and memory and it disperses itself and reintegrates. 
The openness of the body corresponds to the amplitude 
of perception that is, the time the body allows before 
recognition. However, this is not abstract time elapsed, but 
energy dispensed by the body or the generation of its life. It 
seems that perception of beauty and perception of an object 
differ only in the degree or the intensity of pleasure. Pleasure 
and affective states in general correspond to the body's making 
final decisions about the regulation of energy, and about its 
homeostasis; it is the way the body retrieves the outcome of its 
actions and envelops its expenditure. Thus, beauty is forced by 
an outside, or by the intensity of the encounter, which triggers a 
will - that is how it poses a problem. But if it is an intensity or a 
rhythm, then it has less to do with the object itself, as properties 
and qualities, and much more to do with our way of 
encountering it, that is how we have given time, energy and 
ourselves to it. In this case beauty is not our construction but we 
allow it to become in us. Rhythm means that we are media, 
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through which rhythm, as life, becomes transmitted and 
generated anew. 
In neurobiology, every repetition 'strengthens the 
synaptic connections' and therefore also acts retrospectively. 
Every affirmation of the event, every repetition of rhythm or 
every time we say 'yes', we affirm the work as a whole that is 
now and the whole of its past. It is a whole that returns in 
repetition, empowered, and therefore 'yes' does not only make 
it pass the test now, but it also gives it a chance to recur in the 
future. 
The idea of rhythm makes art an event of the body, not 
simply because it is perceived by the body, but because art gives 
itself as that fragility which will either be willed, experienced 
and felt all through the body, generating its life, or it perishes. 
In the plane of immanence and of rhythm, once there are no 
longer external criteria to 'measure' or to 'judge' actions, events 
and objects, it becomes clear that the impeccable test has always 
been a truth of the body. For the body itself as rhythm or as 
affect is the embodiment of a will or of a passion; how one wills 
is inseparable from how one is taken in willing. 
But mainly, rhythm is a call to participation and sharing; 
it cannot be in-itself but only gains its life at the encounter As 
such, it necessarily opens to a community. At our encounters 
one does not give or take something, but one is becoming in 
speaking, thinking or laughing, and one is therefore only giving 
oneself. The economy of energy is a non-linear economy of 
distribution which generates itself in transmission, rather than 
in reserve. This is not however, an abstract increase of energy 
but the generation of the life that we are. Although rhythm is 
never lost, it requires that it be repeated in the body, actualised 
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in memory, affirmed in dance and with it, not only the 
community of the past but also of the future to come. 
Art, rhythm and technology 
We have suggested the idea of rhythm as a response to 
the reification of art in modernity and we have let it unfold in 
the work of Theo Angelopoulos and Bill Viola in order to show 
how, through movement, film and video strive to touch the 
viewer in the creation of affects and bodily becomings. Film, 
video and new media constitute paradigmatic surfaces, in order 
to think and elaborate in concrete terms the notion of rhythm. 
This is not simply because these technologies incorporate 
movement but rather because they entail a profounder 
ambiguity, which moulds the life of our bodies; to think rhythm 
in these terms means to think the relation of art, technology and 
the body. 
When art adopts technology as its medium of expression 
it does not simply use it in order to facilitate the achievement of 
its aims (a photograph is not a better painting), but rather it 
aspires to invent for technology its own expression. That is, it 
aspires to redeem it for us and make it ours. 
Cinematic and video technologies differ profoundly in 
the way they incorporate time and relate to reality, and the 
consequences of this shift become most apparent with digital 
technology. While film creates time indirectly in the intervals 
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between frames, video materializes time in the electronic signal, 
and shifts the temporal paradigm from sequentiality to 
simultaneity. Digital technology shares with analog video the 
common conceptual basis of extending to the present - 
simultaneity. But it takes the spatialization of time further, since 
editing can now add in density without adding in length. 
Consequently, these technologies create a different metaphysics 
of time and alter the structure of experience by extending us to 
the present. In a paradoxical way, the extension to the present 
does not bring us closer to the real but on the contrary, it makes 
it redundant, as becomes apparent with the advent of digital 
technology and virtual reality. This appears as the threshold of a 
new distribution for the paradigm of experience. 
The consideration of the different ways various film- 
makers (Kar-Wai, Meirelles, Kiarostami etc. ) and video-artists 
(M. Abramovic, S. Neshat, D. Gordon etc. ) create rhythm would 
show how in the fragments of a suffocating extension to the 
present, one could retrieve and create a new possibility for 
affective experience. 
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